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INTRODUCTION 
In the world toddy the gctr l:'etween the ri<...t1 deveL-'..iec. c0-1ntrie. 
and the poor ur,aer-dl-'vf-' P' 
This has created much d"scu..,sion in recent years of the part 
which i n ternational capital movemen scan play in reducing these 
international differenceu by stimulatinr growth oF the poorer 
economies . 
Australia cannot be clas.,i ied c1s c1 "poor" country although 1ts 
growth has always been re3tricted by a lack of capital and a 
small population. Thus the greater part of Australia tas remained 
undeveloped through its history. However with the rapid i nFlow ot 
fore ign capital in the past decade, coupled with an ctctive immi-
gration policy, Australia ' s north and west are at present in the 
midst of great L1ctnF 
into Australia has le 
Th .., ~L.ct en 1n low uf tu e 1gn-01med cc1pi ta 1 
ec,nom1sts here to ask such questi >ns as 
"wha t is the effec .. 0f ~0reign inve::.tmen on the nr1tional e~0nomy?" , 
" should he level uf roreign ~nvestment be control.,_ed." , and 1f so, 
"what policy :::;hc,u_d •he govoernment adopt - cor. ~r0lli f! the 1 .f 1 
of new capital and the o tf Low o dividends or proFits?''. It :s 
questions such as these which h ve prompted the tollo~ing theoretical 
ana lysis of internd iond~ ldpital ~ovements. 
Traditional pure theory of rnter•nati-::inal trade :.s based on the 
assumption of perfect mobility of factor::. of produ~tion with1r each 
country and complete immc 'n li ty factors of prod cti0n between 
countries . The ea.,.. Lest trf:'ut )' of international capital movemE.>nts 
was in term~ of the transter payments - discussing specifica-ly 
the problems of raisin? tht nece..,sc1rv capital for thE:. transfer 
2. 
payment nd the effects o this transfer on the barter terms of trade . 
However , rece nt literature1 in the field of international trade has 
relaxed part of the raditiondl ass ump ions o include the movement 
of capital between countries. The term " interndtional capital move-
ments " has been defined to include only the movements of the factor 
of product ion , capital , in either the sense of foreign inves ment or 
imports of capital . This definition of international capital move-
ments will also be assumed in the following analysis . 
Almost all of the recent analyses 2 of international capital movements 
have assumed a static ramework . However , since capital itself is a 
dynamic concept , it would seem reasonable that any analysis of inter-
national capital movements would be more correctly carried out within 
a dynamic model . Thus the tallowing analysis is concerned with inter-
national capital movements within the context of optimal economic 
growth . The over-riding question of this analysis is , "wha policy 
should a country adopt regarding international capital movements if 
its aim is to achieve optimal economic growth?" 
A survey of the static analyses of international capital movements 
is presented in Cha ter I whilst Chap ers II and III survey the 
dynamic analyses. Chapter II considers purely descriptive models 
but Chapter III investigates the question in the context of optimal 
economic growth . 
The nature of international c..apital movements , when the term " inter-
national capital movements" includes only the movements of the factor 
of product ion capital , is considered in Chapter IV . fvlost of this 
l . For e xample Jones [13] , Kemp [16 to 20] Bardhan [7] 
2 . For example Jones [13_] , Kemp [16 to 20 ·1 
3 . 
discussion is centred around the question of mobility of capital inter-
nationally and the nature of the return payable on foreign borrowed 
capital. 
Chapters V, VI and VII consider he question of optimal economic growth 
when the international capital movemen takes the form of an inter -
national loan . Chapter V examines the effect of the assumption of 
restricted mobility of foreign capital on the borrowing country ' s 
optimal growth paths . This analysis is carried out under the con-
dition of a linear objective function. Then in Chapter VI the 
objective function is assumed to be non-linear by introducing the 
concept of diminishing marginal utility of consumption . Both 
Chapters V and VI include the assumption made by Bardhan [7] that 
the rate of interest payable on a foreign loan is a function of the 
amoun borrowed per head of the population in the borrowing country . 
From the discussion in Chapter IV it will be seen that this assumption 
is not realistic . Thus Chapter VII considers the question of optimal 
foreign borrowing when the more reasonable assumption is made that 
the rate of interest payable on an international loan is a function 
of the absolute size of the loan . 
Chapters VIII and IX discuss optimal economic growth when the inter-
national capital movements take the form of direct investment . 
Chapter VIII abstracts from explicit international trade by assuming 
that only one commodity is produced in the world economy . Inter-
national trade is then introduced explicitly , by assuming the exist-
ence of two goods in the world economy , in Chapter IX . 
The concluding chapter gives a comparison between international 
capital movements in the form of an international loan and those 
in the form of foreign direct investment . It also discusses the 
value of this work to economic theory in general . 
Chapter I 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
WITHIN STATIC TRADE THEORY 
Much of the discussion of international capital movements has been 
carried out within the static framework . The earliest discussions 
began with the "trans er problem" . As was noted in the Introduction 
the "transfer problem" was not concerned with the international 
movement of the factor of production capital but , as the effect of 
a transfer payment on the terms of trade does carry over into the 
analysis of real international capital movements , section I of this 
chapter contains a brief discussion of the "tra nsfer problem". 
The earliest of the modern analyses of he movement of the factor 
of production capital are examined in section II. All later 
theories on international capital movements can be explained in 
terms of two concepts which were developed in these early analyses . 
The first is the effect of international capital movements on the 
rate of return to capital invested in the country . This concept 
has been discussed by MacDougall [22] and Kemp [19] in their 
examination of the benefits and costs of private foreign investment. 
The second is the effect of international capital movements on the 
pattern of production and the terms of trade . This question was 
first considered by Johnson [12] and later it was extended by 
Amano [2]. Both these concepts will be discussed in section II . 
The recent gene~al theories on foreign investment within the static 
trade model which have been put forward by Kemp [16, 17 , 201 , 
Jones [13] , Nadel [26], Corden L9] and Rowan and Pearce [31] will 
4 . 
5 . 
be considered in section III . Jones and Kemp examine the case of 
full optimization in which the home country is free to adjust its 
commerical and fiscal policies so as to maximise its welfare . This 
"first best " case will be considered in part (a) of section II I . 
However , often the home country is not free to control both its 
terms of trade and its level of foreign inves ment . Thus the 
" second best" case in which the home country can only control its 
level of foreign investment has been discussed by Rowan and Pearce , 
Corden and Jones . This "second best" case will be considered i!"l 
part (b) of section III . 
As the analysis here and in all subsequent chapters is in terms of 
barter models it is assumed that markets including the "foreign 
transactions markets" are in equilibrium . If they were not , short-
run capital flows would be necessary to correct the disequilibrium 
and this is impossible in a barter model . 
I 
Economists have long discussed the effects of a transfer payment 
from one country to another on the terms of trade . Its long 
history is a clear indication of the difficulty they have had in 
reaching agreement on the proper analysis . The problem simply 
stated is to find what happens to the barter terms of trade when 
country A makes a transfer payment to country B. However despite 
this extensive history most economic theorists subscribe to what is 
called the "orthodox" doctrine : any increase in unilateral payments 
will probably shift the terms of trade against the paying country ; 
a ny reduction in its unilateral payments will probably shift the 
terms of trade in its favour . 
The debate between Keynes and Ohlin on the effects of a transfer 
6 . 
payment is well-known. Keynes argued that if country A made to 
country Ba unilateral payment then the terms of trade would turn 
against country A. In addition to the "primary burden" on country 
A of the direct payment , there would be a "secondary burden" as her 
export prices deteriorated relative to her import prices. Keynes ' 
analysis was in terms of price-elasticity . 
Ohlin adopted what is called the "modern view" . This took: in o 
account income effects and the purchasing power passing between he 
two coun+ries and concluded that no change in the terms of trade 
was necessarily implied by the transfer . Samuelson [36] interprets 
Ohl in ' s Theory 
3 
as follows. " The M3.rshallian international-trade-
offer curves of both countries are shifted in opposite directions, 
with t his important result : the implied qualitative effect on the 
terms of trade does not depend upon the price-elasticity of one 
offer curve alone , or on the price-elasticities of the two curves; 
rather the more crucially important parameters are the income-
elasticities or propensities in the two countries" . 
By the 1930 ' s the holders of the orthodox viewpoint had refined 
their analyses to take account of the mutual shifts of the o fer 
curves . They then concluded that a deterioration in the terms 
of trade of the paying country is not inevitable, but there is a 
strong presumption that the income-elasticities of the different 
goods in the different countries will be such as to create some 
deter ioration in the terms of trade. At the same time holders of 
the modern view admitted that a change in the terms of trade might 
take place but argued that it could be in either direction and 
3 . Page 279 
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that there was no presumption as to its direction . 
Samuel son [35 , 36] has carried out an exhaustive analysis of this 
effect on the terms of trade. In his first paper [36] he considers 
the problem with the assumption that transport costs are zero and 
that no impediments to trade or imperfections of competition exist. 
He conc l udes , in this case , that the orthodox presumption tha the 
terms of trade of the paying country will tend to deteriorate need 
not hold . In his analysis he has established for every case 
put forward in favour of the orthodox view , that somewhere in the 
chain of reasoning impediments to trade have been directly or 
indirectly considered. The crucial point of this analysis is that 
under the assumption of zero transport costs there is absolutely 
no localisation of demand and thus there can be no a priori correl-
ation between national patterns of production and tastes . Then in 
this case of zero transport costs it appears that Ohlin ' s view is 
correct . Namely , there is no presumption that the terms of trade 
will deteriorate rather than favour the paying country . 
However , in Samuelson ' s second paper [35], he finds that the exist-
ence of transport costs and impediments to trade may create a 
presumption that the terms of trade will move against the paying 
country but this presumption is still weak . 
I n the traditional theory of in ternational capital movements trans-
port costs are considered to be zero but the imposition of a tariff 
policy is permissible . From Samuelson ' s analysis above there is no 
clear cut solution regarding the effect of an international capital 
transfer on the terms of trade of the countries involved in the 
transfer . 
8. 
Johnson [12] and Mundell [25] have also considered the" ransfer 
problem" with the main aim of translating Samuelson ' s results into 
modern trade terms. Their discussions of the "transfer problem" 
have been carried out wi hin the standard two-country , two-food 
trade model . Under both the classical and the Keynesian assumptions , 
Johnson concludes that the movement in the terms of trade depends on 
whether the sum of the marginal propensities to import of the two 
countries exceeds or falls short of unity. On the other hand 
Mundell , assuming the classical assumptions, derives the additional 
result that the transfer payment causes a rise in the real income 
in the recipient country and a fall in the real income of the 
transferring country . This theory of transfer payment as presented 
by Johnson and Mundell is conventionally accepted by present day 
international trade theorists . However it should be noted that 
regarding the effect of an international capital transfer on the 
terms of trade , the solution depends on the comparison of he 
marginal propensities to import of the two countries and is thus not 
clear cut . 
II 
(a) The effects of international capital movements on the rate 
of return on capital 
MacDougall [22] and Kemp [16 , 19] have considered the benefits and 
costs of private foreign investment . MacDougall ' s analysis is 
concerned with the effects of foreign borrowing on the country's 
national revenue . Kemp , on the other hand , considers the benefits 
and costs to both the borrowing country and the lending country of 
private foreign investment . The costs and benefits of Kemp ' s 
analysis refer to the effects of foreign investment on the country ' s 
real income . 
9. 
The analyses are carried out under the strict assumptions of perfect 
competition , constant returns to scale, he absence of taxa ion and 
external economies and the independence of the erms of trade of 
international capital movements. It is also assumed here as well 
as in all the analyses to be discussed in this chapter that there 
exists two countries , two factors of production (labour and capital) 
and that international capital movements take place instantaneously 
without cost to either country. 
Any increase in the level of foreign investment reduces the marginal 
product of capital and thus the rate of return on capital in the 
borrowing country . Because the analysis is within the static frame-
work , the level of domestically-owned capital is constant . Therefore 
the total return to the borrowing country ' s capitalists falls but 
this loss is merely a redistribution of output to labour. The 
to al return on the increased level of foreign investment rises 
but the loss , through the reduced rate of return , on the original 
level of foreign investment goes now to the factor of production 
labour in the borrowing country. Therefore total real income in 
the borrowing country increases as a result of an increase in the 
level of foreign investment . 
MacDougall makes two further points in his analysis. The first is 
that the foreign capitalists will continue to invest abroad until 
the rates of return on capital in the two countries are equated . 
Secondly , he concludes that the level of foreign investment should 
be restricted by the lending country because the real income created 
by increased foreign investment falls short of that which would be 
created if the inves ment was made in the lending country by the 
proportion of the increased output which goes to labour in the 
borrowing country . It is these two points which Kemp discusses in 
10 . 
more detail in his analyses. 
The first of two conclusions made by MacDougall is discussed by 
Kemp in [19]. Because foreign capital flows into the borrowing 
country until the rates of return in the two countries are equal , it 
appears that the borrowing country should encourage further capital 
inflows until the rate of return on capital becomes zero . That is , 
it appears that the borrowing country should subsidize foreign 
investment so that the inflow of foreign capital will continue until 
the net benefit to the borrowing country is reduced to zero. 
Kemp discusses this possibility by maximising the real income of 
the borrowing country subject to the condition that the net rates 
of return i n both countries are equal . He derives that it is always 
optimal for the borrowing country to tax capital earnings. 
This result can be explained as follows. Assume initially hat the 
capital stock owned by the two countries is distributed freely 
between them so as to make the rates of return on capital equal . 
If the borrowing country imposes a small tax on capital earnings 
then the gros~ rates of return in the two countries are forced 
apart by the amount tf2 ' , where t is the tax rate and f 2 ' is 
the marginal product of capital in the borrowing country. This 
results in an outflow of foreign capital until the net rates of 
return are once again equated. Because the total capital stock 
invested in the borrowing country has decreased , outp t has also 
decreased. Then the borrowing country's real income is affected by 
two forces - an increase in real income resulting from the taxation 
policy and a decrease in real income resulting from the reduced 
output . The optimal taxation policy will then be such as to balance 
these two opposing forces . 
11. 
In Kemp ' s second paper [16] he considers the question of foreign 
investment from the point of view of the lending country. He 
analyses the case where the lending country is free to choose its 
terms of trade and the level of its private foreign lending so as 
to maximise its national welfare . These chosen levels of private 
foreign lending and terms of trade are then maintained by appropri-
ate fiscal and commercial policies. 
foreign investment has a depressing influence both on the price of 
the good to which the inves ment is directed and on the average 
physical productivity of the capital invested. The private investor 
is ignorant of both these influences and invests abroad until the 
value o the marginal product of capital is equated in both countries . 
But , from the national point of view, the optimal level of foreign 
investment is reached when the value of the marginal product at 
home is equated to the magnitude which is marginal to the curve of 
total earnings abroad. Then from Kemp's analysis it follows that 
foreign investment is always excessive and should be curbed via a 
tax on repatriated foreign earnings . 
In Kemp ' s andlysis he as~umes that earnings on foreign investment 
are subject both to the tariff , because foreign earnings are 
repatriated in the form of goods , and then to a tax because they 
are earnings on foreign investment. Then the tax imposed is the 
optimal derived tax minus the optimal tariff imposed on goods. The 
optimal tariff is always positive. Theretore Kemp discovers that 
the optimal tax imposed on oreign earnings can be either positive , 
negative or zero. But it is unnecessary to consider the problem in 
this way,particularly as it does not carry over into the real world . 
The optimal derived tax is always positive which is in agreement with 
the conclusions drawn by MacDougall [22] and later by Jone~ [13]. 
12 . 
(b) The effects of international capital movements on the pat ern 
of production and the terms of trade 
Johnson ' s pioneering work [12] on the effects of international 
capital movements on the pattern of production and the terms of 
trade is well known. His analysis is carried out within the two-
country , two-good , two-factor of production model with both the 
countries (1 and 2) incompletely specialized in the production of 
the two goods (A and B) . Country l ' s natural export is good A 
which is the capital-intensive good while country 2's natural export 
is good B which is labour-intensive . 
Johnson considers the effect of an act of foreign investment by 
country 1 in country 2 on the world pattern of production for given 
terms of trade in order to infer what change in the terms of trade 
is necessary to restore international equilibrium. This movement 
of capital in the form of foreign investment gives rise to both a 
short-run and a long-run transfer problem . In the short-run the 
movement of capital from country 1 to country 2 would require the 
expenditure of part o country l ' s current income in a different way 
than it otherwise would have been spent . In the . long-run the 
international flow of interest or dividends from country 2 to 
country 1 would result in a different pattern of expenditure than if 
the income (dividends) were retained in country 2 . In both cases 
the transfer payment will turn the terms of trade in favour of the 
country for whose export good demand is increased as the result 
of the transfer. From the discussion of this short - run transfer 
problem in section I , there is no presumption that the terms of 
trade will turn in favour of one country or the other . But as far 
as the long-run transfer is concerned , if it is assumed that capital 
is invested abroad by the country whose income per head is higher , 
the terms of trade will tend to move in favour of the investing 
13 . 
country . That is , under Johnson ' s assumption above, the transfer of 
i nterest or dividends from country 2 to country l would end to 
t urn the terms of trade in favour of country 1 . 
Then ignoring the short-run ransfer problem , the act of foreign 
i nve stment has the same effec as a decumulation of capital in 
country 1 , capital accumulation in country 2, accompanied by a transfer 
of i ncome from country 2 to country 1 . The decumulation of capital 
i n country l will reduce country l ' s real income and thus reduce its 
demand for imports whilst its output of the labour-intensive good is 
i ncreased . This change in the pattern of production is determined 
by the Rybczynski Effect [32] which shows that , for ~iven terms of 
tr ade , if one of the factors of production is increased then the 
output of the good which is intensive in the use of that factor of 
production will increase also . That is , country l ' s own production 
of its imported good rises and thus its demand for imports falls . 
Thus , other things being equal , country l ' s terms of trade would 
tend to improve . 
Similarly , country 2 ' s demand for imports will fall because its pro-
duction of its imported good will increase by more than its i ncrease 
in total output (via the Rybczynski E feet again) . Thus , other 
things being equal , country 2 ' s terms of trade would tend to improve . 
Apart from the effect of the long- run transfer of dividend payments 
on the terms of trade , foreign investment by country l reduces the 
level of foreign trade below what it otherwise would be . But , 
because it reduces demand for imports of both countries , its effect 
on the terms of trade might be ei her favourable or unfavourable to 
country 1 , the lending country . 
14 . 
Johnson examines this effect on the terms of trade by considering 
the effect of foreign investment on the world demand and supply of 
the capital-intensive good A at constant prices . 
In the case of forei gn direc investment under competi ive conditions , 
the return payable on foreign investment is equal to the marginal 
product of capital in country 2 . Therefore all the increase in 
output in country 2 due o the foreign investment will accrue as 
income to country 1 . The total change in the demand for good A due 
to the act of foreign investment will therefore be determined com-
pletely by the above increase in country l ' s real income . As part 
of this increase in country l's real income increases its demand for 
good A, the consumption effect of foreign investment is favourable 
to the lending country , country 1 . 
On the production side, the effect of foreign investment is favour-
able or unfavourable to country 1 according as the decrease in 
country l's output of good A is greater or less than the increase 
in country 2 ' s production of good A. Although it is more likely 
that total production will decrease and thus turn the terms of trade 
in favour of country 1 , no general statement can be made unless more 
information on the production conditions is given. 
Amano [2] takes Johnson ' s analysis further by considering the effect 
of factor-intensity reversal on the analysis. If good A above is 
assumed to be capital-intensive in country 1 but labour-intensive 
in country 2 a movement of capital from country 1 to country 2 will 
reduce the output of good A in country 1 and in country 2 (via the 
Rybczyns ki Effect [32]) . That is , the total production of good A 
falls whilst demand rises. Therefore the terms of trade will turn 
in favour of country 1 . Amano concludes that , in general , if there 
is a factor-intensity reversal between the lending and the borrowing 
15 . 
country , international capital movements will turn the terms of 
trade in favour of or against he lending country depending on 
whether its export good is capital-intensive or labour-intensive . 
• 
III 
In section II the effects of international capital movements on 
(a) the rate of return to capital and (b) the pattern of production 
and the erms of trade have been discussed . These two concepts 
can be used to explain the recent theories of international capital 
movements . 
In part (a) the "first best" case or the full optimisation case 
will be discussed . In this case the home country can adjust both 
the level of in ernational indebtedness and the terms of trade 
with the aim of maximising its national welfare . In part (b) the 
"second best" case will be considered. In this case it is assumed 
that the home country is not free to adjust the terms of trade and 
can only attempt to maximise its national welfare by adjusting the 
level of international indebtedness . 
(a) The "first best" case 
Kemp [20] and Jones [13] consider international capital movements 
within the standard two-country , two-commodity trade model in which 
the factors of production are capital and labour . The factor of 
production, labour, is internationally immobile while capital is 
assumed to be completely mobile between countries. Both Kemp and 
Jones are concerned with static analysis; therefore there is no 
growth in the supplies of factors of production. That is , in each 
country the labour supply is constant and net savings are zero . The 
factor markets are considered perfectly competitive with full employ-
ment of factors and constant returns to scale . It is also assumed 
16. 
that there is no retalidtion by a country against a restrictive 
trade policy introduced by the other country . 
The aim of the home country is to adopt whatever commerical and 
fiscal policies it chooses so as to maximise its national welfare. 
That is, it maximises its welfare with respect to the commodity 
terms of trade p* and the level of international indebtedness 
K . Movements in both p;', and K can change the home country ' s 
real income in two ways - directly and indirectly. A favourable 
movement in the relative price of any commodity or factor exported 
by the home country increases the home country ' s real income 
directly . lf the home country is a lender of capital , a change in 
the level of international indebtedness will have a direct effect 
on the home country's real income which will be favourable or 
unfavourable depending on whether the rate of return on capital in 
the foreign country is greater than or less than tha on capi al 
in the home country. Jones has also shown explicitly that p;', ar d 
K affect real income indirectly by changing the rate of return on 
capital in the foreign country r;', and the oreign country's excess 
demand for the home country's natural export good (good2) E·'· 2 
That is, r* - r*(p*,K) and E;', - E:', ( p:', K) 2 - 2 ' • 
Jones derives the following expression for the change in the home 
country's real income y 
dy - {E~dp~- + Kdr~-} + {(p:'--p)dE~ + (r:Lr)dK} . 
It should be noted that if there is no interference in the goods 
and factor market~, p* - p and r* - r so that the second bracket 
b>come, zero. However with positive taxes and tariffs the home 
country ' s real in ome can be increased by the movement of goods and 
factors abroad for which the world price and rate of 1eturn exceeds 
17. 
that at home. 
The nature of the functional relationships r :': - r:':(p:': , K) and 
E; = E~ (p:':, K) is important in determining the total effect of a 
change in the commodity terms o!" trade or• a change in the level of 
international indebtedness on the home country ' s real income. These 
functions are dependent on the degree of specialization in the 
foreign country's production. Consider firstly r * = r :': (p 1: , K) 
If the foreign country's production is incomple ely specialized , 
r* is determined uniquely by p* and not by K. Then the effect 
of a change in the commodity terms of trade on the return on capital 
in Lhe foreign country depends on the factor-intensity ranking of 
the industries - the Stolper-Samuelson Effect [34]. If the foreign 
country ' s production is completely specialized , the return on 
capital is its marginal physical product and hence depends only on 
K . Therefore , in general , r :': - r*(p:':,K) so that 
ctr:': y:': dp·': ~·: dK 
=- T 
r·': p•': K 
pi: a r·': K a .,. 
where yi: and o··· 
r'" 
-
·'· a p:': 
.. 
=- r ~': ai< r ..
and either y-:: or o,': equals zero. 
Consider the relationship E3 = E~ (pi:, K) . For given amounts of 
foreign indebtedness and fixed resources , the relationship between 
E·'· and p·': is given by the foreign offer curve for imports with 
2 a E:': 
the elasticity of demand along this n-:: 
2 
_k· For curve = 2 ap:': E·'· 
2 
given terms of trade the relationship between E·'· and 2 
K depends 
on the pattern of specialization in the foreign country. If pro-
duction in the foreign country is completely specialized in the 
first good , a change in K does not affect foreign production of 
the second good but 1 t does affect the demand because an increase 
18. 
in the level of foreign investment reduces the rate of return on 
invested capital r* , thus reducing the 
aE;': 
2 the foreign country . Therefore = 
burden of 
m~': 
~ r;':6:': 
p :': 
indebtedness in 
where m:': 2 is 
the marginal propensity to consume the imported good in the oreign 
country. 
If the production is incompletely specialized , changes in foreign 
investment at constant terms of trade do not change the return on 
capital and thus cannot affect the oreign country ' s real income 
or demand for the second good . But production is affected because, 
from the Rybczynski Effect [32], an inflow of capital at constant 
prices raises production o the capital-intensive 
Samuelson ' s reciprocity 
ax;': £ :': 
ax;': 
2 _ ar:': heorem [3 3 J , a'K - ap :': 
good. Using 
and thus 
2 = 2 ·'· .,. h aK K JJ " Y" , w ere X;': 2 is the foreign country ' s output of good 
Kr :': 
2 and µ :': = E;p :': 
Then the total change in 
given by 
due to changes in p:': and K is 
dE ;': 
2 
d ~ dK 
= £ :
2
': { 11:
2
': ~.:· - µ:':[ rrf': 6;': + y;': J -} 
P" 2 K 
with one of tne coef icients of dK equal to zero. 
Substituting for dE;': 2 and in the equation for dy , the 
total change in home welfare produ ed by a change in p:': and K 
is given by 
dy = _iy_ dp;': + ~YK dK 
op;': a 
where ay - E;':{1 + µ ;':y:': + p;':-p 11;': } 
ap;: - 2 p;': 2 
and cly - [l + (m;': + L m;': )<5:': - p ;Lp y;;Jr1: aK - l p:': 2 p·': - r . 
It should be noted that Jones has preferred to discuss the case of 
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incomplete specialization in the foreign country in terms of the 
effect of the factor-intensities in preference o the Rybczynski 
ax:·: 
Effect . But , by Samuelson's reciprocity 
so these two effects are duals . 
heorem [33] 2 ar:': = ~ ap:': 
The home coun ry is free to choose its tariff and tax policies so 
as to maximise its welfare. That is, by equating and 
to zero the home country de ermines its optimal tariff and op imal 
tax policies respectively. The resultinf optimal policies depend 
on the pattern of specialization of production in the countries . 
Therefore the various patterns of production will be considered one 
at a time. 
The foreign country ' s production completely specialized 
I n this case , the rate of return on capital in the foreign country 
is a function of K only and not of p:': . Then the model reduces 
to the early Kemp model discussed in section II above . In this 
case it is optimal for the home country to levy a positive tariff 
on goods and a positive tax on capital flows whether it is a net 
lender or borrower of capital . 
The foreign country ' s production incompletely specialized 
The rate of return payable on capital in the foreign country is now 
a function of p:': only - assuming that any change in the level of 
international indebtedness is small so that it will not bring about 
complete specialization of production in the foreign country , in 
which case r'': then becomes a function of K . 
Assume initially that there is free trade in goods and unrestricted 
movement of capital. Then 
ay 
reduces to E:':(l + µ :':y :':) That a p:': 2 
is , a movement in the terms of trade changes the real income via 
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its effect on r* This effect of p* on r * depends on the 
technology of the foreign country ' s production. If the sign of 
ay 
ap* is positive then the home country ' s income will increase as 
a result of an increase in p*. That is, it is optimal for the 
home country to impose a tariff so as to increase the terms o 
trade and thus increase its real income . 
Recalling that µ :': is the ratio of foreign capital earnings to 
foreign export earnings Kr :': (£:':p:': ) , µ :': is positive if the home 
2 
country is a lender of capital and negative i the home country is 
a borrowing country. Also µ* will be larger the more important 
foreign capital earnings are to the home country as a source of 
income. The sign of y* depends on the factor-intensity of the 
foreign country ' s production of good 2 (the home country ' s natural 
export good). If good 2 is labour-intensive y:': < 0 but if good 2 
is capital-intensive l < y* - from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
[34]. 
The home country's optimal policy is to impose a tariff in all cases 
except 
(i) when th~ home country is primarily a lender of capital and 
the foreign country ' s production of good 2 is labour-
intensive , and the symmetrical case 
(ii) when the home country is primarily a borrower of capital 
and good 2 is capital-intensive abroad . 
In these two cases is negative and 1t is optimal for the home 
country to subsidize exports of good 2. 
The optimal tax policy of the home country is derived by equating 
a ~·:_ 
- [l + .E...___E_ y:': Jr:': - r to zero. Because the for•eign country is aK p :': 
incompletely specialized, the return on capital abroad r* varies 
only with a change in the commodity terms of trade via the foreign 
. 
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technology . Therefore the optimal tax policy of the home country 
which links r and r* via r = r*(l + t) , depends on its tarif 
policy and the technology of the foreign country . 
Taking ½ - 0 and r = r *(l + t) together , the optimal tax t R- is 
p* -p Then the optimal is positive if and if the tariff -- y* tax only p* 
is positive and the foreign production of the home country ' s export 
good is capital-intensive or the home country subsidizes its commod-
ity exports and the foreign production of this good is labour-
intensive . 
Then the possible combinations of optimal tax and optimal tariff 
when the home country is a lender of capital are : 
(i) Both the optimal tariff and optimal tax are positive . This 
occurs if and only if the favourable movement in the commodity 
terms of trade produces a favourable movement in the return 
on capital abroad. That is , if the foreign production of the 
home country ' s natural export is capital-in tensive . 
(ii) The optimal tariff will be positive but th e capital exports 
should be subsidized if foreign production of the home country ' s 
export good is labour-intensive and the home country is primar-
ily a commodity exporting country . That is , capital exports 
are encouraged so as to increase the foreign production of the 
good with a relatively higher value at home . 
(iii) The optimal tax will be positive and the home country will 
subsidize its commodity exports if foreign production of this 
export good is labour-intensive while the home country is 
primarily a lender of capital . By subsidizing commodity exports 
the return on capital in the foreign country will rise . But 
capital exports are discouraged because the good whose pro-
duction is increased abroad as a result of the capital flows 
has a relatively lower value at home . 
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The case in which the home country is a borrower of capital is 
symmetrical. Therefore the optimal tax and optimal tariff can be 
both positive and negative but it is never optimal to subsidize 
both capital exports and commodity exports . These results then 
differ from those of Kemp [20]. In his analysis, Kemp fails to take 
account of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [34] which shows that if 
y* is positive then it is also greater than unity. This error led 
to Kemp's paradoxical result that both the optimal tax and the 
optimal tariff can be negative . 
Jones has considered only cases in which at least one of the two 
countries is completely specialized as the result of capital flows 
induced by the home country's tariff and tax policies . He realize:! 
that if both countries were incompletely specialized it would only 
be by chance that the optimal tariff and optimal tax policies would 
satisfy the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [34]. 4 He therefore con-
cludes that production in at least one country must become completely 
specialized. Thus the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem no longer holds and 
the system is not constrained by the magnification effect (y* > 1 , 
if production of good 2 is capital-intensive). Nadel [26] disagrees 
4. Both countries are incon~letely specialized in production. There-
fore in each country the ra e of return on capital and the country's 
price ra io are linked by the country's technology. When the home 
country levies the optimal tariff,the price ratios in the two 
countries are known and separated by the tariff . The rate of return 
on capital in each country is then deter•mined via its technology. 
It will only be by chance that these two rates of return on capital 
will be separated by the optimal tax. That is, it is only by chance 
that the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is satisfied. 
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with Jones ' conclusion on the grounds that market forces will not 
take the system to complete specialization in at least one country 
and that incomplete specialization of production remains in both 
countries but that the pattern of trade changes . 
Nadel considers the effects of interferences such as taxes and 
tariffs on Mundell ' s theory of perfect substitutability of goods 
flow with factor movements when production in both countries is 
completely specialized . Mundell [24] showed that in the absence of 
trade impediments and provided the production functions were the 
same in each country , factor movements can generate exactly the same 
results as free trade in goods with factor immobility - the only 
differences being that capital is distributed differently between 
countries and that there is a continuous repatriation of foreign 
earnings to the lending country in place of the continuous two way 
flow of goods . Also , with mobility of the factor of production, 
capital , no barter trade takes place between the two countries as 
imports are paid for out of foreign earnings and not by an equivalent 
amount of exports of final goods . Then apart from the repatriation 
of foreign earnings the two countries are self-sufficient . 
Using these generalized results Nadel [26] shows that the solution 
to the incompatibility between incomplete specialization and tariff 
effectiveness , as recognised by Jones [13] , is that incomplete 
specialization is retained but that the difference in relative 
prices between the two countries is less than the tariff protection . 
That is , it is not always certain that a tariff which is levied is 
automatically effective . Then firstly , the good which was imported 
before the tariff was levied may cease to be imported afterwards -
that is , the pattern of trade may change under the influence of 
tariffs , taxes and capital mobility , and secondly , even if the good 
continues to be imported subject to the tariff , this necessitates 
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absolute prices of the imported good differing in the two countries 
by the amount of the tariff but does not necessitate relative goods 
prices differing by that magnitude . 
The introduction of factor mobility into the case where both countries 
are incompletely specialized does not increase he optimization 
potential a country has when it seeks to interfere with barter goods 
trade under conditions of capital mobility, but merely complicates 
attempted interference in the barter goods trade. Nadel then makes 
no attempt to find the optimal tariff and optimal tax applicable 
for this case where both countries are incompletely specialized . 
(b) The "Second Best" case 
Jones [13] , Ravan and Pearce [31] and Corden [9] have considered 
the "second best" case in which the home country aims to maximise 
its real income or national welfare by controlling only the movement 
of capital internationally. Often in the real world , a country is 
not free to adjust its tariff policy (for example , as the result 
of an international tariff agreement) so the "second bes " cases 
are important and probably much more realistic than the "first best" 
ca::.es. 
The tariff policy is assumed to be given and is non-optimal . For 
simplicity it is assumed that the tariff rate is held at zero level . 
That is, free trade in commodities is guaranteed . 
In the full optimisation case of part (a) above the expression Jones 
derives for the change in real income is 
where 
dy = ay d ··· + ay dK 
ap1: P" aK 
= E;':{ l + µ;':y;': + p;Lp n ;': } 
2 p;': 
25. 
In this "second best" case, the change in real income as the result 
of a change in the level or international indebtedness, assuming 
initially that free trade in goods and unimpeded capital flows 
exist , is given by 
where 0~ 1 = E~ ( 1 + µ:':yx) and 
~ = o ,':r :': 
oK 
That is, a change in the level of foreign investmen , K in general 
alters real income directly , as of given commodity terms of trade 
and indirectly, through requiring a change in these terms of trade . 
p,': is the price ratio which clears the world markets, and in general 
there exists a different equilibrium p:': for each value o K 
Then 
dp)': 
is determined by the change in p,': necessary as the dK 
result of the change in K o clear the world market for good 2 . 
That is, 
dp;': 
is determined from d(E 2 + E,':) = 0 dK 2 
The factors changinf E2 are given in the following equation : 
dp m2 dK 
= E,'( { fl - + ~E~ dy + µ ~'cy -} 2 p p 2 K 
An increase in p must decrease E2 via the substitution effects 
in consump ion and production . The second term is the increase in 
E2 as a result of any increase in real income through m2 , the 
home country ' s marginal propensity to consume good 2 . Finally , any 
change in the supply o gocx:l 2 as the result of capi al flows produces 
a change in E2 . By Satmlelson ' s reciprocity theorem [33] the change 
in production at constant home prices is given by y . 
A similar expression can be obtained for the oreign country . Since 
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initially prices and rates of return are equal in the two countries 
- dy* = dy a nd dp = dp* because the tariff is assumed to be fixed 
at zero level , then d(E 2 + E~) is given by 
= { dp :': D2~ - 6 - ~ + µ*[(y - y*) + (m2 P" 
m:': )81: J dK} 
2 K 
where 6 = - {~ + ~* + (m - m* )(l + µ*y* )} 2 2 2 2 
Assuming that commodity markets are stable 
cl(E 2 + E~) 
a p :: , for given 
K , is negative . That is , the coefficient of dp:': is negative , or 
E*6 is positive . 2 
Then equating d(E2 + E~) to zero 
dp :': 
dK = 
r ·/: 
- {(y - y*) + (m2 - m:2~)8 * } . E:':6 2 
The total effect of a change in the level of foreign investmen t on 
the home country ' s real income is given by the followin~ equation 
which is derived by substituting the above expression for 
the equation for dy dK 
into 
This general equation can be used to determine the optimal taxation 
policy to be adopted in the free trade world . If , from an initial 
position of unimpeded capital flows , an increase in K increases 
y , foreign investment should be encouraged by a subsidy if the home 
country is a net lender and discouraged by a tax if the home country 
is a net borrower of capital . 
If the foreign country is incompletely specialized a nd the home 
country comple ely specialized in production the sign of he optimal 
tax on capital flows is identical to that of the full-optimisation 
case , although the process through which interference in the i nter-
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national low of capital affects the home country ' s real income differs 
in these two cases. 
Since it is assumed that free trade in goods is maintained , the direct 
effect of capital flows on the home country ' s income is zero . 
Capital flows can affect real income only via the indirec effect 
they have on the terms of trade. An increase in K will raise or 
lower p* depending on the factor-intensity of the production of 
good 2 in the foreign country . In his case 
Then this change in p:': will raise or lower the home country ' s 
real income. The direction of this change depends uniquely on the 
sign of E:': ( 1 + µ :':y:': ) • 2 If the home country is a lender of capital , 
real income will be raised by an increase in p:': unless the foreign 
country ' s production of good 2 is labour-intensive and the home 
country is primarily a lender of capital . Similar results are 
obtained for the case in which the home country is a borrower of 
capital. 
If the foreign country is completely specialized in production 
capital flows have both a direct and an indirect influence on the 
home country's real income. 1n the full optimisation case capital 
flows had only a direct effect on real income; therefore the 
additional indirect effect on real income (via its effect on p:': ) 
may produce different results. 
On this case J:•'· U " is non-zero. Therefore the determination of the 
effect of capital flows on the commodity terms of trade is more 
complicated than in the case of incomplete specialization abroad . 
Not only are pure supply effects involved , (y - y*) , which in 
this case reduces to y , but also the change in the rate of return 
on capital necessarily involves a transfer of real income from one 
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country to the other . This transfer of real income affects the world 
demand for goods if the marginal propensities to consume good 2 
differ between countries. From the discussion of the "transfer 
problem" above in section I , it is not clear in which direction the 
terms of trade will move . 
With the foreign country completely specialized in production , the 
total effect of capital flows on the home country ' s real income 
reduces to 
dy 
dK 
At unchanged terms of trade ~ = r ·': i5 .': aK This real income transfer 
affects p:': which further affects y . The net effect on real 
A ,,.. _,_ 
n2 + n2 
income , ignoring the supply effects y is - ( )r :': ~·:. This , /). 
effect must have the same sign as r :': o :': and will be larger or 
smaller than it depending on the direction in which the terms of trade 
move . However an increase in K also alters the world production 
of good 2 by an amount y as capital moves out of the home country . 
It is this effect on the world supply of good 2 which introduces 
the possibility that the optimal taxation policy in this case may be 
different from that of the full optimisation case . 
If the home country is a lender , J: •'· U " is negative and ignoring supply 
effects dy dK would be negative so that it would be optimal to tax 
capital outflows . But the imposition of a tax would bring capital 
into the home country and , at constant p* , increase the production 
of the capital-intensive good . If this good is good 2, y is positive 
and p·': tends to fall which would reduce the gains brought about 
by increasing r * If the terms of trade effect of the supply changes 
brought about by the change in K outweighs the beneficial effects 
of raising r~': via the imposition of a tax , it would pay the home 
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country to subsidize foreign investment . 
If the home country is also completely specialized y is unity . 
The above "paradoxical" result can be obtained if the home country 
is a lender but it is not possible when he home country is a 
borrower . A subsidy is optimal only if ~~ is ne~a ive which 
would require (~ 2 + ~~)8* to exceed uni y . However when the 
home country is a borrower his expression is negative so that the 
"paradoxical" result cannot occur . When he home country is a 
borrower it is optimal to impose a tax on foreign investment to 
lower he rate of return payable on the borrowed capital and to 
restrict world production of its export good . 
As discussed above in par (a) of his section Jones does not consider 
the case in which both countries are incomple ely specialized . 
Corden [9] and Rowan and Pearce [31] , however , do discuss this 
"second best" case. Corden considers the case in which the tariff 
is fixed above its optimal level for some industry and the resultant 
efficiency of a tax policy in controlling investment in this over-
protected indus ry. Rowan and Pearce , on the other hand examine what 
appears to be a much more realistic problem than that considered by 
Jones and Kemp. Instead of a tempting to reallocate world capi al 
optimally , Rowan and Pearce assume some new capital formation in the 
lending coun ry which is then lent abroad . Initially his act of 
foreign inves men is considered within the standard two-country , 
two-good , two-factor of production trade model . Then Rowan and 
Pearce introduce a third good into each country o the model . These 
two goods are assumed to be non-traded goods . 
In the standard two-good trade model Rowan and Pearce derive the 
following equation for he total change in the home country ' s 
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national welfare (W) resulting from this movement of capital 
abroad : 
where 
demand 
is the difference between the production x2 of and the 
for, the home country's export good (No.2) and p* is the 
terms of trade in terms of the price of good 1. 
Rowan and Pearce have chosen to examine the effect of foreign invest-
ment on the home country's welfare in terms of (a) the change in 
the terms of trade and (b) the change in the supply of goods abroad 
as a result of the foreign investment. In the two-good case this is 
the Rybczynski Effect but as Rowan and Pearce later extend the 
model to include non-tradedgoods , they prefer not to discuss the 
results in terms of factor-intensities. However , the analysis of 
the two-good case can perhaps be more clearly explained in terms of 
Jones' analysis which shows explicitly the Stolper-Samuelson Effect . 
(The Stolper-Samuelson Effect and the Ry bczynski Effect are duals.) 
From the Balance of Payments equation and the home country's budget 
constraint 
Total Demand 
by home country 
Total Production 
by home country exports 
+imports+ return on foreign investment 
i.e. D l t p~-D
2 
- x
1 
t p:',X
2 
- p:',X 2 - p~'-E3 t t•1 + r:',K , 
where M
1 
represents imports o+ good 1. Re-arran~ing the terms 
In Rowan and Pearce's notation 
I 
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Differentiating with respec to K 
Therefore he Rowan and Pearce equation reduces o 
dW dpl't _ 
dK = E~ dK 
Now 
Because the foreign country ' s production is incompletely specialized 
the level of foreign investment does not affect the rate of return 
on capital at constant prices , is zero . I should be noted 
tha t ari't ai< is the concept discussed in Kemp ' s early paper [19] . 
Therefore the effect of foreign investmen in this case can be 
explained in terms of the Stolper-Samuelson Effect and the terms of 
trade effect . 
From the discussion o Jones ' derivation of * above , 
Ei', 
ari't 2 , , ~ = - µieyH Therefore , in more explicit terms , the Rowan and 
ap ie K 
Pearce equation becomes 
dW ~ dK = E~ ( 1 t µi'cyi',) dK 
From Jones ' discussion of the effect of capital flows on the terms 
of trade , the sign of 
d ,., tr depends on the sign of (y - y i't ) • 
However , in this model the capital invested abroad is newly created 
capital so that its withdrawal from the home country has no effect 
on the home country ' s supply of goods . Thus y becomes zero and 
the sign of - yi', determines the direction of the movement in the 
terms of trade resulting from the investment of capi al abroad . If 
the foreign country ' s produc ion of good 2 is capital-intensive the 
terms of trade deteriorate bu if good 2 is labour-intensive abroad 
the terms of t~ade improve . Because the home coun ry is he lender 
I 
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of capital µ* is positive . 
Rowan and Pearce conclude that 
(a) if the home country ' s export good is capital-intensive abroad 
the terms of trade deteriorate and the home country ' s welfare falls 
as the result of investing the newly formed capital abroad . It is 
optimal in this case to levy a tax on capital flows out of the home 
country , 
(b) if the home country ' s natural export good is labour-intensive 
abroad the terms of trade improve and it is not clear whether the 
home country ' s welfare falls or rises . However , from the discussion 
above of the Rowan and Pearce problem in terms of Jones ' analysis , 
it is clear that it is optimal to subsidize capital flows unless the 
home country is a more important investor of capital abroad than an 
e xporter of good 2 (i . e . µ* large) in which case it is optimal to 
tax the capital flow from the home country . 
From the analysis of the more general model Rowan and Pearce are 
unable to make any conclusions regarding the change in the home 
country ' s welfare because it'is now not known how the production 
of the three goods in the foreign country will change as a result 
of the capital inflow . However as the analysis is entirely in terms 
of price-elasticities of demand , elasticities of supply and elastic-
ities of supply with respect to factor endowment changes, conclusions 
can be made for any given quantitative system . 
The above analysis of Jones and Kemp (part (a) section III) have 
been carried out within the static trade model . However in the 
dynamic frame work of optimal economic growth to be developed later , 
it will be seen that their conclusions drawn from the "first best" 
cases still hold . 
Chapter II 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL 
MOVEMENTS IN GROWTH THEORY 
In this chapter only the effects of international capital movements 
on the economic growth of a country will be considered . The question 
of optimal economic growth will not be discussed until the following 
chapter . 
Johnson [12] , Ball [S, 6], Massell [23] and Amano [l] consider the 
effects of international capital movements on he equilibrium growth 
rate of a single economy. Their analyses will be discussed in 
section I . In section II Johnson's extension of this analysis to 
the two country case will be considered. Discussions of the paths 
of capital accumulation and international debt which take the economy 
to the position of equilibrium growth are carried out by Hamada [10] , 
Oniki and Uzawa [28], and Kemp [18]. These discussions will be 
considered in section III. 
I 
Johnson [12] and Ball [SJ extended the Harrod-Damar growth model 
from the closed economy case to a two-country international economy 
so that conclusions could be drawn regarding equilibrium growth in 
an open economy. 
The Harrod-Domar growth model consists of two basic rela ions: 
(a) The investment required to employ existing capital fully is 
equal to a constant fraction of income saved multiplied by the 
capacity output of the existing equipment . That is , It= sYt. 
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(b) The increment to capacity output resulting from this investment 
is 
where k , the capital coefficient , is the constant ratio of capital 
to output and a , the output coefficient , is its reciprocal . 
From these two relations it follows that the rate of growth of 
investment , capacity and income which maintains full employment of 
the productive capacity is 
s 
r = = k = as . 
Then for consistency the model must assume that either population 
growth rate is at least r or that technical progress of a type 
that leaves the capital coefficient (k) unchanged is going on 
rapidly or steadily enough to prevent the capital stock from out-
growing the labour required to work it . It is also assumed that 
the price level is constant , that output is measured in units such 
that the price of a unit of output is one unit of currency and 
that units of currency are so defined that exchange rates are initi-
ally equal to unity . 
In the closed economy the only outlet for saving is investment . 
However , in the open economy imports as well as savings constitute 
leakages from effective demand , while exports as well as investment 
may fill the gap be ween domestic demand for and supply or home 
production at capacity output . Then the first equation of the 
Harrod-Domar model becomes 
where m is the constant fraction of income spent on imports and 
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Xt the current rate of exports . Then 
where is the country ' s current export surplus 
expressed as a fraction of its production . 
Then from these equations Johnson [12] draws the following conclusions : 
(a) If the proportional export surplus is falling over time , the 
equilibrium rate of growth rises over time . 
(b) By differentiating the above equation for rt 
dr xt (x - rt) dt - - a yt 
where x is the rate of growth of exports . Then if the rate of 
growth of e xports exceeds the equilibrium rate of growth , the latter 
is falling over time . 
(c) The equilibrium growth rate will be higher the higher the out-
put coefficient and the savings ratio and the lower the export surplus 
(or the higher the import surplus) as a fraction of total output . 
These results are dependent on the three simplifying assumptions : 
(a) that investment utilizes only domestic output, 
(b) that domestic production has no import content - imports are 
required only for consumption , 
(c) that trade surpluses or deficits are financed in a way that 
does not give rise to international interest payments - such as 
unilateral payments or movements of international reserves . 
Now, if the creation of new productive capacity requires a certain 
proportion of imported good s , the equation for the equilibrium growth 
rate becomes 
a xt 
rt = 1- m' ( s + m - Y t) 
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where m' is the fraction of investment expenditure spent on imported 
goods , assumed to be constant . If a is redefined as the ratio of 
output to the domestically produced frac ion of capital , all the 
preceeding results apply , with the extension hat the output coeffic-
ien t varies with both output per unit of otal capital and the 
proportion of investment goods imported . 
Re laxing the second assumption so that production now has an import 
content income is no longer identical with production , but is less 
to he e x ent of the import content . Then to maintain full-capaci y 
production , inves ment must be large enough to offset the gap 
between exports and he sum of (i) expenditure on the import content 
of domestic production and (ii) saving and expenditure on imports 
from domestically earned income . Then the equilibrium rate of 
growth is 
xt 
rt= a(s + m + qc - - ) 
yt 
where q is the fractional import content of domestic output which 
is assumed to be constant and c(= 1 - s - m) is the fraction of 
income spent in home produced goods (c > 0) . All the conclusions 
previously derived still stand with the difference now tha the 
initial equilibrium growth rate r 0 is given by 
and the further conclusion follows that the equilibrium level of 
income and equilibrium rate o growth will be higher the higher 
the fractional import content of domestic production . 
If the third of Johnson ' s simplifying assumptions is now relaxed so 
tha trade defici sand surpluses are financed by capital movements , 
the problem becomes much more complicated since income is no longer 
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determined exclusively by current output . Income arising from 
current production will be increased or decreased by interest pay-
mens from or to the outside world . Leakages from domestic earned 
income may be offset by consumption of domestic goods out of inter-
est earned on foreign investment , as well as by exports and invest-
ments in new capacity , or such leakages may be augmented by the 
payment of interest to foreigners . 
Johnson [12] assumes that differences between receipts and payments 
on current account , including both the trade balance and interest 
payments on past debts , are financed by international capital move -
ment s bearing a fixed interest rate i . Then ignoring the two 
qualifications introduced above , the equilibrium rate of growth 
becomes 
r 
cZt 
= a(s + m - y 
where Zt is the interest income or the negative of the interest 
payments determined by 
dZ 
i(Xt zt mYt mZt) dt = + -
That is , a(s zt b) and dZ ibYt , where b is rt = + s yt - dt - now 
the current account surplus expressed as a fraction of domestic 
production . Then the equilibrium rate of growth will be higher the 
lower the ratio of foreign investment income to domestic production 
as well as the higher the output coefficient and the savings and 
import ratios , and the lower the ratio of exports to output . 
The behaviour of the equilibrium growth rate now depends on its 
relation to the rate of growth o interest payments as well as its 
relation o the rate of growth of exports . Therefore if the equi-
librium growth ra e is initially below the rate of growth of exports 
it is no longer possible to conclude that it will remain there . To 
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consider this behaviour Johnson derived expressions for Y and 
Zt from the equations immediately above . However these equations 
are too complex to allow the formulation of simple relationships 
between the constants of the system. He does , however , conclude 
that it is only under certain conditions that there exists a rate 
of growth of exports which would allow the economy to maintain 
equilibrium between effective demand and productive capacity by 
growing at a steady rate . 
The simplest case is when initially trade is balanced and interest 
payments (or receipts) are zero . Then x = r = as . Or more 
generally , a rate of growth of exports permitting equilibrium growth 
at a constant rate exists only when initially the equilibrium growth 
of output is equal to the initial rate of growth of interest income 
(or interest payments) . A special case is when initially trade is 
balanced , Then equilibrium growth at a constant rate i is possible 
if exports are expanded at the rate x = i . However , if initially 
the current account is balanced via the existence of interest payments , 
then no rate of growth of exports exists which would permit equilib-
rium growth at a constant rate . These are particular cases however 
and no simple but general statement can be made about the behaviour 
of the equilibrium growth rate . 
Ball [SJ and Massell [23] also consider the effect on the rate of 
growth of a country of financing its interest payments on inter-
national debt by further borrowing . Ball considers the rate of 
growth of the economy as the rate of growth of its national income . 
But in a model with international borrowing or lending , as Massell 
e xplains , the distinction between income growth and output growth 
is important . If a country borrows from abroad , or is the recipient 
of direct foreign investment , then its output will rise provided the 
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productivity of the new investment is ~reater than zero . But some 
part of the increased output , possibly all of it , will be paid out-
side the country either as interest payments or dividends. As 
Massell points out Ball ' s failure to make this distinction is the 
basis of his paradoxical results hat capital imports result in an 
accelerated rate of growth in the recipient country and that the 
burden of debt thus incurred can be shifted entirely to the capital 
expor ing country . 
The basic structure of Ball ' s model is somewhat different to that of 
Johnson 's . Ball assumes that international debt adjusts to increases 
in national income via ~D = A~Y , where he parameter A is positive , 
and that the balance of trade adjusts to changes in the economy ' s 
e xternal capital position 
X - M = rD - ~D , 
whereas Johnson assumes that differences between receipts and payments 
on current account, including both trade balance and interest payments 
on past debts , are financed by further borrowing . 
Massell then concludes hat the rate o growth of output will be 
increased by foreign borrowing if the net increase in debt exceeds 
that part of the interest payments that would be allocated to 
i nvestment in the absence of foreign debt . In Ball's formulation 
of the problem with no distinction between income and output , the · 
rate of growth of both income and output in the presence of foreign 
borrowing appears higher regardless of the magnitude of the interest 
payments . This is because a balance of payments surplus is auto-
matically created to enable the economy to meet its interest pay-
ments and his is done at no cost to the economy . But in Massell ' s 
analysis , the fraction (s) of interest payments must be subtracted 
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from current foreign borrowing and this difference determines whether 
or not the rate of growth of output is increased and by how much . 
Thus an economy servicing a debt incurred in the past, but no longer 
receiving new foreign loans, will have a growth rate of output less 
than that of the Harrod-Domar model with no international capital 
movements ; whereas , according to Ball , the growth rate of output 
will always be at least as great as that of the closed Harrod-Domar 
rate , regardless of the size of the debt or the interest rate payable 
on this debt . 
Considering the rate of growth of income , Massell finds that capital 
imports will increase this growth rate if the marginal output-capital 
ratio exceeds the interest rate . Amano ' s criticism [l] of Massell ' s 
model is that it fails to show the explicit link between the domestic 
rate of profit on capital and its marginal output-capital ratio-and 
hence the actual direction of capital movements . Amano attempts to 
find this link . 
Amano assumes that the country is relatively small and characterised 
by perfect competition and full utilisation of economic resources . 
He also assumes that commodity prices and the rate of profit on 
capital in the rest of the world are given. Then , without capital 
movements , this country grows with zero trade balance at constant 
terms of trade . Its long-run equilibrium growth rate equals the 
sum of the rate of growth of working population and the rate of pro-
ductivity increase . Moreover , along the equilibrium growth path 
the domestic ra e of profit is constant and is determined by the 
relative share of capital , the equilibrium growth rate and the 
economy ' s average propensity to save . These equilibrium growth rates 
differ from those of the Harrod-Demar growth model because Amano has 
assumed substitutability of factors of production . In the Harrod-
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Domar growth model the rate of growth of both factors of production 
must be equal along the equilibrium growth path so as to maintain 
full employment of both fac ors . 
Amano assumes that the country ' s aggregative production function is 
the Cobb-Douglas type , P(t) = K(t)aL(t)l - a , where a is the 
elas icity of output with respect to capital input . Under the assumed 
condition of perfect competition a also represents the relative 
share of capital and a P(t) K(t) the domestic rate of profit on capital . 
The country ' s saving is a constant fraction (s) of its national income 
while the labour force is assumed to be growing at a constant rate 
n . Then with no international capital movements , the outpu -capital 
ratio along the equilibrium growth path is !!.. so that the rate of s , 
profit is an 
s 
When free international capital movements are introduced into the 
model , a capital inflow or outflow will start, depending on whether 
the domestic rate of profit is higher or lower than the profit rate 
given i n the rest of the world . If capital is perfectly mobile 
i nternationally , capital will flow immediate l y so as to equate the 
domestic rate of profi to the fixed international level . 
In the case of the capital-importing country , if the foreign rate 
of profit is r then an r< -. 
s 
Amano concludes that if free capital 
inflow is allowed to the country with a potentially high rate of 
profit , the continuous capital inflow raises the rate of growth of 
national income of the capital-impor ing country above its long-run 
equilibrium growth rate in the absence of capital movements . But the 
r a te of growth of national income declines as capital i nflow con -
tinues and after a suf iciently long period it will revert to the 
original level . Since labour grows at the constant rate n , the rate 
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of growth of income per head increases initially but as time goes to 
infinity the rate of growth of income per head approaches zero . 
Also the ratio of foreign borrowed capital to the total capital stock 
is a decreasing function of time , approaching a finite value as time 
goes to infinity . Thus it is not possible for the growth of foreign 
capital to continuously outstrip the growth of domestic capital 
forever . 
In the case of the capital-exporting country , Amaro derives similar 
results . That is , whenever the foreign rate of profit exceeds the 
average output-capital ratio in the absence of capital exports , the 
rate of growth of national income in the capital-exporting country 
is greater than its potential growth rate for a given time period . 
Thus the main conclusion of Amano's analysis is that free inter-
national capital movements based on profit motives are beneficial to 
both the capital-importing and capital-exporting countries , in the 
sense that they raise the rates of economic growth above their 
potential rates of growth in the absence of international capital 
movements , at least for a sufficiently long period . 
II 
The analysis so far has been concerned with the requirements for 
equilibrium growth in a single country , the rate of growth of whose 
exports is given . But except in the case of a relatively small 
country this analysis is unsatisfactory because it does not consider 
the requirements of equilibrium growth in the rest of the world nor 
does it allow for repercussions of variations in a country ' s imports 
on incomes abroad and through them on its own exports . 
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Abstracting from foreign content of investment e xpenditure , the 
import content of domestic production and the payment of interest 
on international loans , the simple extension of Johnson ' s previous 
model gives the result that if the equilibrium growth rate of one 
country is greater than that of the other , then its equilibrium 
growth rate must rise and the other must fall continually over time . 
That is 
dr . 
l dt = 
a . m. Y. 
_ 1_-"-J --=-J ( r. 
Y. 1 
l 
r . ) 
J 
where r is the rate of growth of investment , capacity and income 
which keeps productive capacity continuously fully employed , a the 
constant ratio of output to capital , Y the income , m the fraction 
of income spent on imports and i and j represent the two 
countries . 
Assuming that domestic production has an import content , the behaviour 
of the two countries ' equilibrium growth rates over time depends , 
as above, on the relative magnitude of their initial equilibrium 
growth rates . But if part of investment expenditure is spend on 
imported goods then : 
dr . a . (m . + m~ s . ) Y. 
l l J J J f (r . r.) dt = m! l - m! - . l J l J l 
(where m' is the fraction of investment expenditure spent on 
imports) from which it is seen that the behaviour of the equilib -
rium growth rate over time depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the two growth rates and the sum of the two foreign content fractions 
of investment expenditure . If this sum is less than unity then 
unless the equilibrium growth rates are the same in the two countries , 
they will diverge over time . If the sum of the two fractional 
foreign contents of inves ment is greater than unity then provided 
the equi librium growth rates are not the same, they will converge 
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over time . But in the limiting case when the above sum is unity , 
the equilibrium growth rates of the two countries are completely 
i ndeterminate . 
Johnson [12 ] finds that the introduction of interest payments on 
international lending makes it impossible to deduce the future 
course of the equilibrium growth rates from their initial magnitudes . 
However , he does draw some conclusions about the influences of 
i nterest payments and receipts on the equilibrium growth rates at 
any given time . The receipt of interest payments by one country 
from the other may tend either to raise or lower its equilibrium 
growth rate depending on whether the fraction of interest receipts 
it spends on its own good is less than or greater than the fraction 
of interest payments by which the paying country reduces its imports 
from the receiving country - and conversely for the payment of 
interest by one country to the other . In the limiting case where 
these two fractions are equa~ interest payments and receipts would 
have no influence on the equilibrium growth rates . If no part of 
interest receipts were saved or if no part of payments dissaved , 
the effect of interest transfers on the equilibrium growth rates would 
depend on whether the sum of the fractions of interest receipts 
spent on imports were less than .or greater than unity . .Then .the 
effects of interest payments are similar to the effects of foreign 
contents of investment expenditure . 
III 
Sections I and II have been concerned with the effect of international 
capital movements on the equilibrium rate of growth of output of a 
country . In this section the time paths of capital ace umulation 
and international debt which take the economy to the equilibrium 
position will be examined . 
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Hamada ' s analysis [10] is in terms of the two-country model of 
economi c growth with international capital movements . Capital is 
assumed to be perfectly mobile between countries while labour is 
compl ete l y i mmobile internationally . It is assumed that the two 
c ount r i es pr oduce only one good which is the s ame in both countries . 
Thus Hamada ' s model abstracts from international trade and the 
t erms of t r ade effect . On the other hand, Oniki and Uzawa ' s [28] 
and Kemp ' s [18] analyses are within the standard two-country , two-
good , two-factor of production model of international trade but the 
process of capital accumulation is determined with the aid of 
Uzawa ' s t wo sectoral growth theory . Hamada ' s analysis will be con-
s i dered first and then the analyses of Oniki and Uzawa , and Kemp 
will be d i scussed . 
In Hamada ' s model the two factors of production, labour and capital, 
are used to produce one commodity . The factor of production labolll" 
is growing at a constant rate in each country , but not necessarily 
at the same rate in both countries . Capital is assumed to move 
instantaneously so as to equate the marginal productivities of capital 
in the two countries . Then the rate of interest payable on borrowed 
capital is assumed to equal this common marginal product of capital . 
It is assumed that saving is a constant fraction of income and that 
the production functions which are linear , homogeneous , concave and 
twice-differentiable functions of capital and labour are identical 
in both countries . 
The optimal paths of capital accumulation in each country and of 
international debt depend on the relationship existing between the 
two labour growth rates and the saving ratios. 
(a) The case when each country has the same labour growth rates and 
the same saving ratios , namely Al= A2 = A ; s 1 = s 2 = 8 • 
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If the initial capital endowments are proportional to the initial 
available labour , then there is no need for international capital 
movements since capital growth , as well as labour growth , is at the 
same rate in both countries. Therefore the marginal product of 
capital will continue to be the same in both countries . But if the 
initial capital-labour ratios are not identical , 5 capital will move 
instantane ously from one country to the other so as to equalize the 
rates of return to capital . Thus initially the level of international 
debt is B0 . 
At a ny time , the total amount of saving or the increase in the total 
stock of capital is 
K = S = s(P1 - rB) + s(P 2 + rB) = s(P1 + P2 ) = sP . 
Production (P . ) in each country is proportional to its labour . 
l 
Also , capital has been adjusted to be proportional to labour so as 
to equalize its marginal productivity in the two countries . To 
maintain these conditions investment in each country must equal its 
saving . That is K. = sP . . 
l 1. 
But interest payments must also be 
paid on the foreign debt by country 1 . Therefore saving in country 
1 is smaller than that required to maintain these above conditions 
for balanced growth by an amount srB . Then this amount must be 
borrowed anew from country 2 . Thus the level of in ernational debt 
is increasing continuously : 
B = srB . 
Hamada finds that on this balanced growth path the amount of inter-
5 . Assume K L in country 1 < 
K 
L il) country 2 . 
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national debt increases exponentially at the rate -sr where 
the marginal productivity of capital at the equilibrium capital-
- sf(k) labour ratio k(= --).-) , namely r = f ' (k) • But the ratio of 
existing international debt to the to al capital stock of the two 
countries <f) continuously decreases at a constant rate on the 
equi librium balanced growth pa t h . 
is 
(b) The case with different labour growth rates and the same saving 
If initially the capital-labour ratios are not equal , capital will 
move instantaneously so as to equate the capital-labour ratios and 
thus the marginal productivities of capital in the two countries will 
. . . 
be identical. As in the previous case , K = K1 + K2 = s(P1 + P2 ) 
Because the labour grow h rates are no longer identical 
KlK2 
K2 must equal s P 1 + ( >.1 - >.2 ) -K- and 
respectively so as to maintain equal capita l-labour ratios in the 
t wo countries. 
Savings in each country are 
Therefore to maintain equal marginal productivities in each country , 
. 1 6 interna ional debt must grow continuous y , namely 
But Hamada finds that rega dless of the initial value of international 
debt , the proportion of international debt to total capital stock 
6. Assumin~ the ini ial debt B0 is positive . 
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becomes negligible in the long- un. 
(c) The case where profits equal savings and the labour growth rates 
are differen. 
In this case assume again that Al > A2 . The total increase in 
capital is 
B) + r(K2 + B) = rK . 
In order to maintain equal marginal productivities of capital 
and the required increase in international debt is 
As in the previous case if B > 0 
0 then B > 0 • But Hamada con-
eludes in this case where saving always equals profits in both 
countries , that the debt-capital ratio converges to a positive value 
which is determined by the initial endowments of capital . This 
result reflects the self-reproductive nature of the savings 
behaviour assumption. 
(d) The case of di erent saving ratios with the same labour growth 
rates , namely s1 < s 2 and Al = A2 = ,\ • 
In his case the increase in the tot 1 stock of capital is 
This additional term (s2 - s 1 )rB appears because the saving ratios 
are constant ractionsof income which is output net of interest 
payments. 
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In the previous cases s = s and K = sP The K. necessary 1 2 l 
or each country to equate its marginal productives are 
slKl + s2K2 
(s2 
Kl 
Kl = K pl+ - s 1 ) K rB and 
K2 
slKl + s2K2 
p2 (s2 - sl) 
K2 
= + - rB K K 
The second terms enter again here because o the assumption of differ-
ent saving ratios . Therefore the required increase in international 
debt is 
Then the system can be described by the two equa ions (in per 
capita terms) 
where 
k = s (k) + (s 2 - s 1 )rb - Ak , 
b = (s 2 -s 1 )H(k) + srb - Ab 
L2 L2 Ll Ll L2 
L s = L s 1 + L s 2 and s = L sl + L s2 
The equilibrium solutions found by equating k and b to zero give 
one positive level and one negative level of b . For the positive 
equilibrium solution Hamada derives that 
k ~': s 
---> f(k:': ) -x-
where s is the average savings ratio weighted by the existing 
labour in each country and thus can be interpreted as the average 
savings ratio of the total world economy . Then f is the equi-
librium capital-output ratio of the asymptotic growth path in an 
economy where labour grows at the rate A and the saving ratio 
is s . Then i the equilibrium amount of per capita indebtedness 
(b) is positive, ca pital is deepened more than in the case 
of no in ernational capital movements. This result reflects the 
fact that interest paymen s from a coun ry saving less o hat saving 
more increases he total average propensity to save in the world . 
so . 
This case with different saving ratios and the same labour growth 
rates is the most realistic because if labour growth rates are 
different then in the very long-run one country becomes dominant 
and the other negligible . 
(e) The case where both saving ratios and labour growth rates are 
different . 
Assuming Al> A2 and s 1 i s 2 , the increase in the total capital 
stock is 
K = s l Pl + s 2P 2 + ( s2 - s l )rB . 
Then in order to maintain equal capital-labour ratios in the two 
countries, 
Kl 
slKl + s2K2 
pl+ (s2 s ) 
Kl 
+ 01 A2) 
KlK2 
= - rB K 1 K K 
and K2 
slKl + s2K2 
P2 + (s2 - sl) 
K2 
0 - A2) 
KlK2 
= - rB -K K 1 K 
The first term in each is sP. where s is the average world saving 
l. 
ratio . Then the second and third terms are adjustments to Ki to 
take accoun t of the different saving ratios and the different labour 
growth rates respectively . Therefore the amount of new borrowing is 
Then under the condition of this analysis , namely t hat capital is 
completely mobiJe internationally and that the production functions 
of the two countries are identical , the increase in the level of 
international debt depends on (i) the difference of the saving 
ratios , (ii) the difference of the labour growth rates and (iii) a 
compensating term for the international interest payment transfer . 
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Hamada has assumed that the production functions are identical in 
each country . As this assumption removes much of the rationale for 
international capital movements , it would have been interesting to 
see the effect of different production functions on the optimal 
paths of capital accumulation and international debt. 
Oniki and Uzawa [28] have assumed that one of the two goods traded 
between the two countries is a consumption good and the other an 
investment good . For given technology and consumers ' tastes in 
each country , the volume and terms of trade and the pattern of 
specialization of production in each country depends on the factor 
endowments of the country . Each commodity is assumed to be pro-
duced by the two factors of production , labour and capital . The 
supply of labour in each country is given and it is assumed to be 
growing at a constant rate n in both countries . International 
capital movements in the model put forward by Oniki and Uzawa exist 
only in the orm of trade in capital goods and not in the form of 
foreign investment. Thus the rate of capital accumulation is 
determined by the amount of domestic output and the imports of the 
invest~ent good . The comparative advantages of each country thus 
vary over time as the process of capital accumulation continues and 
the terms of trade in turn affects the rate at which capital is 
accumulated . 
Oniki and Uzawa use the reciprocal demand curve to determine the 
patterns of specialization of production and of trade and the 
effect of factor endowments on these patterns . They derive the 
dynamic path of capital accumulation and show that , under their 
assumption that consumption goods are capital-intensive , the 
accumulation path is always stable with the capital-labour ratio 
of each country converging to the long-run stationary ratio . This 
long-run stationary capital-labour ratio of each country is deter-
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mined relative to the average propensity to save and the technologi-
cal conditions of the other country , as well as of its own . If the 
average propensities to save of both countries are different the 
production of one of the countries may be specialized either in 
consumption goods or in investment goods at the long-term station-
ary state . 
Kemp [18] attempts to extend the above analysis by allowing the 
possibility of movement of capital internationally in the form of 
foreign borrowing or lending. As in the Oniki and Uzawa model , 
Kemp assumes that there exist two countries , two goods and the two 
factors of production , capital and labour . He assumes that trade 
between the two countries is unimpeded and that capital is completely 
mobile internationally . Thus capital moves instantaneously so as 
to equalize the returns on capital in the two countries . 
Kemp makes the additional assumption that technology is not only 
given but is the same in both countries . Then each country is 
incompletely specialized in production and thus from the production 
side this international economy behaves like a closed two-sector 
economy . 
Considering the static case , or the case in which the labour growth 
rate is zero , the equilibrium distributions of capital and labour 
are determined by balancing the world demand for and supply of 
newly created capital goods . These distributions are found to be 
unique provided that the total capital-labour ratio is a monotonic 
function of the wage-rental ratio and that all equilibria are 
locally stable . 
I ntroducing constant labour growth into the mode~ Kemp draws the 
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following conclusions : 
(i) a steady- growth solution always exists 
( ii) not all steady-growth solutions are locally stable 
( iii) global stability is not assured 
(iv) for local instability it sufficies that the macro-elasticity 
of factor substitution a is less than C 7 
(v) for locals ability it sufficies that the consumption good 
industry be relatively capital-intensive and that a> c . 
Kemp also concludes that since international trade and foreign 
indebtedness are not considered explicitly , their actual levels are 
i ndeterminate . However Kemp attempts to evaluate the limits of 
international indebtedness along the steady growth path . But , from 
Mundell ' s discussion [24] of international trade and factor mobility , 
since international trade is unimpeded , there will be no trade when 
the system is in equilibrium . Because capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile between countries , it will move so as to equate 
the marginal return on capital in the two countries . Therefore , 
the limits of international indebtedness are obvious . 
7 . c is defined by L K K 
s [s (k 2 + w) + (1 - s )(k1 + w)J 
where sL is the labour-weighted average of the propensities 
to save , 
K 
s is the capital-weighted average of the two propen-
sities to save , 
k. 
l 
. .th . d is the capital-labour ratio in he i -in ustry , 
w is the wage-rental ratio . 
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Kemp ' s model is somewhat uninterestin~ from the point of view of 
international capital movements because , as he assumes that the 
production functions , prices and labour growth rates are the same 
in the two countries , the international economy behaves in the same 
way as that of a single country. International capital movements 
would play a more important role in a model where either the pro-
duction functions were not identical and international trade was 
restricted , or the mobility of capital internationally was restric-
ted . Hamada [10] has considered the case in which the production 
functions and labour growth rates are identical in both countries . 
But because it is assumed that both countries are completely 
specialized in producing the same good , it is possible to determine 
the accumulation path of international indebtedness as well as 
that of total capital . 
I n section I Johnson [12] and Ball [5] extend the well-known Harrod-
Domar growth model and draw conclusions regarding capital accumulation 
in the open model . The two factors of production, labour and capital, 
are assumed to be ully-employed . Then for equilibrium growth it 
is assumed , if labour is not growing at the same rate as capital, 
that technical progress of a type which maintains a constant capital-
output ratio is going on at such a pace as to prevent the capital 
stock outgrowing the labour required o work it . 
Johnson concludes hat the equilibrium growth rate will be higher 
the higher the output-capital ratio , the saving ratio and the 
import surplus as a fraction of total output . However, if capital 
is also imported in the form of investment goods , the equilibrium 
rate of growth rises as the fractional import content of domestic 
production increases . Johnson does not consider the possibility 
of capital movements in the form of foreign investment although he 
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does consider the case in which trade deficits and surpluses are 
financed by capital movements whi ch bear a fixed interest rate. 
The equilibrium growth rate will be higher the lower the ra io o 
foreign interest income to domestic production . The behaviour of 
the equili brium growth rate then depends on its relation to the 
rate of growth of interest payments as well as its relation to the 
rate of growth of exports . Johnson is unable to draw any general 
solution as the system of equations is too complex but he does 
give answers to particular cases . 
Ball [5] considers a slightly different problem to that discussed 
by Johnson. Ball assumes that capital movements take the form of 
foreign investment and that the level of foreign investment adjusts 
to increases in national income via a debt-accelerator. It is also 
assumed that the Balance of Trade adjusts to changes in the e conomy ' s 
external capital position. As Massell [23] points out , Ball assumes 
that output and income growth are iden ical but this is incorrect 
when capital movements take the form of foreign investment . In this 
case Massell concludes that if the economy is servicing a debt 
i ncurred in the past but is not receiving new loans,the rate of 
growth of ou put is less than that in the closed Harrod - Domar 
growth model. 
Amano examines the rela ionship between the domestic rate of profit 
on capital and its marginal output-capital ratio, to determine the 
direction of the flow of capital in Massel1 ' s model . Amano assumes 
hat in hP. srnall country labour is growing at a constant rate n 
and that the country ' s aggregative production function is of the 
Cobb-Doug 1 s type. Capita 1 is assumed to be completely mobile 
and moves between countries so as to equalize the rate o profit 
in the two countries . He concludes that in both the lending and 
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the borrowing countries the rate of growth of national income 
exceeds its potential growth rate in the absence of capital move-
men ts , for a sufficiently long period of time . 
Except i n the case of a relatively small country it is unsatisfactory 
to assume that the level of exports is given , as in the case dis-
cussed by Johnson [12] and Ball [5] . I n section II Johnson takes 
a ccount of the repercussions of variations in a country ' s imports 
on inc omes in the rest of the world and through them on its own 
e xports . Then Johnson derives that if a country ' s equilibrium 
growth rate is above that of the other , its growth rate must rise 
and the other must fall continually over time , provided that domestic 
investment has no import content and that trade surpluses and 
deficits are financed in a way that does not give rise to inter-
national interest payments . However if these two assumptions are 
relaxed the relationship between the two growth rates depends on 
whether the sum of the two fractional foreign contents of investment 
is greater than or less than one and whether the fraction of interest 
receipts one country spends on its own good is less than or greater 
than the fraction of interest payments by which the paying country 
reduces its imports from the receivin~ country . 
In section III the paths of capital accumulation and international 
debt for a country from any initial position to the position of 
equilibrium growth are considered . Hamada ' s model abstracts from 
trade as he assumes that only one good is produced in the two-
country world . As he also assumes that the production functions 
are identical , the international movement of capital is determined 
by the factor of production endowments of the two countries , the 
relationship between the saving ratios and that between the labour 
growth rates of the two countries . International capital movements 
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considered by Oniki and Uzawa exist only in the form of trade in 
capital goods and not in the form of foreign investment . Thus 
capital accumulation is determined by the amount of domestic output 
and the imports of investment goods . Then the terms of trade 
influence the rate of capital accumulation . Kemp has discussed the 
capital accumulation path of the two-country two-good model when 
international capital movements take the form of foreign investment . 
However as Ke mp assumes that the production functions and the 
constant labour growth rates of the two countries are identical 
much of the rationale for international capital movements is removed. 
Chapter III 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND 
OPTIMAL ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Whilst many economists have been interested in the optimal accumul-
ation path of a national economy , most of the analyses have been 
confi ned to the optimal growth of a closed economy . However recently 
Bardhan [7] , Hamada [10] , Negishi [27] and Pitchford [29] have dis-
cussed optimal growth in an open economy . Bardhan and Hamada have 
considered the case of a country facing an international capital 
market while Negishi and Pitchford consider the case of direct foreign 
i nvestment . 
The central problem of he theory of optimal economic growth is how 
national income should be allocated between investment and consumption 
so as to maximise national welfare . From the theory of optimal 
economic growth of a closed economy , a balanced growth path or a 
golden-age growth path is that along which the two factors of pro-
duction , capital and labour , grow at the same rate . If the saving 
ratio is constant there is only one balanced growth path . That is 
the path along which f(k) w 
- k- = 8 , where s is the constant saving 
ratio , w is the constant rate of capital depreciation , k is the 
capital-labour ratio and f(k) is the production function . 8 If 
however s is not constant there exists a number of golden-age 
8 . f (k) can be considered to be either a neoclassical production 
f unct ion or a production function with fi xed coefficients . 
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9 paths which are all logarithmically parallel. The golden-age path 
along which consumption per head (c) is maximised is called the Golden 
Rule path . Then the Golden Rule path is that golden-age path along 
which f ' (k) = w . 
Introducing diminishing marginal utility of consumption , the optimal 
growth path is defined as that path along which the accumulated differ-
ence between the actual utility of consumption and the maximum obtain-
able level of utility (or Bliss) is minimised . This path is defined 
by the Ramsey Rule which states that the rate of saving multiplied by 
the marginal utility of consumption should always equal Bliss minus 
the actual rate of utility enjoyed . 
If , on the other hand , a rate of time preference p is introduced 
so that the welfare of each generation is weighted according to 
ce-pt or U(c)e-pt , the golden-age path along which welfare is 
maximised is given by f '(k) = w + p . This balanced growth path 
is termed the modified Golden Rule path. 
In section I the borrowing models of Bardhan [7] and Hamada [10] 
will be considered and then in section II the two-country models of 
Negishi [27] and Pitchford [29] will be discussed . In all of these 
papers it is assumed that there exists only one good which may be 
9 . Logarithmically-parallel means that the logarithm of the capital 
stock on one golden-age path differs by a constant from that on any 
other particular golden-age path. There is such logarithmic 
parallelism in terms of any variable . Thus the consumption path 
corresponding to one golden-age path never intersects the consumption 
path corresponding to any other golden-age path. 
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either consumed or accumulated . Then these models may be thought 
of as either incorporating or not incorporating international trade . 
However , it is not necessary to consider trade explicitly , so that 
the theory abstracts from the problems associated with international 
trade and thus allow~ a discussion of long-run international capital 
movements in the context of optimal growth theory . 
I 
The models put forward by Bardhan [7] and Hamada [10] which deal 
with optimal foreign borrowing , assume that capital is perfectly 
mobile internationally . However , as the other basic assumptions 
of these two models are very different, the papers will be discussed 
separately . 
Bardhan considers an economy which can borrow from , but never lend 
to , an imperfect international capital market such that the rate at 
which it borrows is a function of the total amount of capital 
borrowed . Bardhan ' s objective is to find the optimal capital 
accumulation path along which the economy maximises , over an infinite 
time period, the accumulated difference between the actual level and 
the maximum sustainable level of social welfare . He defines social 
welfare as the difference between the social utility of per capita 
consumption and the social dis-utility of having foreign-owned 
capital in the home country . The population growth rate is 
assumed to be constant , savings per head is a constant fraction of 
per capita national income and depreciation is ignored . Then 
Bardhan formulates the problem such that the level of domestically-
owned capital per head is the only state variable and the level of 
foreign-owned capital per head and the savings ratio are the two 
control variables . State variables .are those which .define .the state 
of the economy at each instant of time and control variables are 
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those which are assumed to be adjusted so as to determine the growth 
path of the economy . 
The solution of the problem depends on the relationship between the 
population growth rate and the rate of interest ruling in the inter-
national capital market when the amount of foreign borrowin? of the 
home country is zero . This rate of interest is denoted by r
0 
. 
(a) The case where the rate of population growth is greater than 
the rate of interest ro . 
If initially the level of per capita domestically-owned capital .is 
less than its optimal level , then along the optimal growth path 
the amount per capita of domestically-owned capital is steadily 
increased while the amount of foreign-owned capital per head decreases 
asymptotically to approach the Golden Rule path . Along this .path 
the level of foreign-owned capital per head is positive . The oppos-
ite holds when the initial level of per capita domestically-owned 
capital is greater than its optimal level . 
(b) The case where the rate of population growth is less than or 
equalto the rate of interest r 0 . 
Along the optimal growth path , if the level of domestically-owned 
capital per head is less than its optimal level initially , the 
amount of per capita domestically-owned capital .steadily .increases 
and the amount of foreign-owned capital per head is decreased to 
ultimately become zero - or is always zero . 
An important feature of Bardhan ' s model is the rule derived for the 
acquisition of foreign-owned capital : 
f ' D' r ' k 0 - r = U' + > f 
f ' 0 D' 0 or - = -> 
' U' 
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where f ' is the rate of return on all capital invested in the 
borrowing country , r the rate of interest in the international 
capital market (r ' > 0) , D' the marginal disutility of foreign-
owned capital in the borrowing country and U' the marginal 
utility of consumption in the borrowing country . 
is the marginal cost of foreign borrowing. 
Also 0 = r + r ' k f 
Private borrowers would borrow up to the point where f ' = r . 
Therefore , private borrowing tends to be excessive because of their 
failure to take account of the fact that an increase in the amount 
borrowed for the country as a whole raises the total borrow-
ing cost nd also of the increased disutility for the country as 
a whole from the extra borrowing . That is , private borrowers tend 
to over-borrow and thus it would be optimal for the borrowing 
country to tax the earnings from borrowed capital . 
To compare this Bardhan rule for acquiring foreign-owned capital 
with that derived in the static model , consider Jones [13] where 
the rule derived is f' = ~ = 0 That is , foreign borrowing should 
continue until the marginal return on capital in the borrowing 
country just equals the marginal cost of borrowing. This rule 
differs from that derived by Bardhan because in the static model 
it is assumed that there exists no disutility from foreign - owned 
capital in the borrowing country . Therefore , under the static 
model assumptions optimal foreign borrowing is greater than that 
determined from the Bardhan model . 
It should be noted that the endpoint determined from within the 
Bardhan model satisfies the Golden Rule. That is, the marginal 
product of capital equals the rate of growth . However , I have not 
been able to discover a sufficiency theorem which would establish 
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that the assumptions of the Bardhan model (particularly the form 
of the objective function) are sufficient to ensure that an optimal 
path e xists . 
Hamada assumes in his analysis that the economy faces a competitive 
international capital market where it can borrow or lend capital at 
an interest rate which is constant over time and independent of the 
amount it borrows or lends . That is , Hamada considers the case of 
lending or borrowing by a small country whose dealings with the 
international capital market are such as to have no effect on the 
interest rate ruling in the market . 
Hamada ' s aim is to determine the optimal path of capital accumulation 
which is defined as the choice of the levels oficonsumption , real 
capital net of depreciation existing in the country and the total 
international debt of the economy (all in per capita terms), which 
maximises the discounted sum of future utilities of consumption .per 
head over an infinite time period . This maximisation is carried out 
subject to the conditions that (a) the initial value of the national 
wealth of the country is given and (b) a wealth-indebtedness 
restric-cion in the case of borrowing and a wealth-creditness res-
triction in the case of lending, exist . The wealth-indebtedness 
restriction limits the country ' s level of indebtedness Bt to a 
certain proportion B of its net wealth Kt . That is , 
Bt S BKt (B < 1) . Similarly the wealth-creditness restriction does 
not permit the creditor country's foreign credit or lending to exceed 
a certain fraction of its total wealth . Hamada assumes that labour 
is growing at a constant positive rate and that all variables are 
net of depreciation . 
Because the value of national wealth enters into the model as the 
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difference between the total capital existing in the economy and 
the total international debt of the economy , it is implied t hat the 
country can increase or decrease its capital stock by increasing or 
decreasing its indebtedness instantaneously . Hence perfect mobility 
of capital is assumed . By introducing the wealth-indebtedness res-
triction (or wealth-creditness restriction) there is a restriction 
on the upper limit to borrowing (or to l ending) but within this 
limit there remains complete mobility of capital . 
The solution of this problem depends on the relationship between 
the sum of the rate of growth of the labour force and the discount 
rate and on the interest rate ruling in the international capital 
market . 
(a) If the sum of the rate of growth of labour and the discount 
rate is greater than the interest rate , the optimal capital accu1Tn..1l-
ation path eventually approaches a balanced path where capital and 
foreign indebtedness grow at the rate of growth of labour . Under 
these conditions the e conomy will benefit eventually from borrowing 
abroad . If the initial endowment of domestically-owned capital is 
relatively small , the economy will assume a borrowing position 
immediately . If it is relatively large , the economy will first 
assume a lending position and then shift from lending to borrowing , 
keeping the capital-labour ratio constant such that the marginal 
product equals the interest rate . But when the maximum possible 
indebtedness-wealth ratio is reached , the economy gradually approache s 
the balanced path where capital and foreign indebtedness grow at the 
rate of labour growth . If the initial endowment is intermediate the 
economy starts at the shifting position . That is , it increases its 
borrowing until the maximum possible indebtedness-wealth ratio is 
reached whilst the capital-labour ratio remains constant . Then when 
this ma ximum possible indebtedness-wealth ratio is reached , the 
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economy gradually approaches the balanced path while maintaining 
this maximum indebtedness-wealth ratio . 
To consider this balanced growth path refer to the diagram below . 
f(k) 
{(l-8)( A+p) + 8i }k 
k 
The modified golden rule growth path in the closed economy is shown 
by k where domestically-owned capital grows at the rate A while 
consumption per head is -C • But Hamada ' s balanced growth path is 
shown by k** where consumption per head c** is greater than c 
That is , the possibility of borrowing from an international capital 
market at a fixed interest rate can eventually sustain a higher level 
of per capita consumption than can a closed economy with t he same 
production technology . At this endpoint, output is distributed such 
that the domestically-owned capital stock (k :h': - b1b': ) grows at the 
rate A , ib'H is pa id as interest owing on the foreign borrowed 
capital bin': and the balance goes to consumption . However , it is 
a stahle endpoint because the economy can maintain the level of 
international indebtedness b = 8k . 8 That is , b = -- (k - b) so 1- 8 
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if (k - b) = A(k - b) then b = Ab . That is , to maintain b at 
the greatest level, it must grow at the same rate as (k - b) and 
thus at the same rate at k . Then b grows at the rate A such 
that part of the new borrowing is used for interest payments on 
existing debt and the balance is allocated to consumption. Therefore , 
Hamada ' s growth path is both balanced and stable but this results 
directly from the assumption that the interest rate is c onstan t , 
independent of the amount of international i ndebtedness and that it 
is less than A+ p . If however , the interest rate was made a 
function of the level of foreign borrowing,as in the Bardhan case , 
these results would not necessarily hold . 
It should be noted that because Hamada ' s initial condition involves 
only the level of national wealth and because it is assumed that the 
rate of i nterest payable on foreign borrowed capital is constant , 
without the wealth-indebtedness restriction the optimal solution 
would be the trivial one of borrowing as much as possible and con-
suming as much as possible . Thus the assumption of the wealth-
indebtedness restriction is vital to Hamada ' s model . Firstly , it 
e liminates the trivial solution and secondly , it allows the endpoint , 
which is unstable in the optimal growth theory of the closed economy , 
to be stable because the capital-labour ratio can be maintained , as 
labour grows , by borrowing forever . This endpoint of Hamada's 
analysis then allows consumption per head to be increased above that 
given by the Golden Rule endpoint . 
The results of the other cases when A + P < . 
- l are similar to those 
above . 
(b) If the sum of the rate of growth of labour and the discount 
rate is smaller than the rate of interest , the optimal capital 
accumulation path approaches asymptotically a balanced path where 
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both domestic capital and foreign assets grow at the rate of growth 
of labour. Under these conditions , the economy will bene f it 
eventually from investing abroad . If the initial endowment of 
national wealth i s relatively large , the economy assumes a lending 
position from the beginning . If the initial endowment of national 
wealth is relatively small , the economy assumes a borrowing position . 
Then the economy shifts from a borrower to a lender keeping the 
capital-labour ratio such that the marginal pr oduct equals the rate 
of interest . 
As in the above case , the asymptotic level of consumption is higher 
than that of a closed economy with the same production function and 
the same labour growth rate . Also in this case the capital-labour 
ratio at the endpoint is greater than in the closed economy case . 
The country can afford to deepen its domestic capital because of 
the favourable international investment opportunity . The added 
incentive to deepen comes from the introduction of the wealth-
creditness restriction; in order to take advantage of the foreign 
investment opportunity, the country must match any increase in 
foreign lending with a certain amount of domestic investment . 
(c) If the sum of the rate of growth of labour and the discount 
rate equals the rate of interest , the optimal paths of capital 
accumulation and consumption approach asymptotically the stationary 
values of capital per head(whic h is determined by equati ng t he mar -
ginal produc t to the interest rate)and the corresponding level of 
consumption . If the initial endowment of national wealth is 
relatively small (or relatively large) then the economy assumes a 
position of borrowing (or lending) and then moves to the stationary 
solution . In this boundary case , the asymptotic level of consumption 
is not improved by the existence of an international capital market . 
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II 
Negishi [27] and Pitchford [29] have considered capital movements 
between two countries when foreign investment takes the form of 
direct investment and ndt foreign borrowing. They both assume that 
capital is perfectly mobile and labour is completely immobile 
internationally . In the last part of Pitchford's analysis he 
restricts the mobility of capital by a ssuming that it is irreversible 
internationally. That is, once capital is i nstalled it can change 
ownership but it cannot be moved between countries . Negishi 
determines the optimal level of foreign investment in the long-run 
but Pitchford's analysis is concerned with finding the optimal growth 
path to this optimal long-run solution . Both Negishi and Pitchford 
assume that the two countries involved in the international capital 
movements produce the same good which can be both consumed and 
accumulated . That is , both countries are completely specialized in 
the production of the same good. As a consequence of this , int er-
na t ional t rade does not enter ex licitly into the analyses o .!cgish i 
and Pi chfo d . 
Negishi discusses international capital movements between two 
countries which have the same growth rates but different saving 
ratios . He assumes initially that both economies are in a stationary 
state but later relaxes this assumption to include the case where 
the uniform growth rate is positive. The optimal level of foreign 
investment is such that the home country maximises its long-run 
level of maintained consumpt ion per head subject to the stationary 
state condition that gross savings must equal depreciation in each 
country . But because capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile 
internationally , it will instantaneously move between countries so 
as to equate the marginal productivities of capital in both countries . 
Then the home country controls the movement of capital by adopting 
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the appropriate fiscal policy so as to maintain the optimal level 
of foreign investment . 
Negishi considers two different savings assump ions , firstly that 
only capitalists save and secondly , that gross saving is a constant 
proportion of gross income . 
Using the first of these savings assumptions it should be noted that 
the rate of return on capital in the foreign country is constant 
because the level of foreign-owned capital adjusts to a change in 
foreign investment so as to keep the total capital stock per head 
constant . Hence the rate of return abroad is constant . In this case , 
Negishi finds that the optimal fiscal policy is to subsidize its 
foreign lending . Comparing this result with the discussion in 
Chapter II , this optimal policy is "paradoxical". 
With the second saving assump ion , the optimal policy is for both 
countries to impose a tax on earnings from foreign investment . If 
however the saving assumptions are such that in the foreign country 
only capitalists save and that in the home country gross saving is 
a proportion of gross income, then it is optimal for capital to 
move internationally so as to equate the marginal productivities 
of capital in both countries. He also shows that extending the 
analysis to include a positive growth rate gives similar optimal 
fiscal policies. 
Both Kemp [15] and Jones [13] have discussed Negishi ' s "paradoxical" 
result in relation to their analyses . Because Negishi includes 
growth in his model, there is the possibility that changes in foreign 
investment may induce an increase in the level of savings and capital 
endowments and thus a rise in future maintainable consumption . 
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In considering Jones ' model , the effect of i ncreased foreign invest-
ment in stimulating further capital accumulation at home must be the 
dominant factor near the initial point where returns to capital in 
both countrie s are equated and thus the sole determinant of the 
optimal fiscal policy . Kemp continues this discussion of the effect 
of subsidizing capital movements on the steady-growth income . 
From neoclassical growth theory , the steady-growth rate is independ-
ent of the savings assumption bu the level of income per head is 
not. Thus any policy which turns the distribution of income in favour 
of capitalists will raise the level of steady - growth income . But 
to subsidize foreign investment is to forgo possible monopoly-
monopsony gains which , from the short-run point of view , is to mis-
allocate resources . Thus the subsidization of capital movements has 
two conflicting effects on steady-growth income , namely an expansion-
ary effect and a misallocation effect. Therefore the home country , 
in choosing its optimal fiscal policy , has to weigh up these two 
effects on the steady-growth income . Then the problem confronting 
the home country is that of choosing the optimal rate of subsidy . 
Pitchford , on the other hand , determines the optimal fiscal policy 
necessary to control the level of foreign investment and the optimal 
current domestic investment so as to move the economy along the 
growth path which will maximise the accumulated utility of consumption 
along this path to the optimal long-run endpoint. It should be 
noted tha Pitchford treats the level of current domestic investment 
or saving as a control v riable. Therefore his model is differs 
from Negi shi's model in which the saving ratio is assumed o be 
constant . 
Pitchford ' s results are similar to those of the static models dis-
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cussed in Chapter I. At any point of time he optimal level of 
foreign investment and the optimal tax rate agree with those derived 
from the static analysis with the same assumption of complete 
specialization of production in both countries . However , the 
optimal long-run solution is not derived explicitly in the static 
analysis. If the rate of discount of future utilities c is less 
than ~ , the lowest rate of return at which any country will lend , 
it is optimal for the home country to have no f oreign direct invest-
ment i n the long-run . If however c is greater than ~ , the 
optimal level of foreign investment remains positive for all time . 
When Pitchford restricts the mobility of capital internationally by 
assuming that capital is irreversible he does not develop the complete 
set of optimal growth paths for any initial levels of foreign invest-
ment and domestically-owned capital but instead considers the 
characteristic s of var ious paths. 
As I have independently developed a similar model for the case of 
direct foreign investment under the various patterns of specialization 
of production , any further discussion of Pitchford 's analysis will be 
consider•ed when this model is presented in Chapter VII I . 
In the following discussion of optimal foreign borrowing, there are 
two concepts which Bardhan and Hamada have used which will not be 
utilised . The first is the concept of disutility of foreign capital 
in the home country , which was considered by Bardhan . The second is 
Hamada ' s wealth-indebtedness restriction (or wealth-creditness 
restriction) . This assumption seems to have been included in his 
model to eliminate the possibility of obtaining a trivial solution . 
As both of these concepts appear artificial in nature they will not 
be used in the following theory . 
Chapter IV 
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
There are many factors , both economic and non-economic , the behaviour 
of which it is necessary to examine to give a clear understanding 
of the nature of interna ional capital movements. These factors 
include the degree of mobility of capital internationally , the 
characteristics of the international capital market , the existing 
level of international debt and he stability of the country both 
politically and economically. 
The standard model of international trade theory assumes perfect 
mobility of factors of production wi hin each country but complete 
immobility of factors between countries. On the other hand , in 
recent literature 1 dealing with international capital movemen s 
the assumptions which have been made are not far short of implying 
perfect mobility of capital between countries. The true situation 
however is a complex mixture of partial , total and zero mobility 
which is difficult, if not impossible , to represent generally. 
There are two aspects o international capital mobility in a growth 
model . The first is the question of reversibility of foreign 
investment. In the literature referred to above it is assumed that 
1. Far example , recent papers by R.W. Jones [13] , P.K. Bardhan [7] , 
K. Hamada [10]. 
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reversibility is achieved by he physical withdrawal of foreign-
owned capital if foreign borrowing has been excessive , bu reversib-
ility could also be achieved by buying out foreign investments as 
an al ernative to domestic investment. In he models to be presented 
below, I have assumed that neither form of reversibility is possible . 
The first because in some cases it is obviously physically impossible 
and in others the expense would be prohibitive. Initially I have 
omitted the possibility of buying out foreign-owned capital because 
it often appears difficult in practice to persuade foreign owners 
to sell their invested capital - perhaps this may be partly for 
non-economic reasons . Then foreign ownership of capital can only 
be reduced by the non-replacement of foreign-owned capital and thus 
the stock of such capital is allowed to depreciate . However, this 
assumption is later relaxed so that the implications of permitting 
buying-out of foreign-owned capital can be investigated. 
The second aspect of capital mobility is concerned with the supply 
of and the demand for foreign-owned capital in the international 
capital market . When the home country is a borrower there is a 
limit to the rate of expansion of foreign-owned capital in the home 
country, determined by the supply of capital in the international 
capital market . The supply of such capital is a function of the 
rate of return on capital in the international capital market . 
Similarly when the home country is a lender of capital there is a 
limit to the amount of foreign lending , set by the demand for capital 
by the borrowing countries. This demand is also determined by the 
rate of return on capital in the international capital market . 
However there is a na ural upper limi to the supply of capital 
available for lending which is determined by the limited capacity 
of he lending country ' s capital goods industries . 
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In the models to be presented below it is assumed that capital is 
neither completely mobile nor completely immobile between countries . 
Both Bardhan [7] and Hamada [10] have assumed prefect mobility of 
international capital . Therefore the introduction of this more 
realistic assumption should modify their results . 
The behaviour of the rate of return on capital borrowed or lent 
plays an important role in the theory of international capital move-
ments . If the form of the international capital movement is that 
of direct investment in the borrowing country then the gross rate 
of return on the foreign-owned capital is the same as that on the 
domestically-owned capital . That is , the gross rate of return 
equals the marginal product of total capital employed in the 
economy . Then the gross rate of return on the foreign investment 
is a decreasing function of the total capital in the borrowing 
country . 
When the international capital movement is of the form of an inter-
national loan then the rate of return depends on the relative size 
of the country , the size of the existing international debt and risk 
factors such as political and economic stability . The political 
stability of the borrowing country is a difficult factor to define 
precisely and a difficult factor for the lending country to measure . 
However economic stability and the ability to pay the interest on 
the international loan are directly related . Thus economic and 
political stability are included in the risk factors associated with 
international capital movements . In the models to follow it is 
assumed that the world economy is riskless . This assumption has 
been made in most growth models although in the real world risk is 
one of the more important factors entering into any investment 
decision . 
75 . 
When the country is relatively smal~ the rate of return is equal to 
that ruling in the international capital market . That is , the rate 
of return is independent of both the size of the current international 
loan and the level of the existing international debt . However when 
the country is relatively large , its borrowing or lending influences 
the rate of return ruling in the international capital market . The 
rate of return is a function of the size of the loan and of the 
existing international indebtedness of the country . In the models 
below this function is approximated by assuming that the rate of 
return is a function of the total level of international indebtedness . 
It has been noted in Chapter III above that Bardhan has assumed that 
the rate of return is a function of the level of international 
indebtedness per head. That is , when the country is a borrower , 
the rate of return on the foreign borrowing is a function of the 
amount of the foreign borrowing per head in the borrowing country . 
This function is extremely unrealistic because the population of 
the borrowing country is not considered by the lender in determining 
the rate of interest at which it is willing to make an international 
loan to the borrowing country . A similar argument exists for the 
case when the home country is an international lender of capital . 
The rate of interest which the borrowing country is willing to pay 
on foreign loans is determined independently of the population of 
the lending country . 
If i(t) is the interest rate payable on .a loan made a t time t 
and If(t) the borrowing at time t the total interest payable 
on loans over the time period T is given by 
fn i(t) If(t) dt . 
n- T 
This equals i(t) Kf only if i(t) is constant for all t . 
That is , 
Jn i n-, 
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where Kf is the total amount of orelgn borrowing over he time 
pericxl t , Then the Bardhan model is only an inexact approximation 
unless i is constant or such fixed interest loans are not made . 
The more realistic assumptions relating to the nature of international 
capital movements, namely that the mobility of capital is restricted 
and that the rate of return on foreign loans , when the home country 
is relatively large , is a function of the total amount of inter-
national debt , are introduced into the mcxlels below , one at a time , 
so that full effect of each new assumption can be determined. 
Chapter V 
OPTIMAL GROWTH WITH RESTRICTED MOBILITY 
OF FOREIGN CAPITAL 
As dis cussed in the previous chapter , capital in the real world is 
ne ither completely mobile nor completely immobile internationally 
but is rather one of restricted mobility . 
Bardhan [7] discusses the optimal capital accumulation of a relatively 
l arge country which borrows from an international capital market , 
wh en capi tal is assumed to be completely mobile internationally . 
He assumes that the social objective of the country is to minimise , 
over an infinite horizon , the integral of the shortfall of the 
actual rate of social welfare from the maximum sustainable level of 
such welfare by controlling amongst other things the level of 
foreign borrowing from the international capital market . That is , 
the country can adjust the level of foreign borrowing instantaneously 
by shipping the foreign-owned capital to or from the home country . 
His model may be made more realistic by restricting the movement of 
foreign - owned capital . I have introduced such a restriction i nto 
the model by assuming irreversibility of capital . To do this it is 
necessary to reformulate the problem so that the country controls 
not the level of total foreign borrowing but the level of per capita 
current foreign borrowing . 
In section I the Bardhan problem will be re-worked and then in 
section II the case where the mobility of foreign capital is res -
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tricted will be considered . By comparing these results the full 
i mplications of the abo ve restriction will be seen ex plici ly . In 
section III the effects of permitting he home country to repay 
for eig n loans will be considered . In all three sections of this 
chapter the objective function is assumed to be linear . In the 
following chapter the effec sofa non-linear objective function on 
the optimal growth paths will be examined. 
I 
In the model presented below it is assumed that capital and labour 
are the only factors of production and that the country produces 
only one good which may be either consumed or invested . Despite the 
fact that international trade is not mentioned in the following 
ana l ysis it is possible to think of the model either as incor porating 
or not i ncorporating trade . 
The country faces an imperfect international capital market from 
which it borrows but to which i can never lend . It is assumed that 
all capital whether borrowed or domestically-owned is fully empl oyed . 
If kd is the domestically-owned capital/head (kd ~ 0) and kf 
the foreign-owned capital/head in the home country (kf ~ 0) , then 
the total capital/head employed is 
The domestically-owned capital accumulation equation is 
or 
where id is the current domestic investment/capita (id - 0) 
µ he constant rate of population growth and o the constant rate 
of capi al depreciation (w = µ + o) 
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It is assumed that the country has a nee-classical production 
function in per capita terms under conditions of constant returns 
to scale with 
f ' (k) > 0 , f"(k) < 0 
f(O) = 0 
f(00) : 00 
f'(O) = 00 
f 1 ( 00 ) = 0 
The rate of interest payable on borrowed capital is a function of 
the amount borrowed per head of population in the home country . 2 
That is , 
r = r(kf) > O 
and r'(kf) > 0 . 
There is however an upper limit y to kf with r(y) = 00 • Then 
the marginal cost of borrowing is ~(kf) = r(kf) + r ' (kf) .kf such 
that ~'(kf) > O . 
If c is the current consumption/capita (c ~ 0) and c the 
maximum sustainable level of consumption per capita , then the home 
country ' s budget constraint is 
Now the home country's aim is to minimise the difference between 
the actual level and the maximum sustainable level of consumption 
along the accumulation path from the initial point to a fi xed end-
point by choosing whatever amounts of current per capita domestic 
investment , current per capita consumption and the level of foreign 
2 . As discussed in Chapter IV, this is the assumption which Burdhan 
makes regarding the rate of interest payable on a foreign loan . 
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borrowing which satisfy the budget constraint . That is, the objective 
is to minimi e 
T 
J (~ - c )dt , where T is unspecified , 
0 
(1) 
along the path from any initial point to the endpoint subject to 
f (k) 
- r(kf) . kf - i - C :::: 0 ' (2) d 
kd = i d 
- wd~ ' (3) 
C ~ 0 a n<l (4) 
id ~ 0 (5) 
The fixed endpoint (kd kf) is such that sustainable consumption 
or net output per head is maximised . Net output is 
Y = f(kd + kf) - r(kf) .kf - wkd . To maximise net output wi th 
respect to kd and kf 
ay 
akd = f' - w = 0 
ay 
akf = f' -
cp = 0 
That is, the endpoint is defined by f' = w = cp • This is illustra-
ted in the diagram below. The shapes of the curves have been 
derived in Appendix No, l . 
_____ ,:_f I =cp 
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This endpoint is dependent on the initial assumption that 
w > r(O) > o • That is , that the rate of depreciation on domestically-
owned capital plus the rate of population growth is greater than the 
rate of interest in the international capital market before the home 
country borrows . r(O) is the gross rate of interest payable on a 
foreign loan . Therefore r(O) must be greater than o , the rate 
of capital depreciation , for the lending country to be attracted 
to the home country ' s foreign loan raising activities . Then f ' = ~ 
becomes f ' = r(O) at kf = 0 and the curve f' = ~ cuts the 
kd axis at a point beyond the point where f ' = w The curves 
f ' = w and f ' = ~ will intersect on the kf = 0 axis if 
w = r(O) > o initially but there is no point of intersection if 
initially w < r(O) > o But when the rate of depreciation on 
domestically-owned capital plus the rate of population growth is 
less than the rate of interest in the international capital market , 
at the endpoint the home country would only be . interested in lending 
domestically-owned capital to the market although initially it may 
be optimal to borrow foreign-owned capital . Therefore I have chosen 
to omit the case where w < r( O) > o from this section en foreign 
borrowing and to consider only the ca s e where 
initially . 
w > r(O) > o 
In the optimization problem which must now be solved , the control 
variables c , id , kf can be chosen subject to the given con-
straints to determine the movement of the state variable kd 
. 
3 h. h . This problem is solved by Arrow ' s Method of Solution w ic is 
I • Pr• • l 4 based on Pontryagin s Maximum incip e . 
3 . Arrow [ 3 J . 
4 . Pontryagin [30] , page 19, Theorem No. 1 . 
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Define the Hamiltonian 
( 6) 
and the Lagrangian 
where Al , the auxiliary variable , has the interpretation of the 
social price of net domestic investment and p,t and p are the 
Lagrange multipliers . 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) Al is a continuous function of time given by 
~ = - [pf ' - Aw] 
akd 1 ( 8) 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification 5 
at any point of time and the Hamiltonian is maximised 
subject to this constraint . That is 
aL 
- - 1 + t dC - p = 0 
p ::: 0 
t ::: 0 
pid = 0 
tc = 0 
= 0 
(9) 
(lo) 
( 11) 
(12) 
(13) 
p ::: 0 p[f(k) - r(kf) . kf - C - id]= 0 
(14) 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for an optimal 
5 . Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4] . 
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solution because the Hamiltonian H is concave in the state 
variable kd , given Al and t This sufficiency condition is 
given by Arrow [3] , lecture ~ proposition 4 . 
From (9) and (13) , p ~ 1 (15) 
Therefore using (14) , all net output is used for either id or 
c . Then all possible policy combinations satisfying the given 
constraint are 
Policy 
A 
B 
C 
Properties of these policies 
Policy A 
C = F 
From (12) to (15) 
p ~ 0 t = 0 p = 1 
Substituting into (10) and (8) 
Policy B 
C = 0 
From (12) to (15) 
id C 
0 F 
F 0 
<F(>O) <F(>O) 
where F = f - rkf . 
p = 0 t :".: 0 p :".: 1 
Substituting into (10) and (8) 
Policy C 
From (12) to (15) 
p = 0 
C > 0 
t = 0 
-[A (f ' - w)J 1 
p = l 
Substituting into (10) and (8) 
Al = -[f ' - w] . 
But Al= 1 , therefore Al= O 
i.e . f ' = w 
That is , policy C can only be optimal at the endpoint . 6 
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6 . As is explained in the next paragraph , kf is freely adjusted 
so that f ' = ~ always . But along policy C , f' = w . Therefore 
policy C can only be optimal at the endpoint where f ' = ~ and 
f ' = w 
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The Phase Diagram 
Because kf is a control, the amount of foreign borrowing can be adjusted 
immediately ro that f ' = qi and then by applying the appropriate policy , 
A or B, the system moves along f ' = qi to the endpoint (kd , kf) . 
" Along f ' = w , kd + kf = k Therefore in the region f' > w 
k < k and along f ' = qi in this region kd < kd . Then the 
optimal policy is B along which all o net output is allocated 
to qomestic investment and nothing to consumption . Also in the 
region f ' < w , kd > kd along f ' = qi • Therefore he optimal 
policy is A , along which all of net output is consumed and 
domestically - owned capital is allowed to depreciate at the maximum 
possible rate . 
II 
The assumptions of this model are the same as those of the previous 
model bu now the movement of kf is restricted by introducing 
if , the current foreign borrowing/capita , as a control variable. 
Then from the assumption of restricted mobility of foreign capital , 
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0 S if S V where V is the upper limit to the amount of current 
foreign borrowing imposed by the physical limitations on supply . 
All other variables are as defined for the previous model . Then 
the for eign-owned capital accumulation equation is 
Then the objective is to minimise 
T 
J (~ - c)dt , 
0 
where T is unspecified , along the path from any initial point to 
the fixed endpoint , subject to 
f(kd + kf) 
- r(kf)kf - C - i d ~ 0 (16) 
kd = id wkd (17) 
kf = if - wk (18) f 
C ~ 0 (19) 
. > 0 ld - (2 0 ) 
0 < . 
- lf s V (21) 
In the optimization problem which must now be solved , the control 
variables c , id , if can be chosen , subject to the given budget 
constraint , to determine the movement of the state variables kd 
and kf . Using Arrow ' s method 7 of solution again , the Hamiltonian 
is 
(22) 
and the Lagrangian is 
7 . Arrow [3] . 
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L = H + pid + qif + v[V 
(23) 
where Al and A2 are the auxiliary variables and p ,q , v , t,p are 
the Lagrange multipliers . These auxiliary variables have the 
economic interpretation of social prices of net domestic and net 
foreign borrowing respectively . 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are 
(a) Al and A2 are continuous functions of 
time given by 
c)L 
Al = - -;;;--k = -[pf I 
0 d 
aL A = - - = - [ p ( f ' - ¢, ) - A 2w J . 2 akf 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint 
Qualification 8 at any point of time and 
the Hamiltonian is maximised subject to 
this constraint . That is 
aL 
ac-1+t-p 
aL 
aid 
aL 
aif 
p ::'.: 0 
q ::'.: 0 
V ::'.: 0 
t ::'.: 0 
p ::'.: 0 
v[V 
tc = 0 
= 0 
= 0 
V : 0 
8 . Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4] . 
0 
( 24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
( 29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
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A further necessary condition from the Pontryagin Theorem 9 is that 
this optimal value of H be zero so that for optimality , c , id and 
if from (22) satisfy 
(34) 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality from 
Arrow [3] , lecture l , proposition 4 . 
From ( 26) to ( 32) , p :::. l . (35) 
Therefore , from (33) all net output is used for either id or c 
Then all possible policy combinations satisfying the given 
constraint are 
Policy id C if 
A 0 F 0 
B 0 F >O ( <V) 
C 0 F V 
D F 0 0 
E F 0 >O(<V) 
F F 0 V 
G <F(>O) <F( >O) 0 
H <F( > 0) <F(>O) >O(<V) 
I < F( > 0) < F( > 0) V 
where F = f(k) - r(kf) . kf , 
Properties of these policies 
By substituting the values of id , if and c along each policy 
into the equations (24) to (33) and (35) it is possible to determine 
the values of Al , A2 , Al and A2 . This detailed working is 
9 . Pontryagin [30] , page 19 , Theorem No . 1 . 
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provided in Appendix No.lbut the following table gives a sufficient 
summary of this information . 
Policy Al A2 Region in which 
policy is optimal 
A s 1 s 0 f ' 
-
w , f ' s <P 
B s 1 = 0 f ' 
-
w f ' = <P , 
C s 1 :: 0 f ' 
-
w , f ' :: <P 
D :: 1 s 0 f ' 
-
w , f ' s <P 
E :: 1 = 0 f ' :: w , f ' = <P 
F :: 1 :: 0 f ' :: w , f ' 
- <P 
G = 1 s 0 f ' = w f ' < <P , -r 
H = 1 = 0 f ' = w , f ' = <P 
I = 1 :: 0 f ' = w f ' :: <P , 
Possible policy switches 
The shadow prices , Al and A2 , which are continuous functions of 
time and of the state variables (kd , kf) also possess continuous 
derivatives with respect to time . It is the combination of these 
two properties which allows the policy switches to be determined . 
The possible switches are set out in the table below which is based 
A . 1 on ppendix No . 1. Policies B, E, G, I cannot switch in o any other 
policy . Therefore they have been omitted from that part of the table . 
A zero indicates that no switch is possible while the other inform-
ation given relates to the conditions necessary for the switch to 
take place . Condition (i) must exist immediately before the switch 
and condition (ii) must exist at the "switching surface" . 
1 . All possible policy switches are derived in Appendix No . 1 . 
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Table of Switches 
Switches Switches out of 
into 
A C D f 
A 
- 0 0 0 
B ( i ) f I <<p ( i) f I ><p 0 0 (ii) F>wk d 
C 0 
- 0 0 
D (i) f ' <w 0 
- (i) f I ><p ( i i) F<wk (ii) f ' =<t> and d 
f "(F-wk) 
+wk </> ' <O f 
E 0 0 (i) f I >w ( i) f I ><p 
(ii) f " (F-wk) (ii) f " (F-wk) 
+wk </> ' <O f +wk cp ' <O f 
F 0 0 0 
-
G ( i) f ' <w 0 (i) f ' >w 0 (ii) F>wkd (ii) F>wkd 
I 0 (i) f ' <w 0 (i) f ' >w 
Us i ng all the information summarized in this table it is possible 
to construct the phase diagram showing the paths of the optimal 
pol icies . 
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The Phase Diagram 2 
f ' =~ 
I . Region f ' > w 
(A) f ' < ~ 
In this region k < k , kd < kd , kf > kf Therefore the optimal 
policy is D , along which all net output is allocated to domestic 
investment , nothing to consumption and foreign capital is allowed 
to depreciate at the maximum possible rate . If at the initial 
position kf is such that F < wkd then although all of net out-
2. The shapes of the curves F = 0 , F = wk d and 
f " (F - wk ) + wk~ , = 0 are derived in Appendix No . 1. In drawing f 
this phase dia gram it is assumed that f " (F - wkd) + wk ~ ' = 0 f 
cuts the kd = 0 axis above f ' = ~ so that policy E lies along 
the whole of f ' = ~ in the region f ' :::: w 
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pu is allocated to domestic investment it is not greater han the 
amoun t of depreciation so kd as well as kf falls un il F > wkd . 
Then by increasing total capital per head , f ' is reduced until 
f ' equals either ~ or w. (This depends on the initial position . ) 
(i) If the system reaches f ' = w , the optimal path switches 
from policy D to G along which kf depreciates a the 
maximum possible rate, thus reducing ~ so that at the 
= w = ~ But the path o G is along f ' = w endpoint 
where k = 0 This is achieved by allocating he required 
amount from net output to domestic investment and the balance 
to consumption. 
(ii) If the system reaches f ' = ~ , then the optimal pa h switches 
from policy D to E which takes the system along f' = ~ 
o the endpoint . Along policy E all net output is invested 
(kd > 0) , nothing is allocated to consumption and kf < 0 
but > -wkf . That is, f' is reduced to w by increasing 
k by allocating net output o kd and allowing kf o 
depreciate so as to keep f' = ~ • 
Tha 1s , the 0ptimal policy D switches to either policy E or 
G . The difference between these policies arises from the fact 
that along G , k = k bu along E , k < k . 
(B) f ' > ~ 
Because k k , the optimal policy is F which allocates all of 
total net output to domestic investment and current foreign invest-
ment is at he maximum amount possible (1.e. V) until either f ' 
equals ~ or w. 
(i) If f ' becomes equal to w first , the optimal policy 
93. 
swi ches from policy F to policy I along which kf 
continues to increase a the maximum possible rate until f ' 
is decreased such that f ' = w = ~ But the path o policy 
I is along f' - w where k - k so that to reach the endpoint 
it is necessary to change only the composition of ownership 
of capital and not the totdl amount of capital . This is 
achieved by allocating the required amount from otal net 
output to domestic investment and the balance to consumption . 
(ii) If along policy F f ' becomes equal to ~ then the optimal 
policy switches from F to E . This has been discussed 
in (A) above. 
II . Region f ' < w 
(A) f ' > ~ 
The optimal policy in this region where k > k , kd > kd , kf < k 
is policy C along which all net output is consumed , nothing is 
allocated to domestic investment and foreign-owned capital is 
increased at the maximum possible rate. Thus , by decreasing total 
capital per head , f ' is increased un il it equals either w or 
~ . (This depends on the initial position.) 
(i) I along policy C the system reaches f ' = w first , the 
optimal policy switches from policy C to I . 
been discussed in I (B) above. 
This has 
(i i) If the system reaches f ' = ~ first , the optimal policy 
switches from policy C o B along which all net outpu 
is allocated to cons mption , nothing to investment (kd < 0) 
and k > 0 f Thus f ' is increased o w by reducing k 
hy allowing kd to depreciate at the maximum possible rate 
and by increasing k so as to keep f ' = ~ . 
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(B) f ' < cp 
Because in this region k > k , the optimal policy is A which 
a llocates all of total net output to consumption and allows both 
kd and kf to depreciate until ei her f ' equals w or cp 
(Neglect for the moment all points of this region which do no 
lie on a path o policy A which cuts f ' = w in the F > wk d 
region , that is , the shaded area on the phase diagram . ) 
(i) If he system reaches f ' = w first , the optimal policy 
switches from A o G . This has been discussed in I 
(A) above . 
(ii) If policy A takes the system to f ' = cp first , the optimal 
(C) 
policy switches from A to B 
cussed in II (A) above . 
This then has been dis -
Th e remaining region is the shaded area on the phase diagram . In 
this region k > k and kf > kf . Therefore the optimal policy is 
either A or D Both policies A and D can exist in this 
region but if the initial policy is A then it must switch to 
policy D somewhere inside the region . These policies differ 
mainly in the rate of depreciation of kd . Policy A allocates 
nothing to kd thus allowing maximum depreciation of kd , whilst 
policy D allocates all of total net output to kd but this is 
not sufficient to cover depreciation so kd does not increase . 
The ac ual level of kd at which the policy switch occurs is 
indeterminate . 
Quali ication 
If the curve f"(F - wk)+ wkfcp ' = 0 cuts the line f ' = cp i n 
the region f ' > w then policy E is no longer op imal along the 
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whole of f ' = ~ in this region . Thus the phase diagram is a s given 
below . 
f " (F - wk) + wk ~ ' = O f 
f I= ~ 
The optimal policies remain the same in most regions of the phase 
diagram but it should be noted that because policy E does not 
lie along f ' = ~ in the region f"(F - wk) + wkf~ ' < 0 , policy 
F will still ake the economy to the f ' = ~ curve but there it 
switches into policy D which as before switches to E at f ' . = ~ 
in the region f" (F - wk) + wkf~ ' > 0 . Policy E then takes the system 
to the fixed endpoint. 
Comparison of the two models 
In the first model , as kf is a control variable , the optimal 
policy is to adjust the level of kf instantaneously so that the 
marginal product of foreign borrowing is equated to its marginal 
cost . Then subsequent adjus ments to the endpoint depend on whether 
If kd < kd say , domestic capital is increased at the 
ma ximum possible rate with instantaneous adjustments of kf such 
as o maintain the relationship f ' = ~ . 
The introduction of the above. restrictions on he movement of 
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foreign-owned capital in the second model does not allow the 
instantaneous adjustment of kf as kf is restricted to 
- wkf S kf S V - wkf . In this model there are two important 
relationships which determine the optimal policy - namely the 
relationship between f' and ~ and that between f' and w , 
that is , (a) the marginal product and the marginal cost of foreign 
borrowing and (b) the size of the total capital stock rela ive to 
its optimum size . 
To illustrate the conclusions for the second model take the case , 
say, of a country for which k < k 
(i) If the country has less than optimal foreign borrowing then 
the optimal policy is F along which kd and k are 
increased at the maximum possible rate until either f' = ~ 
or k = k 
(a) If the marginal product of the oreign-owned capital 
becomes equal to its marginal cost then the optimal policy 
switches from F to E or, as discussed in the qualific-
ation , from F to D and hen in o E . Along policy E 
kd continues to increase at the maximum possible rate and 
kf is controlled so as to maintain the equality between f' 
and ~ until the endpoint is reached where kd = k 
' kf = d 
(b) If the total capi al stock reaches the optimal capital 
kf 
stock size, then he optimal policy switches from F to I 
Along I , only the composition of he capital stock is 
changed by continuing to increase kf at the maximum possible 
ra e and adjusting kd so as o keep k = k until he end-
point is r ached. 
(ii) I the country has excessive foreign borrowing and hence a 
deficiency in domestically-owned capital , the optimal policy 
is D along which domestic inves ment is increased at the 
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maximum possible rate and the foreign-owned capital is 
reduced by allowing it to depreciate at the fastest po.ssible 
rate until either k = k or 
' = ct> 
(a) If along policy D the total capital stock is increased 
to the optimal level k , then the optimal policy switches 
from policy D to G along which the composition of k 
is adjusted by continuing to allow the oreign-owned capital 
to depreciate at the maximum possible rate and increasing 
kd so that k remains at the optimal level until the amount 
of foreign borrowin? is no longer excessive; that is , until 
the endpoint where f ' = cp and k = k . 
(b) If the excess foreign borrowing is reduced so that along 
D the marginal product of the foreign-owned capital becomes 
equal to its marginal cost hen the optimal policy switches 
from D to E . Along E foreign-owned capital is adjusted 
so that f ' - cf> and kd is increased at the maximum possible 
rate until the endpoint is reached where k = k . 
Comparing these two sets of results it is clearly seen that the 
assumption of restricted mobility of international capital does 
modify the answer . When the movement of foreign capital is 
unrestricted the op imal policy is always to adjust the level of 
foreign borrowing instantaneously so that the marginal product of 
the foreign-owned capital equals its marginal cost . But when the 
mobility of foreign capital is restricted , instantaneous adjustment 
of foreign capital is no longer possible and both domestically-owned 
and foreign-owned capital are adjusted simultaneously until either 
the marginal product of the foreign-owned capital equals its 
marginal cost or the total capital stock equals the optimal amount 
of capital stock. Then by a policy switch the system is taken to 
the endpoint where both criteria are satisfied . 
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III 
In this section the home country is permi ted to reduce its inter-
national debt by repaying part of its interna ional loans . Then 
the home country ' s current domestic investment per head (id) has 
two possible components . They are id the current domestic 
1 
investment per head out of the country ' s net output and id the 
2 
current domestic investment per head resulting from the repayment 
of part of the foreign loans . Then id = id + id with both 
1 2 
id and id restricted to non-nega ive values . 1 2 
The capital accumulation equations are now 
kd = id + id - wkd 
1 2 
kf = if id 
2 
wkf 
Then he home coun ry ' s objective is to minimise 
!~ (c - c)d 
where T is unspecified, along the path from any initial point to 
the endpoin subject to 
kd = id + 
1 
id - wkd 
2 
kf = if - id - wkf 
2 
C ~ 0 
id ~ 0 
1 
id ~ 0 
2 
0 :s if - V 
This solution is presen ed in Appendix No . 2 and is similar to that 
given in section II except that now there are four control variables , 
namely id , id , if and 
1 2 
C As before all of net output is 
alloca ed to either id , id or c . Therefore all the possible 
1 2 
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policy combinations can be listed . When id = 0 the problem is 
2 
the same as that in section II above . Thus policies A to I 
are identical to those given there , with id held at zero level . 
2 The additional possible policies are 
Policy id id C if l 2 
J 0 F 0 0 
K 0 F 0 0 < if < V 
L 0 F 0 V 
M 0 < id < F 0 < id < F 0 0 l 2 
N 0 < id < F 0 < id < F 0 0 < if < V l 2 
0 0 < id < F 0 < id < F 0 V 
l 2 p 0 0 < id < F 0 < C < F 0 
2 
Q 0 0 < i < F 0 < C < F 0 < if < V d2 
R 0 0 < id < F 0 < C < F V 
2 
s 0 < id < F 0 < id < F 0 < C < F 0 l 2 
T 0 < id < F 0 < id < F 0 < C < F 0 < if < V 1 2 
u 0 < id < F 0 < id < F 0 < C < F V 1 2 
The possible policy switches are derived in Appendix No . 2 and are 
summarised in the following table . 
Table of Switches 
Switches Switches into 
out of 
A B C F I J D,E, K M, N, O 
A 
- (i) f ' <cj) 0 0 0 0 0 (ii) F>wkd 
C 0 (i) f r >cj) 
- 0 (i) f ' <w 0 0 
F 0 0 0 - ( i) f '>w 0 ( i) f ' ><P 
J (i) f ' <w 0 0 0 0 - (i) f ' >w 
f ' <<P 
(ii) f ' -w=>- w 2 
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Policies G, P , S have been omitted from the above able because they 
are non-optimal policies. Similarly , policies H, L, Q, R, T and U 
have been omitted as they are only internally consistent a the 
endpoint . Also the policies B, D, E, I , K, M,N and O canno switch 
i n o another policy . Therefore they have been omitted from hat 
part of the table . 
A zero indicates that no switch is possible while the other inform-
ation given relates to the conditions necessary for the switch to 
take place . Condition (i) must exist immediately before the switch 
and condition (ii) must exist at the "switching surface" . 
Policies D, E, K, M,N and O are all optimal along f' = ~ in the 
region f ' > w . Policies D, E, M have been examined in Appendix 
No . 2 , but so far the policies K, N, O have not been discussed . 
Along the policies K, N, O the home country increases its foreign 
borrowing (if> 0) and at the same time repays part of its 
international loan (id > 0) 
' 
but for the policies to be consist -2 
ent if and id must be such that kf decreases . Thus policies 2 
K, N, O have the same effect on kd and kf as does policy E 
As it is optimal for the home country to reduce its foreign borrowing , 
it does not seem rational to both increase and decrease the amount 
of foreign borrowing to achieve this . Thus policies K, N, O appear 
to be irrational policies for the home country to adopt . The 
economy can be moved along that same part of the f ' = ~ curve by 
adopting policy E. In the real world policies K, N, O would be 
rational policies only in the case in which part of the international 
loan matures and by agreement must be repaid . It would be 
optimal to repay this matured loan and then to increase the level 
of foreign borrowing so as to move the economy along f ' = ~ 
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The Phase Diagram 
y 
f ' =~ 
Comparing this phase diagram with the one presented in section II 
of this chapter , it is seen that the optimal growth paths in the 
region f ' ~ ~ are identical . 
In the region f ' < ~ k > k ~ , f f I is now optimal to reduce the 
level of foreign borrowing by repaying part of the international 
debt . The optimal policy is J along which all of net output is 
allocated to the repayment of foreign loans . However , when the 
economy approaches f ' = ~ the region f ' < w , kd > kd and kf 
approaches its optimal level, the optimal policy switches from J 
to A . As derived in the Appendix No . 2 , this switch occurs when 
Then along pol icy A all o net output is allocated 
to consumption and both the level of domestically-owned capital and 
foreign borrowing are allowed to depreciate . When the level of 
foreign borrowing is such that f ' = ~ the policy switches from 
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A to B which , as before, takes the economy along f ' = ~ to 
the endpoint . 
Conclusion 
The introduct ion of the possibility of repaying foreign loans has 
modified the solution somewhat . When foreign borrowing is excessive 
and the level of domestically-owned stock is either below its 
optimal level or not as excessive as the foreign borrowing , it is 
optimal to allocate all of net output to the repaym:nt of foreign 
loans until the level of foreign borrowing is either reduced to its 
opt imal level corresponding to the stock of domestically-owned 
capital or reduced so that it is in no greater excess than is the 
stock of domestically-owned capital . Then by the policy switches 
discussed above the economy is taken to the endpoint . 
Chapter VI 
OPTIMAL GROWTH WITH A NON-LINEAR 
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
In the models presented in the previous chapter , the home country ' s 
aim is to minimise the difference between the actual level and 
maximum sustainable level of consumption along is capital accumul-
ation path. That is , the objective function is assumed to be linear . 
Bardhan [7] , on the other hand , assumes a non- linear objective 
function . Therefore , the introduction of diminishing marginal utility 
of consumption into the model will allow a strict comparison to be 
made with the Bardhan model . Initially , capital will be assumed to 
be perfectly mobile internationally as this agrees with Bardhan ' s 
assumption. Then in section II , the case in which the mobility of 
foreign capital is restricted and the repayment o~ foreign loans is 
not permitted will be discussed . Then comparing the results of this 
model with those of the model with a linear objective function (dis-
cussed in section II of Chapter V) , an analysis of the effects of 
diminishing marginal utility on the determination of the optimal 
growth paths can be made . 
I 
Using the variables as defined in the preceding chapter , the home 
country ' s objective is now to minimise 
JT A 0 [u(c) - u(c)]dt , 
where T is unspeci ied , alonr the path from any initial point to 
the fi xed endpoint subject to 
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f(kd + kf) 
- r(kf)kf - id - C ~ 0 
' 
kd = id - wk 
' d 
C ~ 0 and 
. > 0 ld - . 
It is also assumed that U' (c) > 0 , U"( c) < 0 and U' (O) = oo 
The fixed endpoint is such that sustainable consumption per head is 
maximised. As derived in Chapter V the endpoint (kd , kf) is 
defined by f ' = $ = w 
In the optimisation problem which must now be solved , the control 
variables id , c , kf can be chosen , subject to the given budget con-
straint , to determine the movement of the state variable kd . 
Applying Arrow ' s Method of Solution3 again , the Hamiltonian is 
and the Lagrangian is 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) The shadow price Al is a continuous function of time given by 
A = a L - -[pf ' - A J l - akd - lw 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification 4 at any 
point of time and the Hamiltonian is maximised subject to this con-
straint. That is , 
3 . Arrow [3] 
4 . Arrow, Hurwicz, Uzawa [4] 
aL 
U 1 ( C) ac - + t - p 
aL 
"1 aid = + p - p = 
aL _ 
p[f ' - cp] = 0 akf -
p :::: 0 
t :::: 0 
p :::: 0 
pid = 0 
tc = 0 
= 0 
0 
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- i J = d 0 • 
(c) The optimal value of the Hamiltonian is zero . That is , 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for an optimal 
solution because the Hamiltonian is a concave function of the state 
variable kd for given >.
1 
and t This sufficiency condition 
is given by Arrow [3] , lecture 1 , proposition 4 . 
From aL = 0 it follows that p = LJ I (c) + t . But , as t is 
positive , p:::: U'(c) . Then all of net output is distributed between 
consumption and current domestic investment . Thus all the possible 
policies can be determined but before listing these it should be 
noted that since U' (c) = 00 when consumption is zero , it can never 
be optimal to allocate all of net output to current domestic invest-
ment . Then all the possible policies with the allocation to consumption 
at the non-zero level are 
Policy id C 
A 0 F 
B O<id <F O<c<F 
where F = f(k) 
- r(kf)kf 
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Properties of these policies 
Policy A 
id = 0 C = F 
then p ~ 0 
' 
t = 0 and p = LJ I (F) 
Thus >. 1 S U' (F) and "1 = -[p f I - "1w] 
Policy B 
id > 0 C > 0 
then p = 0 
' 
t = 0 and p =U ' (c) 
Thus 
"1 = LJ I (C) and "1 = -U ' (c)[f ' - w] 
Since kf is a control variable , the amount of foreign borrowing 
can be adjusted instantaneously so that f ' = ~ Then policies 
A a nd B lie along f ' = ~ . Along policy A kd =-wkd Therefore 
policy A can only be optimal in the region f ' < w . But as kd 
can be either positive or negative along policy Bit is possible 
for B to be optimal in both the f ' < w region and the f ' > w 
region . However , from the fact that the auxiliary variable is a 
continuous function of time and of the state variable and the 
necessary condition for optimality is >.
1 
= -[pf' - >.
1
w] , policy A 
switches i nto policy Bat A = u I (F) 1 
The exact position and shape of this "switching surface" on the 
phase diagram cannot be determined because of the presence of the 
shadow price >.1 in the equation of the surface . However some 
information regarding its position on he phase diagram can be 
determined . 
Consider >.1 = U' (c) . For a constant c , >. 1 is constant and 
also the larger c the smaller >-
1 In the region f ' ~ w , 
c < F and therefore U' (c) > U' (F) and >. > U ' (F) 1 Thus the 
z 
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" switching surface" Al = U' (c) , where c = F , must lie entirely 
to the right of the curve f ' = w That is , the lower boundary to 
the surface Al= U' (c) mus lie entirely in the region f ' < w 
~ 
k 
f 
f ' =w 
The Phase Diagram 
"switching 
surface" 
A = U ' (F) 1 
Capital is assumed to be completely mobile internationally . There-
fore the level of foreign borrowing adjusts instantaneously so that 
f I : cp • 
When the stock of domestically-owned capital is below its optimal 
level kd , the op imal policy is B, along which all of net output 
is distributed between consumption and current domestic investment . 
This distribution is determined by the relationship Al= U' (c) 
which can be interpreted as follows : 
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Al is the social demand price of a unit of domestic investment 
(at time 5 t ) , measured in terms of utility units . Tha is , 
is the amount of domestic investment which society would exchange 
for a unit of utility or , 
.:!_ is the amount of utility society Al 
would exchange for a unit of domestic investment . 
U' (c) = 1~ is the amount of utility which society~ exchange for 
a unit of consumption. However , from the budget constraint , 
15.c = -15.i 
d (at time t ) . Therefore at time t 15.U - - /5.U h • h 
-- W lC 
' 15.c Md 
is the amount of utility society will forgo by investing one more 
unit of net output or the amount of utility society will gain by 
i nvesting one unit less . That is , U' (c) is the social supply 
price of a unit of domestic investment measured in terms of utility. 
Therefore the social optimal utili y at time t is determined by 
equating the social demand and social supply prices of a unit of 
domestic investment . That is , the social optimal utility is given 
by Al = U ' ( c ) . 
If initially the stock of domestically-owned capital exceeds its 
optimal level and the level of net output F is such that the social 
demand price Al of a unit of domestic investment is less than the 
social supply price U' (c) of a unit of domestic investment for 
5. The Hamiltonian H measures the sum of national income in 
terms of consumption over the time interval 0 o T If future 
national income is discounted , the Hamiltonian is the current value 
of the future flow of national income in terms of utility . However , 
because future nation l income lows are no discounted in this 
model , the Hamiltonian has the same value at all points of time. 
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all possible values of c , the optimal policy is A along which 
all of net output is consumed and the stock of domestically-owned 
capital depreciates as quickly as possible until the social supply 
and demand prices of a unit of domestic investment , measured in 
terms of utility , are equal . At this point the optimal policy 
switches from A to B which takes the economy to the endpoint . 
Along policy B, all of net output is allocated between current 
domestic i nvestment and consumption , in such a way as to maintain 
social optimal utility along its path . The allocation to current 
domestic investment is less than the depreciation of the domestically-
owned capital , so that the stock of this capital continues to fall 
until the endpoint is reached . 
Along policy B, Al = U' (c) 
so that Al = U"(c)c 
But Al = -U ' (c)[f ' w] 
Therefore C = U' (c ) [f ' U"(c) - w] 
Then along policy B consumption per head is rising when the total 
capital stock is below its optimal level and falling when the total 
capital exceeds its optimal level . (The optimal total capital 
stock is given by f ' (k) = w . ) 
Comparison with Bardhan ' s Model 
The above model differs from Bardhan ' s model (Bardhan [7]) in two 
important ways . Firstly , Bardhan assumes that the borrowing country 
derives disutility from its dependence on foreign borrowed capital . 
As stated in Chapter III , I have chosen not to include this concept 
in the models presented here . Secondly , Bardhan formulates his 
problem so that the endpoint is free . That is , the endpoint is 
determined from within he model. I n the above model the endpoint 
llO . 
is fi xed or specified in the formulation of the optimisation pro-
blem . The implications of these two differences will be seen in 
the following comparison . 
In Bardhan ' s model the level of foreign borrowing is adjusted 
instantaneously so that 
If , however , Bardhan had not included the disutility of foreign 
borrowed capital the level of foreign borrowing would have been 
adjusted instantaneously so that 
This rule is identical to that derived in the above model for the 
adjustment of the level of foreign borrowing . Then , for all levels 
of domestically-owned capital per head , the level of foreign borrow-
ing per head is greater in the above model than it is in Bardhan ' s 
model . 
Bardhan ' s endpoint satisfies the Golden Rule and is therefore 
equivalent to the above fixed endpoint , after allowance has been 
made for Bardhan ' s assumptions regarding the disutility of foreign 
borrowed capital and capital depreciation . Also it can be shown , 
after the same allowances have been made , that the capital accumul-
ation paths of Bardhan ' s model are similar to those of the above 
model . Because capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile inter-
nationally the level of foreign borrowing adjusts instantaneously 
D' (kf) 
so that f ' (k) - ip(kf) = U' (c) Therefore the optimal capital 
6 
accumulation paths are along this curve to the endpoint . It is 
6 . Bardhan [7] , page 123 . 
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then obvious that Bardhan ' s capital accumulation paths along which 
part of national income is saved are equivalent to the pa hs of 
policy B above and that the part of the capital accumulation path 
along which all of national income is consumed corresponds to the 
path of policy A above . 
From this comparison , it appears that Bardhan ' s capital accumulation 
paths are similar to those of the above model . However , the 
important difference lies in the fact that the capital accumulation 
paths of the above model are optimal paths whereas those of the 
Bardhan model may or may not be optimal .7 
II 
In section I capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between 
countries . The more realistic assumption of restricted mobility of 
foreign capital will now be introduced into the model of section I. 
It will also be assumed that the repayment of foreign loans is not 
permitted . Then using the variables as defined in the preceding 
chapter , the objective is now to minimise 
f~ [U(c) - U(c)]dt , 
where T is unspecified , along the path from any initial point to 
the fixed endpoint , subject to 
kd = id wkd 
kf = if wkf 
C 
-
0 
7. This point has been noted in Chapter III page 62 
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0 < . < V 
- J.f - . 
It is also assumed that U'(c) > 0 , U"(c) < 0 and U'( O) = 00 
The fixed endpoint is such that sustainable consumption per head 
is maximised . As derived in the above chapter the endpoint 
(kd , kf) is defined by f ' = qi = w • 
This optimisation problem is solved by applying Arrow ' s Method of 
Solution .
8 
The detailed working of this solution is given in 
Appendix No . 3 . As in the previous model the budget constraint is 
satisfied with equality . Therefore all of net output is allocated 
to either current domestic investment or to consumption . However , 
because U'( c) = 00 when consumption is zero , policies along which 
all of net output is allocated to current domestic investment are 
ruled out as they can never be optimal. Then the possible policy 
combinations satisfying the budget constraint and having the 
allocation to consumption at some positive level are : 
Policy id C if 
A 0 F 0 
B 0 F >O 
C 0 F V 
D O<id<F O<c<F 0 
E O<id<F O<c<F >O 
F O<id<F O<c<F V 
A 
G F-c C 0 
A H F-c C >0 
A 
I F-c C V 
where F = f(kd + kf) 
- r(kf)kf 
8 . Arrow [3] 
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The properties of these policies and the possible policy switches 
are disc~ssed in Appendix No . 3 . However , the following table 
gives the possible policy switches and the conditions necessary 
f or the switch to take place . Condition (i) must be satisfied 
immediately before the switch and condition (ii) must exist at the 
' 'switching surface". A zero in the table indicates that no switch 
is possible . It should be noted that policies G and I which are 
non-optimal and H which is consistent only at the endpoint , are 
e xcluded from the table . Also policy E cannot switch into any 
other polic~ Therefore it has been excluded from the relevant part 
of the table . 
Table of Switches 
Swi tches Switches into 
out of A B C D E F 
A - (i) f ' <</> 
(ii) \SU ' (F) 0 (ii) .\ =U'(F) l 0 0 
B 0 - 0 0 (ii) A =U I ( F) 0 l 
C 0 (i) f ' ></> - 0 0 
(ii) .\ l :SU' ( F) (ii) A =U I ( F) l 
D 0 0 0 - (i) f ' <</> 0 
( ii) f I =<p 
F 0 0 0 0 ( i) f I ><p -
(ii) f I =<p 
The II switching surface 11 .\ = U' (F) l has been discussed in section 
I . Its shape is indeterminate but it has been shown ( i n sect i on I) 
that this "switching surface" lies completely within the region 
f ' < w • 
The Phase Diagram 
I . Region f ' < ~ 
114 . 
"switching 
surface" 
11 = U ' (F) l 
In this region f ' < ~ , the level of foreign borrowing exceeds its 
optimal level . If , at the same time , the social supply price 
U' (c) of a unit of domestic investment , with all of net output 
F being consumed , e xceeds the social demand price >-
1 
of a unit 
of domestic investment , the optimal policy is A . Along A, all of 
net output is allocated to consumption and both domestically~owned 
capital and foreign borrowed capital are allowed to depreciate at _ 
the fastest possible rate until either the social demand and supply 
prices of a unit of domestic investment become equal ( >-
1 
= U' (F) ). 
or the level of foreign borrowing is at its optimal level corres-
ponding to the stock of domestically-owned capital (f' = ~) . 
(i) If f ' becomes equal to ~ , A switches into policy B. Along 
us . 
Ball of net output is consumed and the stock of domestically-owned 
capital continues to depreciate at the maximum possible rate whilst 
the level of current foreign borrowing is such as to maintain the 
equality between f ' and ~ Because the social demand price 
Al is less than the social supply price U' (c) of a unit of 
domestic investment , the stock of domestically-owned capital is 
reduced at the maximum possible rate until these two prices become 
equal (A 1 = U' (F)) . . Then , at Al= U'(F) , policy B switches 
into policy E. Along policy E part of net output is allocated to 
consumption and part to current domestic investment so as to main-
tain the social optimal utility (A = U' (c)) . l The level of 
current foreign borrowing is such as to maintain the equality .between 
f' and ~ In this region the stock of .domestically-owned capital 
is greater than its optimal level . Ther.efore along policy E, the 
allocation to current domestic investment is not great enough to 
cover depreciation so that the stock of domestically-owned .capita l 
A A decreases . Policy E takes the economy to the endpoint (kd , kf) . 
(ii) If along policy A the social demand and supply price of a unit 
of domestic investment become equal, the optimal policy switches 
from A to policy D at the "switching surface" Al = U' (F) . Along 
policy Dall of net output is distributed between consumption .and 
current domestic investment so as to maintain the level of utility 
at its social optimum . Because f ' is less than ~ , the stock of 
foreign borrowed capital is allowed to depreciate at .its maximum 
possible rate . Policy D remains the optimal policy until the level 
of foreign borrowing falls to its optimal level corresponding to the 
stock of domestically-owned capital . Then at £ ' = $ the optimal 
policy switches from D to E which takes the .economy .to the endpoint . 
Along Ethe allocation of net output between consumption and cur.rent 
domestic investment is such as to maintain social optimal utility 
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(A = U '( c)) 1 But along policy Ethe level of current foreign 
borrowi n g is such as to maintain the equality between f ' and $ . 
II . Region f ' > $ 
When the stock of domestically-owned capital is so large that the 
social demand price is less than the social supply price of a unit 
of domestic investment (for all possible levels of consumption) the 
optimal policy is C , along which all of net output is allocated 
to consumption and the stock of domestically-owned capital is 
a llowed to depreciate at the maximum possible rate . Since f ' is 
greater than $ the level of foreign borrowing is below its 
optimal level corresponding to the stock of domestically-owned 
capital . Therefore along policy C the stock of foreign borrowed 
capital is increased at the fastest possible rate . Policy C is the 
opt i mal policy until either f ' = $ or the social demand and 
supply prices of a unit of domestic investment become equal . 
(i) If the economy reaches the point where f ' = $ the optimal 
policy switches from C to B which takes the economy along f ' = $ 
to the "switching surface" ). 1 = U' (F) where the optimal policy 
switches to E. This movement along f ' = $ to the endpoint , using 
policies Band E, has been discussed in I (i) above . 
(ii) If policy C takes the economy to the "switching surface" 
;\l = U' (F) , the optimal policy switches at this surface from C 
to F . Along policy F part of net output is allocated to consumption 
and part to current domestic investment so as to maintain the 
equality between the social demand and supply prices of a unit of 
domestic investment . Since f ' > $ , the stock of foreign borrowed 
capital is below its optimal level corresponding to the level of 
domestically-owned capital . Therefore along policy F the stock 
of foreign borrowed capital is increased at the fastest possible 
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rate until f ' and ~ become equal . At f ' = ~ , the optimal 
policy switches from F to E which takes the economy to the endpoint . 
The switch to policy E has been discussed in I (ii) above . 
Conclusions 
The introduction of diminishing marginal utility into the model 
with restricted mobility of capital internationally , has produced 
some marked changes in the pattern of the optimal growth paths . 
Firstly , it is no longer optimal for the allocation of net output 
to consumption to be zero and secondly , the relationship between 
the total capital stock and the optimal total capital stock is no 
longer of any importance in determining the optimal growth paths . 
It is assumed in this model that U'(O) = 00 Therefore the zero 
level of consumption can never be optimal and thus along all the 
optimal growth paths there is greater emphasis on the level of 
consumption . The reason for this is that now the utility derived 
from a small increase in the consumption level when consumption is 
relatively low , is higher . Therefore it pays the country to consume 
more in the earlier stages of , and also throughout , the growth 
process , whereas in the linear model a unit increase in the con-
sumption level has the same value at all levels of consumption or 
at any stage of the growth process . Then it pays to move the 
economy as quickly as possi ble to the endpoint where consumption 
is held at the maximum sustainable level . 
Along the optimal growth paths where not all of net output is 
allocated to consumption , consumption per head adjusts over time 
according to 
c = - U ' (c) [f ' - w] . 
uTrTcT 
ll8 . 
That is , when f ' < w the allocation to consumption is falling 
and when f ' > w consumpt ion per head is rising . In the linear 
model , all of net output is allocated to consumption when f ' < w 
but when f ' > w consumpt ion is held at the zero level until the 
endpoint is reached . 
Consider the second difference in the pattern of the optimal growth 
paths . In the linear model the "switching surfaces" are f ' = w 
and f ' = ~ . The optimal growth path is the one which moves the 
economy as fast as possible to either one of these curves and then 
switches to a policy which takes the economy along the curve to 
the endpoint . That is, the system is moved as quickly as possible 
to a position where the marginal product of capital equals the 
marginal cost of borrowing, or where the total capital stock is 
at the optimal level . In this model the switching surfaces are 
>. 1 = U' (F) and f' = ~ • ). = U' (F) is the lower bound to the 1 
surface A = U' (c) over which social utility is optimised . If 
initially the social demand is less than the supply price of a unit 
of domestic investment the optimal policy is such that all of net 
output is allocated to consumption so that the economy moves as 
quickly as possible to the switching surface where the social 
demand and supply prices of a unit of investment become equal . There 
the optimal policy switches to a policy which , while maintaining 
the equality between social demand and social supply price of a unit 
of domestic investment, moves the economy as quickly as possible 
to f ' = ~ . Then at f' = ~ the optimal policy switches to one 
which while maintaining social optimal utility , moves the system 
along f ' = ~ to the endpoint. 
The relationship be tween f ' and w no longer plays an important 
role in the pattern of the optimal growth paths . This results from 
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the emphasis placed on social optimal utility of consumption in 
this model . In the linear model the allocation to consumption 
along f ' = w is the residual of the net output after the alloc-
ation to current domestic investment has been made . The amount 
going to current domestic investment is such as to move the economy 
along f ' = w . 
In this model , A. = 0 along the curve f ' = w and thus the l 
allocation to consumption must be held constant at the maximum 
sustainable level . But there is no policy along which c = c and 
the balance of net output which is allocated to current domestic 
investment maintains social optimal utility and is just sufficient 
to move the economy along f ' = w . Thus the optimal policy is 
always one of maintaining social optimal utility while moving the 
economy as quickly as possible to the f ' = ~ curve and , after a 
policy switch , along the f ' = ~ curve to the endpoint . 
Chapter VII 
OPTIMAL FOREIGN BORROWING 
BY A LARGE COUNTRY 
Hamada [10] has considered the case of a small country borrowing 
from an international capital market . In t his case the rate of 
interest payable on an international loan is constant , independent 
of the size of the loan . On the other hand , Bardhan [7] has con-
sidered the case of a large country which also borrows from an 
international capital market . The rate of interest payable on 
foreign loans is no longer constant but Bardhan assumes that it is 
a function of the level of foreign borrowing per head of the popul-
ation in the borrowing country . However , it seems that a more 
realistic assumption would be that the rate of interest is a 
function of the absolute level of foreign borrowing . The interest 
rate at which a market would lend capital would seem to be independ-
ent of the population of the borrowing country . 9 The inclusion of 
this assumption in place of Bardhan ' s leads to very different 
conclusions . 
Initially , the problem as posed by Bardhan will be re-worked . It 
will be assumed in this model that the objective function is linear . 
Then , in the second section , the assumption of restricted mobility 
of foreign capital will be introduced into the model . In these two 
9 . The rate of interest has been discussed in Chapter IV , page 74 
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sec t i ons a n e xamination of the assumption that the interest rate 
payable on foreign borrowed capital is a function of the absolute 
level of foreign borrowing will be made . 
As discussed in Chapter IV there is an upper limit to the amount of 
curr ent for eign borrowing and this is determined by the current 
s uppl y of capital Vin the international capital market . It is 
r easonable to assume that the current supply of such capital is an 
i ncreasing function of the rate of interest payable on capital in 
t he international capital market . The introduction of this assumption 
into the model in section II will allow the effects of such a limit 
to the current supply of foreign capital to be examined . 
I n section III diminishing marginal utility will be introduced into 
the model . This section gives no new results and is included only 
for completeness . 
I 
The basic assumptions and variables of the Bardhan problem have 
been discussed and defined in Chapter V. All these assumptions and 
variables remain the same here except for those relating to the 
nature of the rate of interest payable on the capital' borrowed from the 
international capital market . The rate of interest is now assumed to be a 
function of the absolute level of for ei?n borrowing . That is r = r( Kf) > 0 
Or in per capita terms r = r(Lkf) > 0 with r ' (Lkf) > 0 . 
It is assumed that there exists an upper limit y to the amount 
of foreign borrowing which is defined by r(y) = 00 
The marginal cost of borrowing is now 
4> ( Lk f ) = r ( Lk f ) + r ' ( Lk f ) . Lk f , 
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where ~ ' (Lkf) is positive . It is worth repeating here that the 
population L grows at a constant rate µ . That is , L L = µ 
Then the optimisation problem is to minimise 
along the path from any initial point to the fixed endpoint 1 subject 
to 
f(kd + kf) - r(Lkf)kf - id - c ~ O , 
kd = id - wkd , 
c ~ 0 and 
That is , the home country ' s aim is to minimise the difference 
between the actual level and the maximum sustainable level of 
consumption along the accumulation path from the initial position 
to the fixed endpoint , by choosing whatever amounts of current 
domestic investment per head , current consumption per head and the 
level of foreign borrowing , which satisfy the budget constraint . 
As in the previous models the fixed endpoint is such that sustain-
able consumption per head is maximised . 
Then maximising y with respect to kd , kf 
1 . It can be shown by integration by parts that a sufficient con -
dition for convergence of this integral is that Lt [c - c] = 0 
and that dLc dt is bounded on (O , oo) . 
t-+oo 
These conditions do hold 
along the optimal growth paths and thus the integral converges . 
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~y - f f (k) 
- w = 0 clkd -
cly - ff (k) <l> ( Lkf) = 0 clkf -
Then maximum sustainable consumption per head is achieved when 
That is , the fixed endpoint is defined by k 
In the above models the endpoint is defined in terms of kd and 
kf By describing the endpoint in terms of kd and kf , it can 
be compared directly with that of the previous models . 
By definition Therefore since L = L eut where 
0 
is the population at the initial time 
optimal level of total borrowing Kf is constant . Therefore the 
level of per capita foreign borrowinp decreases at the rate µ 
over time and thus approaches zero as time goes to infinity . 
A 
Also at the endpoint , k = k That is , kd 
grows at the rate µ so as to maintain the constant total capital-
labour ratio k . That is, as time approaches infinity , kd k . 
Then the fixed endpoint as time goes to infinity is (kd , O) , where 
This fixed endpoint can also be derived in another way by considering 
how he curve f ' (k) = <l>(Lkf) moves over time . Differentiating 
with respect to time 
But 
d [f ' (k) - <l> ( Lkf)] 
dt 
f ' (k) = <l>(Lkf) and therefore 
k I = 
f f I ( k ) = <l> ( Lk f ) 
<l>'k L - k f" f d 
f" - <l> IL 
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Therefore assuming kd to be fixed over time , kf is negative . 
Al so for a fixed kf , kd is negative . Therefore the curve 
shifts downwards to the left . From the slope 
-f" 
f I ( k) 
dkf 
dkd = f" - 14> ' of the curve , it can be seen that -the curve becomes 
flatter as it moves downwards . The following diagram illustrates 
this point . 
f '= w 
J 
- -
_I_ --- -
------
-
---
= 4>( Lkf) I 
= 4>(Lkf) I 
This diagram is dependent on the initial assumption that 
w > r( O) > cS This has been discussed in Chapter V above . 
The optimisation problem is solved again by applying Arrow ' s 
Method of Solution . 2 The detailed working of this solution is 
2 . Arrow [3] , lecture 2 , page 12 . 
t =O 
t=T 
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presented in Appendix No . 4 . As in the previous models the budget 
constra int is satisfied with equality . Therefore all of net output 
is allocated either to current domestic investment or to consumption . 
The possible policy combinations satisfying the given constraints 
are 
Policy id C 
A 0 F 
B F 0 
C O<id<F O<c<F 
where F = f(k) 
- r(Lkf)kf 
A summary of the properties of these policies which are derived in 
Appendi x No . 4 is : 
Policy 
.\1 
Region in which 
policy is optimal 
A Sl f ' = <I> f ' s w 
B :::1 f ' = <I> f ' ::: w 
C =l f ' = <I> f ' = w 
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The Phase Diagram 
f ' =w 
When the total capital-labour ratio in the country is less than the 
optimal level , the problem is one of optimal capital accumulation. 
Because kf is a control variable the level of foreign borrowing 
can be adjusted instantaneously so that f'(k) = ~(Lkf) and then 
subsequently adjusted over time to maintain this equality . Thus 
the optimal policy is B along which all of net output is allocated 
to current domestic investment and nothing to consumption . That is , 
the economy moves such that f ' (k) = ~(Lkf) until the total capital-
labour ratio reaches the optimal level where the optimal policy 
switches from B to C. Along policy C the absolute level of foreign 
borrowing (Lkf) is constant because kf is adjusted so as to 
maintain the equality f ' (k) = ~(Lkf) But because labour is 
growing at the rate µ , kf is decreasinf at the same rate so as 
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to maintain this constant Lkf . Therefore along policy C current 
domestic investment is adjusted so as to maintain the fixed optimal 
level of the total capital-labour ratio k From the above dis-
cussion of the fixed endpoint k = -k d f But kf = -µk and f 
therefore kd must equal -µkf . By definition kd = id - wkd 
Therefore the allocation from net output to current domestic invest-
If initially the total capital-labour ra t i o i n the country is greater 
than the optimal level , the optimal capital decumulation path is 
along policy A where the level of foreign borrowing is controlled so 
that f ' (k) = ~(Lkf) until the total capital-labour ratio is 
reduced to the optimum k . Then the optimal policy switches fro m 
A to C which , as above , takes the economy to the fixed endpoint 
Conclusions 
The effect of the introduction of the assumption r = r(Kf) into 
the model can be determined by comparing these results with those 
of the model where r = r(kf) in Chapter V section I . 
A A 
In the model where r = r(kf) the fixed endpoint is (kd , kf) wi t h , 
in the case w > r(O) > o , both kd and kf positive quantities . 
Now with r = r(Kf) the fixed endpoint is defined by k and 
That is , it is defined by the optimal total capital - labour ratio and 
the optimal level of absolute foreign borrowing . In both models , 
because capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile internationally , 
the level of foreign borrowing adjusts instantaneously so as to 
equate the marginal product and the marginal cost of borrowing . 
Then the optimal policy is to move the economy as quickly as pos -
ible , while maintaining this equality , to the optimal total capital-
labour ratio . In the earlier model with r = r(kf) , this endpo in t 
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is reached in finite time . However in this model with r = r(Kf) , 
the optimal total capital-labour ratio may be reached within finite 
time but the composition (kd + kf) of the optimal total capital-
labour ratio changes over time because The fixed 
endpoint is approached as time goes to infinity when kd goes to 
k and kf goes to zero . 
II 
The assumption of complete mobility of international capital has 
already been discussed in Chapter IV as being very unrealistic . 
The assumption of restricted mobility of international capital will 
be introduced again into the model as it was in Chapter V. As 
before , the level of current foreign borrowing will be introduced 
as the control variable thus eliminating Bardhan's assumption of 
reversibility of foreign borrowed capital . 
Bardhan [7] also considers the supply of foreign capital as unlimited . 
However he prevents the level of forei~ borrowing per head from 
going to infinity by assuming firstly that social disutility is 
derived from the presence of foreign -owned capital in the home 
country and secondly that at some large value y of foreign 
borrowing per head , the interest rate goes to infinity . But in 
the real world the level of current foreign borrowing is limited by 
the current supply of capital in the international capital market . 
This limit to the current supply of capital in the international 
capital market has been discussed in Chapter IV . The limit is an 
increasing function of the rate of interest payable on loans from 
the market and ~s thus assumed to be represented by V(r) , where 
V'(r) is positive . Then in this model , the assumption of restricted 
mobility of international capital is OS if S V(r) . However 
there is a natural limit to V(r) which is determined by the capacity 
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of lending country ' s capital-goods industries . 
Then the home country ' s objective is to minimise 
J~ (~ - c)dt , 
along the path from any initial point to the fixed endpoint subject 
to 
f(kd + kf) - r(Lkf)kf - C - id ~ 0 
kd = id - wkd 
kf = if wkf 
C ~ 0 
. > ld - 0 
0 s if S V(r) 
L L0e 
ut 
= 
In the optimisation problem which must now be solved , the control 
variables c , id , if can be chosen , subject to the budget con-
straint , to determine the movement of the state variables kd and 
A 
kf . The fixed endpoint is again (kd , O) Using Arrow ' s Method of 
Solution
3 
the optimisation problem has been solved and the solution 
presented .:in Appendix No . 4 . The following table gives all the 
possible policies found in solving the optimisation problem . From 
the characteristics of these policies the phase diagram is con-
structed . 
3 . Arrow [3] 
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Policy id C if 
A 0 F 0 
B 0 F O<if<V 
C 0 F V 
D F 0 0 
E F 0 O<if<V 
F F 0 V 
G O<id<F O<c<F 0 
H O<i <F O<c<F O<i <V d f 
I O<id<F O<c<F V 
where F = f(k) 
- r(Lkf)kf 
The Phase Diagram 
A 
~ 
F/ = c!>(Lkf) at t=O 
~ 
kf 
kd kd 
Policies E and B lie along the curve f ' (k) = c!>(Lkf) . Ho wever as 
this curve shifts downwards over time the paths of the policies E 
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and Bare as shown above . At any point in time the pattern of optimal 
4 growth paths is similar to that derived in Chapter V where restricted 
mobility of foreign capital is introduced into the model with 
However as the curve f ' (k) = <l>(Lkf) shifts down to the 
left over time the optimal growth paths are considerably different . 
Initially the optimal policy for any given level o~ kd and kf is 
the same as in the earlier model of Chapter V with r = r(kf) Then, 
with the appropriate policy switches at f ' (k) = w and f' (k) = <l>(Lkf) , 
the economy approaches the fixed endpoint (kd,O) . If at some finite 
time the total capital-labour ratio and the absolute level of foreign 
borrowing become equal to k and ~ respectively, the optimal 
policy switches to ·policy H which moves the economy along f'(k) = w 
so that the fixed endpoint is approached as time goes to infinity . 
It should be noted that lf initially kd and kf are such as to 
lie on the curve f'(k) = w below the intersection of f ' (k) = w 
and f ' .(k) = <l>(Lkf)I , then L0kf is less than the optimal level t=0 
of total foreign borrowing Kf The optimal policy is I which 
moves the economy along f'(k) ·= w until LTkf: = Kf (assuming 
A 
that Kf is reached at time T). On f I (k) = w the total capital-
labour ratio is at its optimal level . Then, as with all the other 
optimal paths , once the economy has reached this position where 
k = k and Lkf = Kf , the optimal policy switches to H which takes 
the economy along f'(k) = w to approach the fixed endpoint 
as time goes in infinity . Along policy H, if is such 
as to maintain and the allocation of net output 
to current domestic investment is such as to maintain k = k , 
4 . See page 91 
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whilst the balance goes to consumption . 
Bardhan [7] shows that if borrowing from abroad is left to private 
borrowers , it tends to be excessive . This results from the fact 
that private borrowers do not take i nto account the effect of their 
borrowing on the rate of interest payable on foreign loans . That 
is , they borrow up to the point where 
f'(k) = ~(Lkf) = r(Lkf) + r ' (Lkf)kf Therefore it is optimal to 
tax foreign borrowing so that along f ' (k) = ~(Lkf) 
(1 - t)f ' (k) = r(Lkf) , 
where t is the tax rate . 
Since taxation enters into the budget constraint only as a transfer 
S r ' (Lkf)kf 
payment , the optimal tax rate is given by ---=-~7-:--s--
~(Lkf) 
Now that the supply of capital in the international capital market 
is considered to be a function of the rate of interest payable on 
foreign loans and not unlimited as in the Bardhan case , there may 
exist values of r(Kf) for which it is optimal to subsidize foreign 
borrowing. To consider this possible implication of assuming V to 
be a function of r , the model will be simplified by making the 
Bardhan assumption that r = r(kf) . If s is the rate of sub-
sidisation , the optimisation problem is now to minimise 
5 . Capitalists borrow at the rate of interest r and earn the 
rate of return f ' . To restrict the level of foreign borrowing , 
the government ta xes the capitalists earnings . These tax payments 
are merely transfer payments between the capitalists and the 
government and do not affect the rate of interest payable on 
foreign loans . 
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I TO ~ [c - C ]d t , 
where T is unspeci ied , along the accumulation path from any 
initial point to the fixed endpoint subject to 
f(kd + kf) - ( l + s)r(kf)kf 
- C - id ~ 0 
kd = id - wkd 
kf = if - wkf 
id ~ 0 
C ~ 0 
0 s if s V(l+s r(kf)) 
s ~ 0 
The fixed endpoint is defined , as above , to be such that sus ainable 
consumption per head is maximised. If y is net output per head 
then y = f (kd + kf) - (1 + s)r(kf)kf - wkd . Maximising y with 
respect to kd , kf , s 
ay - f' - w = o 
akd -
ay = f ' - c 1 + s ) <1> = o 
akf 
ay = _.,...,k < o 
as J. f - · 
That is , at the endpoint the subsidy s is zero (its lower bound) 
and then the endpoint is the same as for the Bardhan model . That 
is , the endpoint is defined by f ' (k) = w and f ' (k) = <f>(kf) . 
In the optimisation problem to be solved , the control variables c , 
id , if , s can be chosen , subject to the budget constraint , to 
determine the movement of the state variables kd and kf . 
Using Arrow's Method of Solution6 , the Hamiltonian is 
6 . Arrow [3] 
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and the Lagrangian 
L = H + pid + qif + v[V(lts r(kf)) - if] 
+ p[f(kd + kf) - (1 + s)r(kf)kf - c - id]+ ws + tc , 
where Al and A2 are the auxiliary variables and p ,q , p ,v ,w. 
are the Lagrange multipliers . 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are 
(a) Al and A2 are continuous functions of time given by 
- [pf ' - A w] 
l 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification 7 at any 
point of time and the Hamiltonian is maximised subject to this 
constraint . That is , aL ac - l + t - p = 0 
aL 
Al 0 aid - - p + p = 
aL 
A2 0 aif - + q - V = 
a1 
-prk vV ' r 0 as - + + w = f 
p ::: 0 pid = 0 
q ::: 0 qif = 0 
V ::: 0 v[V if] = 0 
w ::: 0 WS = 0 
t ::: 0 tc = 0 
p ::: 0 p[f(k) - (1 + s)r(kf)k 
-c-id]=O . 
7 . Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4] 
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These necessary conditions are also sufficient or optimali y since 
the Hamiltonian is concave in the state variables , given the 
auxiliary variables and time. This sufficiency condition is given 
by Arrow [3] , pages 10 and 12 . 
The pattern of optimal growth paths is obviously the same as that 
8 derived in the similar model in Chapter V where V is a given 
constant . Therefore it is only necessary to consider the control 
variable s along these paths . 
From aL - = -prk + vV ' r + w , the subsidy as f 
and positive if a1 0 On paths along as -
a1 
-prkf + w Since 0 and kf as - SW = 
s is zero if 
which V = 0 
' 
t- 0 along such 
a1 as< o 
paths a1 as 
is negative so that it is no optimal to subsidise foreign borrowing 
along these pa hs . From Appendix No . l the paths along which v = 0 
are the optimal paths when the level of foreign borrowing is either 
greater than or equal to its optimal level. 
For paths along which v > 0 the optimal subsidy is such that 
pkf 
V' = -- From the necessary conditions for optimali y above it 
V 
can be shown that if v > 0 , A2 = v and p ~ l Then the optimal 
subsidy along these paths is non-zero if V' is greater than or 
kf 
equal o ~. Depending on the exact nature of the supply function 
2 
it may be optimal to subsidize foreign borrowing along part of the 
optimal growth paths when foreign borrowinp is below its optimal 
level. 
In the static analyses discussed in Chapter I subsidisation of 
8 . See page 91 
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i nternational capital movements appears only in relation to the 
terms of trade effect . It now appears that it may be optimal to 
subs~dize foreign borrowing even in the absence of such an effect . 
If this investigation of the supply function had been carried out 
i n the non-autonomous model , where r is assumed to be a function 
of Lkf , the results regarding the optimal subsidy would have been 
identical . 
III 
To complete this analysis of optimal foreign borrowing by a large 
country consider the inclusion of diminishin? marginal utility in 
this model . The effects of diminishing marginal utility on the 
Bardhan model have been discussed in Chapter VI , section II . The 
effects on this model are similar and thus this section is included 
only for completeness . Therefore the model will not be worked in 
detail and only a discussion of the effects of diminishinp marginal 
utility on the model will be given. 
The introduction of diminishing marginal utility into the Bardhan 
model in Chapter VI produced a chan?e in the "switching surfaces" . 
The curve f ' (k) = w is no longer of any imoortance in the determin-
ation of the pattern of optimal growth paths and Al= U' (c) when 
c = F is the new "switching surface" . However F is an explicit 
function of time . Therefore the "switching surface " 
as well as f ' (k) = ~(Lkf) , will move over time . 
A = U' (F) , 1 
At the "switching surface" A = U ' (F) , 1 Al is positive . Then 
d~ D1 - U' (F)] = ~l - U"{f ' (kd + kf) - \r - kfr •(Lkf + kfL)} . 
Therefore along Al= U' (F) 
If kf = 0 , kd is positive . Therefore over time the "switching 
surface " moves out to the right . 
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Then the pattern of optimal !IT'OWth paths at any point or time is 
similar to that of the Bardhan model with restricted mobility of 
capital (Chapter VI) . However , over time , both the "switching 
surfaces" move . Thus this pattern or optimal growth paths is modiried 
in the same way as was that of the model with the linear objective 
function , in section II of this chapter . 
Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effect of making the 
rate of interest payable on foreign loans a function of the absolute 
level of foreign borrowing and to consider he implications of 
assuming that the limit to current foreign borrowing is the supply 
of capital in the international capital market which is itself 
assumed to be a function of the rate of interest . 
As shown in section I the assumption that the rate of interest pay-
able on a foreign loan is a function of the absolute level of foreign 
borrowing does lead to very di ferent results from those derived 
under the assumption that the rate of interest is a function of the 
level of foreign borrowing per head of population in the borrowing 
country . Perhaps the most important aspect of these different 
results is that the optimal endpoint is now defined in terms of the 
total capital-labour ratio and the absolute level of foreign borrow-
ing . Therefore , as time goes to infinity the optimal level of 
foreign borrowing per head goes to zero . That is , in the long-run 
the optimal foreign-owned capital-labour ratio is zero . Thus , this 
differs greatly from the Bardhan results in which the optimal foreign-
owned capital-labour ratio remains positive over time . 
The assumption that the limit to current foreign borrowing is a 
function of the supply o capi al in the international capital 
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market which is itself a function of the rate of interest , leads to 
very interesting resul s . It now appears that it is optimal to 
subsidise foreign borrowinr for some levels of foreign borrowing 
depending on the exact nature of the supply function of capital in 
the international capital market . The subsidisation of international 
capital movements has only appeared before in relation to the terms 
of trade effect . Therefore these results that it may be optimal to 
subsidise foreign borrowing even in the absence of the terms of trade 
effect are new and very interesting . 
This chapter concludes the analysis of the opic of optimal foreign 
borrowing . The following chapters will be concerned with the 
optimal level of direct forei~n investment . 
Chapter VIII 
OPTIMAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
ONE COMMODITY WORLD 
I n this chapter the question of optimal international capital move-
ments when the borrowed capital takes the form of direct investment 
is considered . It is assumed here , as in the above chapters , that 
only one good is produced i n the world economy . The case involving 
the pr oduction of more than one good will be discussed in the 
fo l lowing chapter , where both international trade and optimal 
i nternational capital movements will be examined . 
Direc t fore ign investment differs from foreign borrowing in many 
ways . The gross ra e of return on direct foreign investment is not 
determined by the amount o foreign investment as in the case o 
foreign borrowing but it is equal to the gross rate of return on 
domestically - owned capital invested in the borrowing country . That 
is , the gross rate of return to foreign-owned capital invested in 
the borrowing country is equal to the marginal product of the total 
capital employed in the borrowing country . 
In the static analyses of direct foreign investment by MacDougall 
[22 ] and KeTp [16 , 19 , 20] it is assumed that capi al is perfectly 
mobile between countries so that the upper limit to the supply of 
foreign-owned capital is the foreign country ' s total capital stock . 
However , as discussed in Chapter IV , capital is not completely mobile 
between countries . Capital is irreversible and once invested cannot 
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be moved internationally. Therefore any additions to foreign 
investment can only be made out of newly-created capital goods and 
any reductions in foreign investment can only be made by either 
allowing the invested capital to depreciate or by sellin~ the 
equipment to the borrow.irw country . Therefore the concept of 
irreversibility of capital internationally cannot be introduced 
into the analysis unless capital growth i s assumed to exist at 
least in the lendinr country . If the borrowing country is to be 
permitted to buy out foreign invested capital then the borrowing 
country ' s capital stock must also be growing . 
The rate of growth of any economy depends on the rates of growth 
of its capital stock and of its population. Labour is usually 
assumed to be immobile internationally . If the rate of population 
growth is assumed to be greater in one country and constant over 
time then , in the long-run , this country will dominate the other in 
the size of its labour force. If the rates of population growth are 
assumed to be constant and equal in both countries the introduction 
of population growth into the model will add little to the conclusions 
to be drawn from a model in which the popul 1 j on i s cl -uP1ed to be 
constant . Perhaps the only meaningful assumption that can be made 
about the factor of production, labour, is that it has restricted 
mobility and is controlled by the country's immigration policy . 
However , the standard assumption of international trade theory that 
labour is immobile internationally is maintained in the following 
analysis . 
Capital , on the o her hand , is assumed to have some degree of 
mobility . Then , if the capital stock owned by each country is 
growing , the question of one country becoming dominant does not 
arise . The total capital stock of one country may become greater 
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but capital is invested internationally so that the returns to capital 
are equated everywhere . Then the fac or of production , capitai will 
be distributed between coun ries and not accumulated in the one 
country . That is , one country may dominate as far as the ownership 
of capital is concerned but it is unlikely that , in the long-run , 
the stock of capital employed in any one country will dominate that 
employed in any other . 
In this chapter capital growth will be introduced into Kemp ' s static 
model of foreign investment (Kemp [16]) and then in section II the 
optimal growth model will be developed where capital is considered 
to be irreversible . 
I 
Kemp [16] assumes that the world consists of two countries which 
produce the same consumption good . That is , he assumes that the 
capital stock owned by each country is constant but , as a result of 
the assumption of complete mobility of capital internationally , this 
total world stock of capital is distributed between the two countries 
so that the return to capi al in each country is the same . To allow 
for capital growth it is now assumed that the one commodity produced 
can be either consumed or invested . Initially it is assumed that 
the foreign country is in a static s tate but this assumption will be 
relaxed later so that its effect on the analysis can also be determined . 
Assume that the foreign country is free o invest its capital stock 
in either country but that the home country is permitted to borrow 
foreign-owned capital (in the form of direct investment) but never 
to lend its domestically-owned capital stock . It is further assumed 
that all capital in both the home and the foreign country is fully-
employed . 
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As in the previous models the total capitals ock employed in the 
home country (K) is equal to the sum of its domestically-owned 
capital (Kd) and the oreign-owned capital (Kf) which has been 
i nvested in the home country . The starred variables such as K .•. .. 
Ka refer to quan ities in he foreign country . Then K = Kd + K 
and K;', - K~', - K d f . 
The accumulation equation for domestically-owned capital is 
where Id is the current domestic investment (Id~ 0) and o the 
rate of capital depreciation in the home coun ry . I has been assumed 
that the foreign country ' s capital stock is not growing . Therefore 
K .•. ,. is a fixed quantity over all time . 
The gross rate of return on capital in the home country is F ' (K) 
Then the net rate of re urn on invested capital is defined by 
r = (1 - T)[F ' (K) - o] , where T is the ra e of tax imposed by the 
home country on capital earnings and F(K) is the neo- classical 
production function such that F ' > 0 , F" < 0 It has been assumed 
that the home country can never invest its domestically - owned capital 
abroad . Therefore the rate o re urn on capital abroad r* must be 
less than or equal to the rate of return on capital in the home 
country r for the foreign country to be willing to invest in the 
home country . 
It is assumed that the production function of the foreign 
d2f:', 
country 
The ra e p ', ( K;', ) is also neo-classical with dP'· -- > 0 d K;', ' - - < 0 . dK;', 2 
o return on capital invested in the foreign country is 
df:', 
r ;', (K;', ) = dK1• . However from K;', = K~ - K 
that is given , Therefore 
since it is assumed 
3r;', d 2r-'• 
_ which 
3Kf - dK;', 2 
I, 
: 
143 . 
is positive . That is , given the total stock of capital owned by the 
foreign country , the ra e of return on capital invested in the foreign 
country rises as the level of foreign investment in the home country 
rises . 
If C is current consumption then the home country ' s budget con-
straint is 
That is , the total domestic output minus earnings on foreign invest-
ment plus the tax revenue on these foreign earnings must be at least 
as great as the sum of current domestic investment and current con-
sumption . It should be no iced tha if all capital earnings are 
ta xed then the taxation income derived from taxing the earnings on 
domestically-owned capital is merely a transfer payment . Also in 
the case of foreign borrowing from an international capital market, 
any restrictive policy such as taxing the earnings on the foreign 
borrowed capital does not enter into the analysis explicitly but 
is purely a transfer payment within the home country's economy . 
This has been discussed in Chapter VII (footnote 5) and is thus another 
difference between foreign borrowing and foreign direct investment . 
Then the home country ' s aim is to minimise the difference between 
the maximum level of sustainable social welfare and its actual level 
along the capital accumulation path from any initial point to a 
fixed endpoint subject to its budget constraint and the boundary 
conditions . That is , the objective is to minimise 
J~ [U(C) - U(C)]dt ' 
where T is unspecified , along the accumulation path from any initial 
point to the endpoint subjec to 
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r ( Kd + Kf ) - r ' ( K d + Kf ) K f + 1 [ r ' ( Kd + Kf ) - cS J K f - c - Id :::. o 
Id :::. 0 
Kf:::. 0 
r = (1 - 1 )(f I - cS) 
r ::'.. r}': 
where U' (C) > 0 , U"(C) < 0 and U'( O) = oo 
The fixed endpoint (Kd , Kf) is such that sustainable consumption is 
maximised . Net output is 
so that ay 
aKd = F ' - F"K + 1F'"K - cS = 0 f f 
and ay 
aKf = -F" K + 1[F' cS + F"K] = 0 f f 
That is , Kf 
1 (F 1 - cS) 
= 
(1 - 1)f" 
Substituting into ay 0 for Kf gives aKd 
= 
(1 - 1) (F 1 - cS) = 0 
Since r goes to zero and thus Kf = 0 if 1 = l 
' 
then sustainable 
consurnption is maximised at F' = cS That is , Kd is defined by 
F I ( K) = cS and the endpoint is c Kd , o) 
In the optimisation problem to be solved , the control variablesC , 
and Kf can be chosen subject o the given constraint to 
determine the movement of the state variable Kd . This problem is 
9 . Because it is assumed that U' (C) = 00 when consumption is zero , 
it can never be optimal to allocate nothing to consumption . 
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solved by Arrow ' s Method of Solution (Arrow [3]) which is based on 
Pont r yagin ' s Ma ximum Principle (Pontryagin [30]) . 
The Hamiltonian is defined by 
where Al is the social price of net domestic investment and the 
Lagrangian is 
L = H + p[ F(Kd + Kf) - F ' (Kd + Kf)Kf + t[F'(K) - o]Kf - C - Id] 
+ pid + nC + z[r - r * ] 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) Al is a continuous function of time given by 
Al 
aL 
-[p(F ' F"K + tF"K) A1oJ = - aKd = - -f f 
(b) The constr aint satisfies the Constraint Qualification l at 
point of time and the Hamil onian is maximised subject to the 
constraint . That is 
aL 
af - U' (C) + n - p = 0 
aL - A 0 af d - 1 + p - p = 
a1 h = p(F ' - o)Kf + z(F ' - o) = 0 
any 
aL 2 
= p[ - F"K t t(F ' - o) + tF "K ] t z[r ' - r ;':' J . 
aKf f f 
The Lagrange Multipliers are such that 
1 . Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4] . 
2 . r ' = r ·/: ' = ' -
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p :::: 0 pid = 0 
n :::: 0 nC = 0 
z :::: 0 z[r r :': J = 0 
p :::: 0 p[F F ' K + t(F ' o)Kf - C - Id J = 0 f 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimali y since 
the Hamiltonian is concave in the state variable , given the auxiliary 
variables and time . This sufficiency condition is given by Arrow 
[3] , page 10 . 
Since aL ac=O , p is positive . Therefore the budget constraint is 
satisfied with equality . That is , all net output is allocated 
between domestic investment and consumption . 
From aL . h a-r" = 0 , ei er F' = o or If F ' = o , then r 
is zero . But foreign investors would not lend their capital if the 
net return on the invested capital were zero . Therefore z = pKf 
and is positive for all Kf > 0 Tha is , the optimal taxation 
policy is such as to equa e the returns to capital in the two 
countries . Then from aL 
- = 0 , the optimal tax is 
aKf 
Kr:':' 
f 
T = 
opt. [F ' - o] 
Because r*' is positive and because foreign capitalists would only 
lend their capital if F ' > o , the optimal tax is positive for 
Kf > 0 and zero for Kf = 0 . 
But r* = r = [l - T ][F ' - o] 
opt. or 
That is , for any Kd , Kf is controlled so that F ' - o = r:': + Kfr :': ' . 
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Then the corresponding phase diagram3 is : 
The feasible phase space lies below the F ' = o curve where F ' 
is greater than o and along the Kd axis . Forei!IT1 investors will 
lend their capital until the return on their foreign investment 
equals the return on capital invested in their own country . There -
fore , at all points in the phase space r = r ;', 
Assume initially that the level of foreign direct investment and 
the level of domestically-owned capital are such that the economy 
is at point A. 
3 . The phase diagram is constructed on the assumption that 
r~·. f 0 If r* = 0 the two curves f ' o = r;'. and 
f ' o = r)', + Kfr ;',' would intersect F ' = o at Kf = 0 . 
Then F ' o > r~·. + K r :': ' 
or 
f 
F ' - o > (1 - t)(F ' - o) + Kr* ' 
f 
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which implies that T > T 
opt . Because capital is assumed to be 
completely mobile internationally , the optimal policy is o reduce 
Kf':'. ' 
the tax rate to the optimal rate (F ' _ 0 ) so that the inflow of 
foreign capital is such as to take the system to the point A'. 
Then the optimal growth path for the economy is along the curve 
F ' - 0 = r :': + K r:',' f to the endpoint (Kd , O) Along this growth 
path all of the home country ' s net ou put is allocated between 
current consumption and current domestic investment . 
Similarly , if the initial levels of foreign investment and domestically -
o wned capital are such hat the economy is at point B, the existing 
ta x rate is less than the optimal tax rate . By increasing the tax 
r a te t o its optimal level foreign capital will flow out of the home 
country instantaneously and the economy is moved to B' . Then the 
optimal growth path is along the curve 
endpoint (Kd , O) . 
F ' - o = r * + Kr*' 
f to the 
If the level of domes ically-owned capital is greater than kd then 
the optimal policy is to allow the capital to depreciate at the 
~ 
fastest possible rate until Kd becomes equal to Kd That is , 
all of net output of the home country is allocated to curren con -
sumption . The rate of growth along F ' - o = r* + Kr*' f depends 
on the distribu ion of the home country ' s net ou put between current 
consumption and current direct investment . The allocation to current 
domestic investment must be greater han the amount of depreciated _ 
capital and the economy ' s rate of growth is an increasing function 
of the amount allocated to current domestic investment . 
In the analysis so far it has been assumed that he capital stock 
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owned by he foreign country is constant and not subject to grow h . 
A more realistic assumption would be that the foreign country ' s economy 
is moving along a positive growth path . To simplify the discussion 
of the effect of growth in the foreign country on the above analysis , 
assume that the to al capi al sock owned by the foreign country is 
growing exponentially at the rate a . That is J<:', = aK:': . 
Assume that initially the stock of capital owned by the foreign 
country is K·'· 0 . Then is allocated be t ween the two countries 
so as to equalize the rates of re urn on capital in the two countries . 
Then at the end of the first period the national income of the 
foreign country is composed of the total output produced in its own 
country plus its earnings from capital invested abroad in the home 
country . The national income is distributed between current invest -
ment and current consumption so as to satisfy the foreiiITI country's 
budget constraint . The allocation to current investment must be 
r:': = (a + o )K:': so as to main ain he chosen growth rate . a of the 
foreign country's capital stock . The balance of the national income 
then goes to current consumption . That is , at the beginning of the 
next period the total capital stock owned by the foreign country is 
increased to K·'· where i ' 
the first period , is allocated between K·'· and 
d 
Then , as in 
Kf so as to 
once again equalize he rates of return to capital in the two countries . 
The main effect of growth in the foreiiITI country on the above 
analysi ~ is its e f fec t on the ra t e of re urn on capital . The rate 
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f 4 . . o return on capital in the foreign country is 
ri': = p ': I (Ka) = p ': ' ( K·'' - Kf) . When there is no economic growth in 
the foreign country ( Ki': = K5) , r•'' is an increasing function of 
Kf , as shown below . 
r ~': 
r•': 
0 
If K·'· 0 is distributed between K•': d 
then r·': = r·'' (= r) At the end 0 
and Kf so that 
of the first period 
r•': 'K·,',· = K' ;: 
1 
Kf = Kf , 
0 
K* 0 increases 
to K·'· 1 Then for a given Kf (say Kf ) r ·': falls . This is true 
0 
for all values of Therefore the curve r*(K) , when the total f 
capital stock owned by the forei~n country increases to K* , lies 1 
below that when Then before allocation of the foreign 
4 . The rate of return on capital in the foreign country also depends 
on the rate of growth of labour in the foreign country and on the 
rate of technical progress . The rate of growth of labour has been 
discussed earlier in this chapter and is assumed to be zero . It is 
also assumed throughout this work t hat there is no technical change . 
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country's capital stock be ween K:', d and Kf ' he rate of return on 
capital in the foreign country falls to r :', If r > r:': 
' 
Kf 1 1 
i ncreases and r :': adjusts along he curve r :': I K·'· K·'· until the .. = 1 
rates of return in the two countries are again equal. Thus there 
are now t wo effects on the rates of return in the foreign country . 
The growth of the capi al stock owned by the foreign country forces 
r~' down and the allocation of this capital stock between K·'· and 
d 
Kf changes r * along the appropriate r* curve . The effect of 
on remains unchanged (that is , is positive) but the 
total effect of growth and the distribution of this capital stock 
between KJ and K can be positive , negative , or zero . Then the 
prev ious analysis holds for both the case of no growth and the case 
of positive growth in the foreign country . 
II 
The above analysis is based on the assumption of complete mobility 
of capital internationally . This analysis can now be made more 
realistic by assuming capital to be irreversible. That is , an 
i ncrease in the sock of capital can only be made out of the current 
output of capital goods , regardless of whether this stock of capital 
is the domestic investment in either country of the foreign invest-
ment in the home country . Also the stock of foreign -own ed capital 
in the home country can only be reduced either by allowing this 
stock of capi al to depreciate or by the buying-out of foreign invested 
capital by the home country . 
To introduce this assumption of irreversibility of capital , it is 
necessary to assume hat the foreign country ' s capital stock is 
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growing . 5 Let this rate of growth be a so that K:': = a K:': or 
p ': = (a + o )K:': , where p': is the current addition to the capital 
stock owned by the oreign country and o is the rate of depreciation 
of capital . Then If , the current direct foreign investment in 
the home country , must be part of J:': That is , If is such that 
0 S If S (et+ o)K* The effect of growth in he foreign country on 
the optimal growth paths of the home country has been discussed 
immediately above and will not be considered again here . 
If the level of foreign investment in the home country is above its 
optimal level at any point of time , the foreign investment can be 
reduced either by allowing this capital stock to depreciate or by 
the buying-out of foreign invested capital by the home country . To be 
able to reduce the level of foreign investment by buying it out , 
the home country must allocate part of its national income for this 
purpose . Then the net output of the home country 
[F - F ' Kf + T(f ' - o)Kf] can be allocated between current consumption 
C , curre nt domestic investment in new capital equipment Id and 
1 
current investment in previously owned foreign investment Id 
2 
Then the home country ' s budget constraint becomes 
where C > 0 , Id - 0 and n is the price paid per unit of capital 
1 
when the home country buys out foreign inves ed capital in the home 
country (Id > 0) or the home country sells some of its domestic 
2 
5 . The rate of growth of he foreign country ' s capital stock is 
the decision of the foreign country . It is assumed here that this 
rate of growth is given exogenously and is a . 
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investment to foreign owners (Id < 0) . The price TI is a 
2 
functi6n of Id with 
2 
TI '(Id ) < 0 • 
2 
This price TI depends on 
the supply and demand conditions present in the capital market . 
The price of a newly-created good is assumed to be unity . There ore 
as Id goes to zero TI goes to unity . That is , TI(O) = 1 . 
2 
If the home country ' s policy were to reduce the level of foreign 
investment , the price it would have to offer or pay for the foreign-
owned capital would depend on the supply conditions of capital in 
the foreign country . These supply conditions are reflec t ed in the 
willi ngness of the foreign country to invest more capital in the 
home country . If the foreign country is not willing to invest 
any of its newly-created capital in the home country , this is 
because r * > r . Then the foreign country would be willing to 
sell part of its investment in the home country at a price which is 
less than unity so that it can increase its capital investment in 
its own country . That is , it can invest more of its capital in its 
own country where the return to capital is greater . Then if If = 0 
and Id > 0 , TI must be less than unity . 
2 
If the home country's policy is to reduce the level of foreign 
investment but the foreign country is willin~ to increase its 
investment in the home country because r* is less than r , the 
home country would have to offer a price for the foreign - owned 
capital which exceeds unity. That is , if O < If S (a+ o)K* and 
Id > 0 , TI must be greater than unity. 
2 
In the case in which the home country ' s policy is to reduce its 
stock of domestically-owned capital by offering part of it for sale 
to the foreign country , the price TI at which it is offered depends 
on the willingness of the foreign country to have more of its capital 
154 . 
stock invested in the home country. If the foreign country is 
willing to incPease its investmen in the home country in order to 
take advantage of the better investment opportunity in the home 
country (r > r:':) , then the foreign country would be willing to 
pay more than unity for domestically-owned capital . That is , if 
0 < If_ (a+ 8)K* and Id < 0 , n would be greater han unity . 
2 
However , if in this case the oreign country was not willing to 
increase its investment in the home country , the home country would 
have to offer part of its domestically-owned capital at a price less 
than unity. 
than unity . 
That is , if I = 0 and f Id < 0 , n must be less 
2 
Then assuming that the home country canno lend its capital and that 
the rate of grow h of the foreign country ' s capital a is given 
exogenously , the aim of the home country is to minimise 
fT [U(C) - U(C)]dt , 0 
where T is unspecified, along the accumulation path from any 
initial point to the endpoint subject to the budget constraint 
0 ' 
the capital accumulation equa ions 
and the boundary conditions 
C :::: 0 
Id :::: 0 
l 
I :::: 0 
d2 < 
0 
-
I 
-
(a + 8) K:': 
r :::: r:': 
where n = n(Id ) and r = (1 - T)[F ' (K) - o] . 
2 
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The fi xed endpoin (Kd , O) is defined and derived in part I of his 
chapter. This optimisation problem is solved i n Appendix No . 5 
giving the following phase diagram : 
The Phase Diagram 
F ' =o 
where the optimal policies are defined by 
Policy Id ld C If 
1 2 
D O<I <f 
dl 
0 O<C<f 0 
E O< I <f 
dl 
0 O<C<f 0 < If< ( et t o ) Ki~ 
F O<I <f 
dl 
0 O<C<f ( et +o) K:': 
J O<I 
dl 
·f O< I 
d2 
f O<C<f 0 
where f = F - F ' Kf + T(F ' - o)Kf . 
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If initially the levels of Kd and Kf are such that the economy 
is at a point above the curve F ' - 8 = r :', + Kfr~·-' , then the stock 
of foreign-owned capital invested in the home country is greater than 
the optimal level corresponding to the given domestically-owned 
capital stock . The foreign country would not have invested this 
amount of capital in the home country if r :', were to exceed r . 
Therefore this distribution of foreign-owned capital must be such 
that r is less than r :', . Then the optimal policy for the home 
country to adopt is policy J . Along J a tax is imposed so that 
r = r :', and the level of foreign investment is reduced by buying 
out foreign-owned capital invested in the home country at the price 
TT • The balance of net national output is distributed between 
current domestic investment and consumption so that the social 
demand (A 1 ) and supply (U'(C)) prices of a unit of domestic 
6 i nvestment are equal and social utility is maximised . That is , 
foreign investment is reduced at a greater rate than the normal 
capital depreciation rate until the economy lies on the curve 
F ' - 8 = r ~·- + Kfr:', ' . Then the stock of foreign-owned capital 
invested in the home country is at its optimal level corresponding 
to the stock of domestically-owned capital in the home country . 
The optimal policy then switches from policy J to either Dor E. 
Along policies D and Ethe home country allocates all of net output 
between current domestic investmen and current consumption . Then 
the level of current foreign investment is such as to maintain the 
stock of foreign-owned capital in the home country at its optimal 
level . If the level of current foreign investment is zero the optimal 
6 . The equality between Al and U'(C) has been discussed in 
detail in Chapter VI page 108 
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policy is D but if it is positive (and less than (a+ o)K* ) he 
optimal policy is E. Policy J may initially switch into D and then 
from D into Eat some point along the curve F ' - o = r :': + r :': ' K 
f 
Then policy E takes the economy to the endpoint (Kd , O) , where the 
stock of foreign-owned capital invested in the home country is zero . 
If i nitially the levels of Kd and Kf are such that the economy 
lies somewhere below the curve F ' o = r* +Kr*' then the level f ' 
of Kf is below its optimal value for the given level of Kd The 
optimal policy is F along which current foreign investment is at its 
ma ximum (a + o )K:': and r and r :': are controlled by taxation so 
that r = r ''• It can be seen from the properties of policy Fin 
Appe ndix No. 5 and from 
.\ = -[p(F ' -o-r:~' K )tv(ato)-.\ o] 
2 f 2 
which is negative along policy F , that is may be optimal for the 
home country to subsidise foreign investment depending on the nature 
of the function r:': = r :':(Kf) , on the relationship between r :': and 
r and on the growth ra e a Net national output is distributed 
between current domestic investment and current consumption in such 
a way as to maximise social utility. Policy F takes the economy to 
the position where the level of foreign investment is at -its optimal 
level corresponding to the level of domestically-owned capital in 
the home country . Then the optimal policy switches from F to either 
Dor E which then takes the economy along the curve 
Conclusions 
From static analysis the optimal level or direct foreign investment 
for the given domestically-owned capital stock of the home country 
and the optimal taxation policy for the home country to adopt so as 
to maintain this level of direct foreign investment can be found . 
The dynamic analysis is concerned with finding the optimal capital 
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accumulation paths over time . 
The first model above is similar to Kemp ' s static model (Kemp [16]) 
except that growth of domestically-owned capital in the home country 
is introduced into the model . Th i s model gives the static model 
results for any given level of domestically-owned capital but it also 
gives the optimal growth path for both the stock of domestically-
owned capital and foreign investment over time . That is , because of 
the assumption o complete mobility of capi tal internationally , the 
stock of foreign-owned capital invested in the home country is 
adjusted instantaneously to its optimal level corresponding to the 
stock of domestically-owned ca pital . This is identical with the 
results of the static model . As the domestically - owned capital stock 
grows , he level of foreign investment is adjusted according to the 
static results until the optimal domestically-owned capital stock is 
reached . At this endpoint where sustainable consumption per head 
is maximised , the amoun t o f foreign investment is zero . 
In he second model above , the assumption of irreversibility of 
capital is introduced . The inclusion of this assumption produces 
two changes . Fir stly , if t he level o f foreign investment is above 
its optimal level corresponding to the given domestically-owned 
capital stock , it cannot be reduced instantaneously , as in the first 
model , but can only be reduced by allowing the foreign-owned capital 
to depreciate or by he buying-out of part o f the foreipn investment 
by the home c ountry at a price determined by the supply and demand 
conditions ruling in the mar ket . Secondly , any additions to direct 
foreign investment can only be made out or newly-created capital goods. 
Therefore, there is a natural limit to the rate of expansion of direct 
foreign investment in the home country . 
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Thus , the inclusion of the assump ion of irreversibility of capital 
does not allow the economy to jump instantaneously to a position 
where the amount of foreign direct investment is at its optimal 
level corresponding to the given level of domestic investment , as 
in the first model . Now there is an optimal growth path along 
which the amount of direct foreign investment is adjusted , as the 
stock of domestically-owned capital grows , until it is at its 
optimal level corresponding to the level of domestic investment . 
When this is achieved the optimal capital accumulation policy switches 
to that which maintains the optimal level of direct foreign invest-
ment as the domestically-owned capital stock continues to grow until 
the optimal endpoint (Kd , O) is reached. That is , the amount of 
direct foreign investment is adjusted first but this adjustment 
process is no longer an instantaneous one . However the level of 
direct foreign investment is always adjusted as quickly as possible . 
These conclusions are perhaps the most si?T)ificant ones but it is 
interesting to consider what is happening to the level of consumption 
along these op imal growth paths . 
Along all these optimal growth paths social utility is optimised . 
That is A = U' (C) l From the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for optimality , Al= -[pf ' - A1o] . But Al= -U"(C)C and there-
fore U' C = - U" [F' - o] which is always positive in the region 
F ' > o . That is , along these optimal growth paths the level of 
consumption is increasin~ until the maximum sustainable consumption 
level is reached at the endpoint . 
Comparing this second model above with that of Pitchford [29] , it 
should be noticed that he includes the assumption of irreversibility 
of capital internationally but has not introduced growth into the 
160 . 
lending country . As discussed early in section II any increase in 
t he l evel of direct foreign investment when capital is assumed to 
be i r reversible can only be made from newly-created capital stock. 
I n the model of section II it is assumed that the foreign country 
has chosen a constant growth rate a It would have been more 
i nt eresti ng if the foreign country ' s growth rate was not fi xed , 
but somehow determined from within the model . However the system would 
be far more complicated and it is doubtful if indeed it could be 
analysed . The assumption of a constant growth rate a is not as 
limited as it first appears . If a varies from one time period to 
the ne xt but is constant for each period , the above results still 
hold , prov i ded the time periods are not infinitesimal . 
As noted earlier it may be optimal to subsidise foreign investment 
as a result of the assumption of irreversibility of capital. This 
a s sumption of restricted mobility of capital will allow the rates of 
return on capital in the two countries t o differ. Also the natural 
limit to the amount of current foreign borrowin? is the supply of 
newly-created capital in the foreign country . However the amount 
of capital which the foreign country is willing to invest in the 
home country depends on the relationship between the rates of 
return i n the t wo countries . Therefore the supply of capital which 
the foreign country is willing to invest in the home country is an 
implicit function of the rate of return on capital in the home 
country . Then , as noted in Chapter VII for the case of optimal fore ign 
borrowing , it may be optimal for the home country to subsidise fore ign 
investment because the supply of capital available for current 
foreign investment is limited by the rate of return on capital in 
the home country . 
Chapter IX 
OPTIMAL DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
In Chapter VIII it was assumed that only one commodity is produced 
in the international economy , so that the model abstracted from the 
problems associated with international trade . In this chapter, 
international trade is introduced explicitly by discussing optimal 
direct investment within the two -country , two - factor of production, 
two-commodity model of international trade , in which the factor of 
production , labour , is assumed to be immobile between countries. 
The home country is then free to choose any fiscal and commercial 
policies it pleases , with the aim of minimising the accumulated 
difference between actual social welfare and the maximum leve l of 
sustainable social welfare along its growth path . It is assumed 
that the foreign country does not interfere in either the commodity 
or the factor markets . Also the factors of production are assumed 
to be fully-employed in both countries . 
As in the previous chapters it is assumed that the home country can 
accept f oreign investment from abroad but that it is not permitted 
to invest outside of its own country . As in the previous chapter 
labour is assumed to be constant in both countries. It is also 
assumed that labour is immobile between industries. This assumption 
differs from that of the standard trade model in which labour is 
assumed to be mobile within each country . This assumption has been 
made for two reasons. Firstly , it appears to be a difficult task 
to introduce foreign investment into the standard two-sector growth 
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model , as no general theory of economic growth with international 
capital movements taking the form of foreign direct investment, has 
yet been put forward . Secondly , it is not a completely unrealistic 
assumption because labour , particularly skilled-labour, is to some 
degree mobile only within the one industry . It would be of great 
interest to r ela x this assumption of immobility of capital between 
industr i e s . However, no attempt to do this will be made in this work. 
Initially it is assumed that economic growth is taking place only in 
the home country . Because it is unrealistic to assume that the home 
country ' s growth is completely dependent on imports of capital goods, 
it is assumed that the home country always produces good 2 , which 
can be either consumed or invested . Good 2 is then also the home 
country ' s natural export good . The natural .export good of the 
foreign country is good 1 which is the consumption good . Because 
it is assumed initially that the foreign country is in a static 
state, its demand for good 2 is for consumption purposes and for the 
replacement of capital stock which has depreciated. However , in 
section IV, the difficulties of relaxing this assumption and intro-
ducing growth in the foreign country will be discussed . 
Several patterns of specialization of production in the two countries 
have to be considered . The general model will be developed in 
section I and the different cases of specialization of production 
will be considered in the following two sections . Section II assumes 
that the home country ' s production is completely specialized whereas 
in section III production in the home country is assumed to be incom-
pletely specialized . 
I 
The foreign country is assumed to be in a static state . Then the 
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stock of capital owned by the foreign country Ki: is constant . 
Ass~mi ng immobility of labour between industries , the outputs of 
good 1 and 2 in the foreign country are and 
pectively . If , however , the foreign country is completely specialized 
i n production the output of good 2 , F~(K~) , is zero . Assuming 
Kf to be the stock of capital i nvested in the home country , it 
follows from t he assumption of full-employment of factors of pro-
duction that K;': - K equals 
f 
The output of good i in the home country is F . (K.) , where the 
l l 
total capital stock employed in the home country , K
1 
+ K
2 
, is the 
sum of the domestically - owned capital in the home country Kd and 
the level of foreign investment Kf . If the home country is completely 
specialized i n its production , F1 (K1 ) is zero . 
All these functions are assumed to be neo-classical productions 
functions under constant returns to scale . That is , for example , 
F ! (K . ) > 0 
' 
F'.' (K . ) < 0 l l l l 
F . ( 0) 
l 
= 0 F ! ( 0) 
l 
= 00 
F . (00) = 00 F ! (00) = 0 l l 
The accumulation of domestically-owned capital in the home country 
is given by 
where Id , the current domestic investment in the home country , is 
non-negative and o is the rate of capital depreciation in both 
countries. Since the foreign country is in a static state , K~': is 
zero . Therefore , from the equation for the static state 
(K;': = I ;': - oK~': = 0) , the level of curTent domestic investment in 
the foreign country is p ': = oK;': • 
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Capital is assumed to be completely mobile between industries in the 
one country . Therefore the gross rate of return in the foreign country 
is 
R-l, = = p-l, 
where 
p ~·. 
p1• = ~ is the world terms of trade . P2 Or alternatively, the 
price-weighted sum of changes in production , at constant prices , 
resulting from an inflow of an extra unit of capital must equal the 
gross rate of return on capital . That is, 
Because it is assumed that the foreign country does not interfere 
in the commodity and factor markets , the gross rate of return R:-', 
equals the net rate of return r* on capital employed in the forei~ 
country . 
Similarly , the gross rate of return on capital invested in the home 
country is 
elf 2 elf l 
R = [ai( + p ai(] 
f f 
The net rate of return on capital is r = (1 - T)(R - o) , where 
T is the rate of tax imposed by the home country on earnings from 
foreign investment after depreciation allowances have been made . 
It is assumed initially that capital is also completely mobile 
between countries . That is , capital moves instantaneously between 
countries so as to equalize the net rates of return on capital in 
both countries . That is , capital moves so as to maintain the 
equality r = r * at all points of time . It has been assumed that 
the home country can never lend capital . Therefore , for international 
capital movements , r* must not exceed r . That is , r ~ r* . 
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The mor e realistic assumption of restricted mobility of capital 
internationally will be introduced into the model in section III . 
The utility of consumption inthe home country is given by 
where u. 
1. is the utility derived from the consumption D. 
1. 
of good 
i . As it is also assumed that D. is non-negative and U! is 
1. 1. 
pQsitive with U! (O) = 00 , it is never optimal for the home country 1. 
to consume nothing of either good . That is , D. is always positive . 
1. 
Similarly , foreign consumption of either good must also be non-zero , 
or D~ is always positive . 
1. 
If p is the price of good 1 in terms of good 2 in the home country , 
then the home country ' s demand for the two goods will be such that 
U' 1 
p 
The four constraints of the optimisation problem are the home country ' s 
budget constraint , the two market clearing equations and the Balance 
of Payments constraint . 
The home country ' s budget constraint is s~ch that output allocated 
to consumption of the two goods and to current domestic investment , 
must not exceed the home country ' s output net of earnings paid to 
foreign capitalists . That is , 
The market-clearing equations are 
F2 (K2 ) + F3(K3) = D2 + D~ +Id+ I~ and 
Fl(Kl) + Ff(Ki) = Dl + Di 
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The home country ' s Balance of Payments inequality is such that its 
exports of good 2 do not fall short of the sum of its imports of good 
1 and foreign earnings paid abroad . That is , 
(D* - F* ) > p*(D - F ) + (RK - T[R - 8]Kf) . 2 2 - 1 l f 
However , since these four constraints are not independent it is 
necessary to include only the first three of these constraints in 
the model . 
If U(D1 ,D2 ) is the maximum sustainable level of social welfare, the 
optimisation problem is to minimise 
where T is unspecified , along the capital accumulation path from 
any initial point to the fixed endpoint , subject to 
F 2 (K2) 
F /K1 ) + 
F2(K2) + 
RKf + T (R - 8)Kf - p;', ( D - Fl) l 
f 1, ( K;', ) = Dl + o··· 1 1 1 
p', ( K;',) 
= D2 + o··· + Id + 8K;', 2 2 2 
Kd = Id 8Kd 
Id ::'.: 0 
Kf ::'.: 0 
D . ,o;:, > 0 
l l 
(i = 1 , 2) 
r = (1 T)(R - 8):::: r;', 
p = p;', ( l + Tl) , 
- D2 - Id ::'.: 0 
where Tl is the tariff imposed by the home country on its exports 
of good 2 , 
and 
The fixed endpoint is such hat sustainable consumption is maximised . 
The net output depends on the specialization of production in the 
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home country . If the home country is completely specialized in the 
production of good 2 , the net output is 
y 
= F2 F2Kf + T(f2 o )K - oKd f 
Then ay F ' - (1 - T)F"K - o 0 and (1) aKd = = 2 2 f 
ay 
- (1 
- T)f " K + T(f ' - 0) 0 (2) 3Kf = = 2 f 2 
Substituting (2) into (1) , either F'(K) = o 2 2 or T = l . But if 
T = l , r is zero and the level of foreign investment is zero . 
Then , in the one sector economy , sustainable output is maximised if 
F ' = o 2 
below . 
That is , (Kd , O) is the fi xed endpoint which is shown 
If the home country is incompletely specialized in production , net 
output is 
y = pfl + F2 RKf + T(R - o )Kf - oKd 
Then ay pf ' + F ' 0 = R 0 = 0 3Kd = - - ' l 2 
ay 
pf ' F ' 
- R + T(R o) = T(R - o) = 0 and 8Kf = + -l 2 
ay 
Fl ~ K (l T) = 0 ap = - -ap f 
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But r:': = (1 - T) (R - 0) 
Therefore ay Fl 
clR clr :': 
0 ap - - - K - = 
ap f R-o 
or (R o)F
1 
~Kr:': = 0 ap f 
From ay clY 0 R 0 0 
clKd = clKf = - = 
From ay 0 and R 0 0 Kf 0 ap = - = 
' 
= 
That is , the optimal endpoint is again defined by R - o = 0 and 
In the optimisation problem which must now be solved the control 
variables Id , D1 , D2 , D~ , Kf , T' Tl and p* can be chosen subject to the 
given constraints to determine the movement of the state variable 
Kd . This problem is solved by Arrow's Method of Solution (Arrow 
[3]) which is based on Pontryagin ' s Maximum Principle (Pontryagin 
[30]) . 
The Hamiltonian is defined by 
where Al is the social price of a unit of net domestic investment 
in terms of utility units and the Lagrangian is 
L = H + p[F/K2 ) RKf + T(R - o )Kf - p*(0 - Fl) 1 
+ z[F1 (K1 ) + f :':(K ) - 01 - o:':J 1 1 l 
+ w[F 2(K2 ) + p ':( K ) - 0 - o:': - Id - oK:': ] 2 2 2 2 
+ h[r - r:': J + v[p - (1 + T )p:':] l 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) Al is a continuous function of time given by 
= -[z+pp* F ' + p+w f ' l 2 
+ (l - T) ~ (h - pK ) 
clKd f 
- 02 - Id J 
169 . 
(b) The constraints satisfy the Constraint Qualification7 at any 
point of time and the Hamiltonian is maximised subject to this con-
straint . That is , 
aL 
Al f 0 lid 
= - p - w + = 
aL U" 
Ul(Dl) pp:'; 1 
an1 
= - - z + V U' - 0 
2 
dL U' U' 1 
an2 
= - p - w - V U" = 0 2 2 
aL 
0 ao:1: = -w = 
2 
aL 
-[p(Dl Fl) zo :': I WO:': I h ar ap:', = - + + + a·'· + V ( 1 + T 1)] = 0 1 2 P" 
aL (pKf h) (R 6) 0 a-r = - - = 
aL 
a-rl 
= 
.•. 
-vp-- = 0 
aL 
p[F2 + p:':F I R (1 T )R I Kf t(R 6) J aKf = - - + 1 
ar ar:', 
+ z[F' + f:':' J + w[F' + F:':' J + h[-- - ~K J = O • 
1 1 2 2 aKf a f 
(c) The Lagrange Multipliers p , h and f which are associated 
with the inequality constraints must satisfy the following conditions : 
p ~ 0 
h ~ 0 
f ~ 0 
p[F2 - RKf + t(R - o)Kf - p*(D1 - F1 ) - D2 - Id]= 0 
h[r - r:':J = 0 
The values of the other Lagrange ultipliers z , v and w are not 
restricted as they are associated with equality constraints . 
Since aL a-r - 0 , either h equals or R equals 0 . Foreign 
7 . Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4] 
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capitalists would not be willin~ to invest capital in the home country 
if the ne t r e turn (R 
-
6) on capital were zero . Therefore h -
is Also since clL 0 cL 0 and cL zero . ~ = ' ao2 = an:·, = 0 V and w ' 2 
are zero and p equals U' which is always positive . Therefore 2 
the budget constr aint is satisfied with equality and thus the 
Balance of Payments is always in equilibrium . Since cL = 0 an 1 
equals U I - pp:'; 1 Then substitutin~ for z h , p , w and 
in a1 ap:', = o and using the relationships U' = pU ' 1 2 
p = p:': (l + T 1 ) , the optimal tariff rate is given by 
-El 
T 1 Opt . : p:':D :': 1 [l - µy:':] ' 
1 
and 
where E1 , the home country's excess demand for goodl, equals 
' z 
V 
pKf 
D1 - r 1 , µ , the ratio of net earnings of foreign capitalists from 
the home countr y to the value of the home country's imports of good 
Kr 1 
1 , equals p:':E and y-l: , which equals a~:': ~ , depends on the 
1 a-:,. r--
p--
factor-intensity of good 2 in the foreign country . If good 2 is 
capital-intensive abroad , y* is positive but if it is labour-
intensive abroad y:': is negative . 
. . . a1 h . f . . b Similarly , since a!<= 0, t e optimal rate o tax is given y 
f 
T : 
opt. 
Df'r*'Kf + E1 (1 - µy*)F1' 
o:·:' CR - o) 1 
The signs of the optimal tax and tariff rates depend on the pattern 
of specialization of production. These signs will be considered in 
section II . 
It should be noted that since h equals u2Kf , h is positive for 
all Kf greater than zero and thus the net rates of return on capital . 
in the two countries are always equal . That is , the foreign 
country ' s capital stock adjusts instantaneously so tha t r and r * 
are equal at all points of time . Then from the assu~ption of perfect 
171. 
mobility of capital internationally , the optimal capital accumul-
ation path is given by 
r* = (1 - T t )(R - 6) . 
op . 
Also , substituting for the Lagrange ultipliers , the equation for 
>- 1 reduces to : 
The nature of the optimal growth paths varies with the optimal tax-
ation and tariff policies of the home country . These , in turn depend 
on the pattern of specialization of production in the two countries 
and on the pattern of international trade . Therefore op imal 
commerical and fiscal policies of the home country will be discussed 
initially when production of the home country is completely specialized . 
Then in section III the case in which the home country is incom-
pletely specialized will be considered . 
II 
A: Home Country Completely Specialized 
When the home country is completely specialized in the production of 
good 2 R equals r2 and the signs of the optimal tariff and tax 
rates depend on the degree of specialization of production in the 
foreign country . 
(i) When the foreign country is completely specialized in the pro-
ar,·, ~r-·-
duction of good 1 , r ·'· = aK 1,., = - aK 1 which is independent of the 
d f 
erms of trade p* (K* is defined as the stock of capital d 
ar-'· employed in the foreign country . ) Then y,', is zero and -- is 
aKf 
positive because the foreign country is assumed to be a lender of 
capital. The derived equations for the optimal tariff and tax 
reduce to 
T 1 opt . 
T 
opt . 
-E 
= 
1 
and p;', o ;',' 
= 
1 
D;': ' r ;': ' K + 
1 f 
D;':' (R 
1 
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E F;':' 
1 1 
o) 
respectively . As these are both positive , it is always optimal for 
the home country to impose a tax on foreign earnings paid abroad and 
a tariff on its exports . 
(ii) If the foreign country is incompletely specialized in its 
production , the rate of return on capital invested in the foreign 
country is 
r ;'; 
ap·. ap·. 
-
- 2 + ·'· 1 W- P" --
f aKf 
Then is zero and the sign of y* , which equals 
1 
ar1• p;'; 
a! r ;'; ' 
p 1: 
depends on the factor-intensity of good 2 in the foreign country . 
The optimal tariff and tax rates now become 
respectively . 
T 1 opt . 
T 
opt. 
- El 
= p*D* ' (1 - µy*) 
1 
= 
E F1• ' ( 1 - µ y ;': ) 1 1 
o;', ' (R o) 
1 
and 
The signs of the optimal tax and tariff rates now depend on the 
pattern of trade which is reflected in the magnitude of µ , as well 
as on y ;', , the factor-intensity of good 2 in the foreign country . 
If the home country ' s export good (2) is labour-intensive abroad 
then y i': < 0 and via the K\ !)(;Z"nsl i Th eorem [32] Fi ' < 0 , so 
that it is always optimal for the home country to impose a tariff on 
its exports of good 2 and a tax on foreign earnings paid ab r•on d . A 
tariff on exports increases the price of good 2 abroad so that the 
return on capital in the foreign country falls and capital tends to 
flow into the home country until the returns o capital in he two 
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countries are equated . The inflow of capital is controlled , however , 
by imposing a tax on capital earnings so that the net rates of return 
on capital in the two countries are the same . 
If the home country ' s exp or good is capital-intensive abroad , y~·: 
is positive and greater than land r~·: ' 
l is positive from the 
Rybczynski Theorem [32] so that it is always optimal to impose a 
tari f on exports unless the home country is a more important 
importer of capital than of good l (µ large) , in which case it is 
optimal to subsidise exports . It is also optimal for the home 
country to tax the earnings on foreign investment unless the home 
country is a greater importer of good l than of capital (µ small) , 
in which case it is optimal to subsidise foreign investment . 
The above results show that the optimal tax and tariff can be either 
positive or negative but it is never optimal to subsidise both 
exports and foreign investment . These results agree with those 
derived by Jones [13] for the static case . 
The optimal growth paths for the home country when its production 
is specialized , are given below . The shapes of the curves are 
discussed in Appendix No . 6 . 
The Phase Diagrams 
(i) Foreign country completely specialized 
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( ii ) Foreign country incompletely specialized 
Because capital is assumed to be completely mobile internationally , 
the level of Kf is adjusted instantaneously so that 
r = r * = (1 - T t )(R - 8) • 
op . 
Then the optimal growth path of the home economy is along 
r ;'; = (1 - T t )(R - 8) to the endpoint (Kd , O) 
op . The optimal tax 
rate and the optimal tariff on exports are defined above . 
Conclusions 
When both countries are completely specialized in the production of 
different goods , the optimal rate of taxation on foreign earnings 
and he optimal tariff on exports are given by 
T 
opt . = and 
-E 1 
T = 1 opt . p*D* ' ' 1 
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r e spectively . In the previous chapter , where it is assumed that only 
one good is produced in both countries and thus no explicit account 
is taken of the movement of this good , the optimal tax rate is 
From a comparison of these two sets of results it can be seen that 
when the model includes international trade in goods (E
1 
i 0) as 
well as the movement of capital , it is optimal for the home country 
to impose a tariff on its exports (so as to reduce the world terms 
of trade) and not only to tax foreign earnings (so as to lower the 
rate of return payable on foreign investment) but to impose a larger 
t ax than is optimal in the model with no explicit trade in goods . 
The reason for this increased optimal tax on foreign earnings is as 
follows . 
The home country's aim is to reduce both the world terms of trade 
and the rate of return payable on foreign-owned capital invested in 
the home country . By levying a tax on foreign earnings , the net 
rate of return payable on foreign investment is reduced . Because 
capital is assumed to be completely mobile between countries , capital 
will flow out of the home country until the net rates of return on 
capital in the two countries become equal . 
By imposing a tariff on exports the world terms of rade fall . That 
is , the relative price of good 1 (the home country ' s import good) 
falls . But as p* falls the demand for good 1 in the foreign 
country D~ rises . 1 If the world supply of good 1 (F*) 1 is 
constant , the relative price of good 1 will tend to rise . The home 
country can maintain the lower p* be forcing some of the foreign-
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owned capital to flow out of the home country and thus increasinf 
F* l . This outflow of foreign-owned capital is produced by increasing 
the rate of taxation on foreign earnings so that forei?n capitalists 
will adjust their capital stocks so as to equate the net rates of 
return on capital in the two countries . Therefore , for any given 
domestica l ly-owned capital stock , the optimal level of foreign direct 
investment is lower in the presence o explicit international trade 
then in its absence . Also , along the optimal growth path or the home 
country , the level of foreign investment approaches its optimal level 
(zero) at a point in time when the level of domestically-owned 
capital is lower . 
When the foreign country is incompletely specialized in its production , 
the optimal growth path for the home country depends on foreign tech-
nology and on whether the home country is a greater importer of capital 
than of good l . The foreign technology links the world terms of trade 
with the rate of return on capital in the foreign country . 
It is always optimal for the home country to levy a tax on foreign 
earnings , except when the home country's export good is capital-
intensive abroad . In this case a tariff on exports produces a rise 
in the rate of return on capital in the foreifn country which results 
in an outflow of capital from the home country . If the home country 
is primarily an importer of capital then the optimal policy is one 
of subsidising foreign investment . The optimal level of foreign 
investment at any given level of domestically-owned capital stock is 
greater than that in the case which abstracts from explicit 
international trade - except when the level of foreign investment 
falls to its ?Ptimal level , zero . 
Therefore when more than one commodity is produced in the world , 
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internat i onal trade i n goods and the degree of specialization of 
product ion must be considered . Each of these plays a par in modi-
fyi ng the re sults obtained in the one-commodity model of Chapter VIII . 
III 
Wh en the home count r y is incompletely specialized i n production , the 
opt i mal commerica l and fiscal policies depend primarily on the 
degree of s pecia lization in the foreign country . If the foreign 
coun try is completely specialized in the production of good 1 , the 
optimal t ar iff and ta x rates are 
T 1 opt . 
T 
opt . 
-El 
= p:':o:':' and 
1 
= 
o :': ' r 1: ' K + 1 f 
o:':' (R -
1 
E p': I 
1 1 
o) 
respectively . As these are both positive , it is always optimal to 
levy a t ariff on commodity exports and a tax on foreign earnings 
paid abroad . 
Comparing these results with those in section II , when both countries 
are completely specialized , it is found that the two sets of results 
are identical . Thus the optimal commerical and fiscal policies 
depend primarily on the degree of specialization of production in 
the foreign country . 
The shapes of the various curves necessary for the phase diagram are 
derived i n Appendix No . 8 . However the phase diagram is identical 
with that when both coun ries are completely specialized (section 
II) and thus will not be repeated here . 
Whe n both countries are incomple ely specialized the a nalysis becomes 
more complex as the pat ern of trade and the optimal tari f and tax-
ation policies are in erdependent . Nadel [26] has discussed this 
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interdependence in his analysis of the static model . It is only by 
chance that the tariff and tax levied by the home country will be 
related o each other in the exact proportions that the technology 
requires . Nadel has shown that if this situation does not occur , 
the tariff becomes inefficient and thus a change in the pattern of 
trade occurs . Therefore the optimal tariff and taxation policies 
of the home country and the pattern of international trade are inter-
dependent . 
Assume initially that there exists free trade and unrestricted 
capital flows . Mundell [24] has shown that when capital is assumed 
to be completely mobile internationally the free trade results of 
the standard trade model with factor immobility can be achieved by 
exporting the factor of production , capital , instead of exporting 
the good whose production is capital-intensive . Capital moves between 
the countries until the rates of return on capital are the same in 
the two countries . Then both countries become self-sufficient and 
the only flow between them is the one-way repatriation of foreign 
earnings from the home country . This repatriation of foreign earnings 
can be viewed as a consequence of the assumption of labour immobil-
ity between countries . An additional assumption will be made that 
the factor-intensity of each good is the same in both countries and 
that no reversal of factor-intensities occurs . 
If the foreign earnings paid by the home country are in terms of 
good 2 , £1 is zero and it is not optimal for the home country to 
interfere in the flow of goods or of capital . 
If on the other hand , the home country exports good 1 in order o 
pay for the forei~n earnings , E = D - F is ne?ative , µ equals 1 1 1 
-1 and the optimal tariff and tax rates become 
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E/1 + y ;': ) 
Tl = and opt . -D;': ' p;': l 
E F;':' ( l + y;'; ) l l T = opt . D;': ' (R 
- o) l 
respectively . 
Good 2 is capital - intensive because the forei?TI country has substi-
tuted capital exports for exports of the good which is capital-
i ntensive . Therefore it is optimal for the home country to subsidise 
exports of good land to tax foreign earnings . 
However , from Nadel ' s analysis [26] of the static case , the imposition 
of the optimal subsidy and tax may stimulate a movement of capital 
internationally which , because of the given technology , may change 
the pattern of trade . 
The nominal return on capital is 
drp 2 nominal return is given by 
and the relative change in the 
rp2 
dr 
which equals 
r 
since is 
constant . From the given technology of the home country equals 
-ydp , where y depends on the factor - intensity of good 2 . Combin -
p drp
2 ing these two results , equals - y1
1 
. 
rp2 
The tax on foreign earnings reduces he nominal return by 1001% . 
Therefore 
(i) if -nl > 0 , forei?n capitalists will increase the level of T 
their investment in the home country , 
(ii) if 
-n1 
-- < 0 , foreign capitalists will withdraw their capital T 
from the home country , assuming that under the i nitial assumption of 
unrestricted capi al movements , the level or foreipn investment is 
positive . If this initial level of foreign investment is zero then 
there will be no relocation of foreign-owned capital as the home 
country is not permitted to lend its capital . 
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Since good 2 is capital-intensive (y > 0) , Tl< 0 and T > 0 
is positive and capi al will flow in o the home country . 
capital flows in , the output of good 2 rises at home and falls 
As 
abroad whilst the output of good l falls at home and rises abroad . 
This results from the Rybczynski Theorem [32] . The excess demand 
for good l in the foreign country falls . Therefore as capital 
continues to flow into the home country , exports of good l continue 
to fall until they eventually equal zero . At this point the optimal 
tariff and tax become zero and capital ceases to move between 
countries . The home country now exports good 2 to pay for the 
foreign earnings on investment in the home country . These exports 
also satisfy an excess demand for good 2 which has been crea ed in 
the foreign coun ry as a result of the outflow of capital to the 
home country . 
That is , in the case where both countries are incompletely specialized 
in production , ree trade in goods and unrestricted capital movements 
are the optimal policies for the borrowing country to adopt . 
However , if initially the borrowing country is an exporter of its 
labour-intensive good it is optimal for the home country to subsidise 
exports but to tax foreign earninps until the foreign country ' s pro -
duction of the labour-intensive good satisfies its demand , when the 
free trade in goods and unrestricted capital movements again become 
the optimal policy . 
These results agree with those put forward by Nadel [26] for the 
static case . However , Nadel considers the extra problem of the tariff 
imposed on all exports to the lending country . from the formula 
developed for the optimal tax and tariff , the idea that all exports 
should be subjected to the tari f does not arise . This is because 
as soon as exports o good 1 - the lending country ' s natural export 
under conditions of immobility of factors of production - fall to 
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zero , it is no longer optimal o impose a tariff . 
Thus the optimal commerical and fiscal policies of the borrowing 
country are those of free commodity trade and unrestricted movemen 
of ca pital internationally , except when under these conditions the 
borrowing country pays he earnings on forei~ investment by export-
i ng the good which as defined above , is the lending country ' s 
natural e xport . This optimal growth path eventually takes the home 
country to its optimal endpoint where the level of foreign investment 
is zero and the terms of trade are such that R equals o 
IV 
If the more realistic assumption of restricted mobility of capital 
internationally is introduced into the above model in which the 
home country is not permitted to lend abroad , international capital 
movements would cease after the first time period unless growth is 
also introduced in the foreign country . This has been discussed in 
Chapter VIII . However the introduction of growth in the foreign 
country complicates the international economy further and thus makes 
the analysis of the home country's growth a little more difficul . 
When the foreign country is completely specialized the effect of 
growth on ri', is composed of two forces . The increase in Ki', 
forces r * to fall but as capital is relocated between the two 
countries so as to maintain the equality between r and r* , r* 
rises along the curve r * = r * (Kf) , given K~ The total effect 
of growth in the foreign country on the rate of return to capital in 
the foreign country can be either positive , negative or zero . 
This has been discussed in detail for the one - commodity model in 
the previous chapter . 
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If the foreign country ' s production is incompletely specialized , 
growth in the foreign country does not affect r* directly but 
indirectly by increasing the output of the capital-intensive good 
which forces its commodity terms of trade to change so as to clear 
the goods markets . This movement in the terms of trade changes the 
rate of r e t urn on capital in the foreign country . If good 1 is 
capital-intensive abroad , growth in the foreign country increases 
its production of good 1 which forces the terms of trade to fall 
and thus the rate of return on capital in the foreign country 
decreases . Foreign-owned capital is then re-distributed between 
the two countries so that r* and r remain equal . The total 
effect of growth on t he rate of return on capital in the foreign 
country can again be positive , negative or zero . A similar effect 
can be shown to e xist for the case in wh ich good 1 is labour -
intensive . 
Defining goods land 2 as above , the foreign country's capital stock 
can be increased either by accumulating part of its output of good 
2 if its production is incompletely specialized or by accu mulating 
part of its imports of good 2 . The stock of capital employed in 
the home country can be increased either by current domestic invest-
ment or by accepting more foreign investment . However , because it 
is assumed that the mobility of capital is restricted internationally , 
the level of foreign investment can only be reduced either by 
allowing it to depreciate or by buying it out . 
If it is assumed here as it was in the previous chapter that the 
foreign country is growing exponentially at the rate a , then the 
introduction of restricted mobility of capital between countries 
modifies the resulisobtained in sections II and III of this chapter 
in the same way as its introduction modified the results of the 
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previous chapter . That is , instead of adjusting the level of foreign 
investment instantaneously so that 
r* = (1 - 1 )(R - 8) , the 
opt . 
economy is moved as quickly as possible to that position and then , 
as before , along this curve to the optimal endpoint . If the level 
of foreign investment exceeds that for which 
r:': = (1 - T ) (R - 8) , 
opt . 
given the stock of domestically-owned capital , then it is optimal 
to reduce Kf by buying it out . If the stock of foreign-owned 
capital is below that for which 
r* = (1 - T )(R - 8) given opt . 
then it is optimal to accept all of the capital which the foreign 
country offers for investment in the home country . 
If good 1 is assumed to be an investment good as well as a consumption 
good , the home country can increase its capital stock by current 
domestic investment , by accepting foreipn investment or by importing 
capital from abroad . Then , in the above model , the home country's 
demand for imports of good 1 is either for consumption or for invest-
ment pur>poses . 
As before it is optimal for the home country to move as quickly as 
possible to the position where 
r* = (1 - t t )(R - 8) and then op . 
along this curve to the endpoint . However it should be noted that 
without specific formulation of the production functions it is 
impossible to determine the exact composition of the home country's 
current investment along the optimal growth path . Once he allocation 
to consumption alon~ the growth path is known , the balance of the 
home country ' s output net of foreign earnings is allocated to current 
domestic investment . This investment can be composed of good 1 or 
good 2 or a combination of the two , depending on the specific pro-
duction functions . However the total domestically-owned capital stock 
is independent of which good is accumulated . If for example , it is 
assumed that capital in the form of good 1 or good 2 can be used 
. 
I 
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just as efficiently to produce either good l or good 2 then from the 
accumulation point of view the two goods can be classified as one 
single good . This then reduces the problem to that of the one-good 
type , as far as the accumulation process is concerned . 
The formulae for the optimal commerical and fiscal policies are 
unaffected by the introduction of restricted mobility of capital 
between countries and of growth in the lend ing country . However 
the introduction of growth in the foreign country may effect the 
position of the curve r* = (l - T t )(R - 6) 
op . h h d
. 8 
on t e p ase iagram 
with the result that the optimal absolute level of forei?T)investment 
may be greater than or less than that determined in the model where 
the foreign country ' s total capital stock is constant . 
It is assumed in this chapter that labour is immobile between 
industries , while the standard international trade model assumes 
perfect mobility of labour wi hin each country . However , it should 
be noted that the signs of the optimal tariff and taxation policies 
put forward by Jones [13] , Kemp [20] and adel [26] remain the same 
under this different assumption of immobility of labour between 
industries . 
When the country ' s production is completely specialized these two 
assumptions are identical but when the country ' s production is 
incompletely specialized these two assumptions do differ . A better 
analysis of this case , where the production is incompletely specialized 
in either country , would have to be carried out under the assumption 
8 . The phase diagram is that presented in sections II and I II 
depending on the pattern of specialization and trade . 
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of perfect mobility of labour within each country . This however 
would involve the use of a two-sector growth model with international 
capital movements and international trade . Before this analysis 
can be attempted it will be necessary to introduce international 
capital movements alone into a two-sector growth model . To date 
no such attempt has been rrade and this is probably because the 
introduction of international capital movements complicates the two-
sector growth model in such a way that any analysis of the model 
appears very difficult . 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing dynamic analysis of international capital movements 
is composed of two parts . International capital movements have 
been examined firstly , in the form of foreign borrowing and 
secondly , in the form of forei~n direct investment . The results 
of each model have been discussed and comparisons have been made 
between these results and (i) the results of other similar analyses 
which are included in the survey Chapters I , II and III and (ii) he 
results of models in which the international capital movements are 
assumed to take the same form . However , no comparison has been 
made between the results derived from models where international 
capital movements take the form of foreign borrowing and those 
derived from models where international capital movements take the 
form of foreign direct investment . Such a comparison can be made 
by discussing any of the models in Chapter VIII and the corresponding 
models in Chapters V, VI and VII . 
As the nature of the objective function plays an important role in 
these models , compare the results of the models of Chapter VI with 
those of the corresponding models of Chapter VIII in which the 
objective functions are identical . In these models the only di f fer-
ence between international capital movements in the form of foreign 
direct investment and those in the form of foreign borrowing is the 
rate of return on the foreign-owned capital in the home country . 
As discussed in Chapter IV the rate of return on foreign direct 
investment is the same as that on the domestically-owned capital . 
That is , the rate of return equals the marginal product of total 
capital employed in the home country , whereas the rate of return 
on foreign borrowed capital depends on the level of foreign borrow-
ing . Thus there is no difference in the structure of these corres-
ponding models and the resulting patterns of optimal growth paths 
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for the economy are similar . 
In the real world , however , the nature of foreign borrowing and 
that of foreign direct investment are different . This difference 
ar ises pr i ncipally because much foreign borrowing is at a fixed 
i nterest rate a nd because it can be used for the import of con-
sumption goods as well as of capital . However as neither of these 
implications are contained in these borrowin? models the results 
of the corresponding models of Chapters VI and VIII are similar . 
A more realistic analysis of international capital movements in the 
form of foreign borrowing would have to be carried out within the 
standard two-country , two-good , two-factor of production trade 
model . However , as stated in Chapter IX , before any such analysis 
can be made , it will be necessary to introduce international capital 
movements into the standard two-sector growth model . 
One important difference in the results of these models can be 
found in the levels of per capita foreign-owned capital which are 
optimal in the long-run. In the case of foreign direct investment 
its optimal per capita level at the endpoint is zero , whereas in 
the case of foreign borrowin? it is always optimal to have a positive 
amount of foreign-owned capital per head in the borrowing country 
(assuming w > r(O) > o) . However , in the models of Chapter VII , 
in which the rate of in erest payable on foreign borrowing is assumed 
to be a function of the absolute level of foreign borrowing , the 
optimal level of per capita foreign borrowing falls to zero in the 
long-run . Therefore , it appears that the optimal level of foreign-
owned capital per head employed in the home country goes to zero 
in the long-run . 
Static analysis gives the level of foreign-owned capital which it is 
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optimal for the home country to employ for any given level of 
domestically-owned capital . This result corresponds to a point of 
the optimal capital accumulation path derived by dynamic analysis . 
Therefore static analysis , which is simpler , is useful but from 
static analysis it is not possible to determine the optimal long-
run endpoint and the pattern of optimal growth paths which take the 
economy to this endpo i nt . Thi s information can be determined by 
the use of dynamic analysis although the analysis becomes much more 
complex . 
Although this work on the theory of international capital movements 
may not have any direct practical application , it is hoped that 
some useful information has been obtained and that the resul s may 
provide some insight into the behaviour of internat iona l capital 
movements in the real world . 
' 
i 
Appendix No . 1 . 
Shapes of the curves f' = w and f ' = ~ 
To find the shapes of f ' = w and f ' = ~ , differentiate each 
totally . Then 
and 
Also f ' = ~ lies below 
f ' = 00 only at k = 0 . 
Properties of the Policies 
Policy A 
From (29) to (33) and (35) 
p ~ 0 ; q ~ 
Substituting into (26) to 
\ 
From (24) and (25) 
>. = -[f ' - >. w] l l 
Slope of path of policy A: 
Along A, kd = -wkd ; kf 
f ' =w 
f ' =~ 
f ' =~ 
k = y f 
0 
( 28) 
< l ; 
-
= -wk f 
dkf 
dkd -
= -1 
f" 
= 
- f "-~' 
> -1 . 
because at kf = y , ~ = 00 but 
c = F(>O) 
V = 0 t = 0 p = l 
>.2 s 0 
' 
so that 
kf 
kd 
That is , the path of A is a ray which passes through the origin . 
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Policy B 
0 < i < V ; c = F f 
Then from equations (26) to (33) and (35) 
From (24) and (25) 
But A = 0 2 
A = -[f ' 1 
so that 
A2 = -[f ' - <I> J . 
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Hence along policy B, f ' = <P which has a negatively sloped path . 
Therefore , this policy will be consistent only if if> wkf . 
Furthermore if policy Bis to take the system to the endpoint then 
it must be optimal in the region f ' < w But if along policy B 
in this region Al becomes equal to one then Al is positive . 
That is , if Al= l at any point on the path of policy Bin this 
region then Al becomes greater than one and thus policy Bis no 
longer the optimal policy . Therefore , if policy Bis to take the 
system to the endpoint , Al must be less than one and Al must 
be positive along its path in the region f ' < w . 
'\J 
Policy C 
id = 0 ; if = V C = F 
From equations (26) to (33) and (35) 
Al :S l ; A2 ~ 0 
From (24) and (25) 
~ = -[f ' - A w] l l 
Policy D 
id = F ; if = 0 C = 0 
From equations (26) to ( 33) and (35) 
Al~ l ; A2 :s 0 
From (24) and (25) 
~ = -A [f ' - w] l l 
Policy E 
id= F ; 0 <if< V 
From equations (26) to (33) and (35) 
C = 0 
'1 ~ l ; '2 = 0 
From (24) and (25) 
'1 = -\ [f ' - w] ; '2 = ->. [f ' - cj, J l l 
But \ = 2 0 ' therefore '2 = 0 and f ' = q, which has 
sloped path . Therefore , this policy will be consistent 
if < wkf For policy E to lie along f ' = q, 
equal that of f ' = cj, , so that 
E 
-f" 
= 
f'=q, f" - q, ' 
Then policy E will lie along f ' = cj, only if 
[f"(F - wk)+ wkfcj,'] 
f" - q, ' 
the slope 
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a negatively 
only if 
of E must 
But along policy E if is positive . Therefore policy E can only 
lie along that part of f' = q, where f"(F - wk) + wkfq, ' > 0 
Then using a similar argument as for policy B above , it will be 
found that if policy Eis the optimal policy which takes the system 
to the endpoint then \ 1 must be greater than one along its path 
in the region f ' > ~ 
Policy F 
id= F ; if= V 
From equations (26) to (33) and (35) 
'1 ~ l 
From equations (24) and (25) 
\ = -\ [f ' - w] · l l ' 
C = 0 
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Policy G 
0 < c < F 
From equations (26) to ( 33) and ( 35) 
A = 1 1 ; A2 s 0 
From (24) and (25) 
A = -[f ' - w] ; A2 = -[(f' - 4>) - Aw] 1 2 
But Al= 1 , therefore Al= 0 and f' = w which has a negatively 
sloped path . Therefore this policy is consistent only if i > d 
Then if policy G is to take the system to the endpoint , it must be 
optimal in the region f' < 4> • If A2 becomes zero along policy 
Gin this region , then A2 is positive and policy G is no longer 
the optimal policy . Therefore , if policy G is to take the system 
to the endpoint , then A2 must be less than zero and A2 
must be 
positive along its path in the region f' < qi • 
Policy H 
0 < i < F ; d 0 < i < V f 
From equations (26) to (33) and (35) 
A = 1 1 ; A2 = 
From (24) and (25) 
Al = -[f ' - wJ A2 = 
But Al = l therefore Al = 0 and 
A2 = 0 therefore A2 = 0 
0 < c < F 
0 
-[f I 
- 4> J 
That is , this policy is optimal only at the endpoint where 
Policy I 
0 <id< F ; if= V 
From equations (26) to (33) and (35) 
From (24) and (25) 
A = -[f ' - w] l 
0 < c < F 
f' = w = 4> 
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But A = l therefore l and f ' = w which has a negatively 
sloped path . Therefore this policy is consistent only if id< wkd 
Then using similar argument as for G above it will be found that if 
policy I is the optimal policy which takes the system to the end-
point then A2 must be greater than zero and A2 must be negative 
along its path in the region f ' > ~ 
Possible Policy Switches 
From policies G and I , it is known that Al= l along that part of 
f ' = w which lies in the region F > wkd . Also from policies E 
and B, it is known that A2 = 0 alon? f' = ~ . Then using the 
fact that the auxiliary variables are continuous functions of time 
and of the state variables and that the necessary conditions for 
optimality are 
Al= -[pf ' - A1w] and 
A2 = -[p(f' - ~) - A2w] 
all possible policy switches can be determined . 
In the region f ' > ~ A2 s 0 if A2 s 0 Therefore , if policies -
' 
with A2 s 0 are optimal in this region they cannot switch 
to any 
other policy in this region nor take the system from this region to 
the endpoint . 
Therefore policies A and Dare not optimal policies in the region 
f ' > ~ . Similarly , policies C and Fare not optimal policies in 
the region f ' < ~ . 
Policy A 
Al S l A2 S 0 
Al= -[f ' - AlW] ; A2 = -[(f ' - ~) - A2W] 
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Al > 0 if f ' < w 
If Al = l Al = 0 if f ' ;;; w 
A < l 0 if f ' > w 
Al ? if f ' < w 
If Al < l A < 0 if f ' = w 
Al < 0 if f' > w 
If Al< 0 , Al< 0 for all f' . 
Consider all the paths of policy A which cut f' = w in the region 
F > wkd . Then from Al above , Al cannot equal one anywhere in 
the region f' ~ w other than at f ' = w , if policy A is to switch 
into either policy B or policy G. 1 Therefore in the region f' < w , 
along policy A Al< l . Then from Al above , policy A cannot 
switch into policy Dor E in this region f' > w nor take the system 
to the endpoint . [2 = 0 if f ' = <I> If A2 = 0 
A2 > 0 if f' < <I> [2 < 0 if f' = <I> If A < 0 2 
A2 ? if f ' < <I> 
Then from A2 above , A2 cannot equal zero anywhere in the region 
f ' ~ <P other than at f' = <I> , if policy A is to switch into either 
1 . Later it will be shown that if policy D exists in this region 
f ' < w , Al> l and never Al= l Therefore , then neither A can 
switch into D not D into B. That is , this cannot lead to the 
endpoint . 
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policy B or G. Therefore , in the region f ' < ~ policy A has 
Consider all the paths of policy A which cut f ' = w in the region 
F:::: wkd In this region it is not known where Al= 1 . From Al 
above , A1 can have the values 
,-
< 1 in f ' < w 
= 1 at f'= w 
< 1 in f' > w 
so that policy A is possible over the entire region or Al is less 
than one initially in f' < w region , but somewhere in f ' < w 
Al= 1 and the policy is no longer possible beyond this point 
because Al becomes greater than one . 
In the region f' < ~ , A < 0 
2 along both policy A and policy D, 
it therefore seems possible that policy A will switch into Policy D 
somewhere in the region F:::: wkd 2 
Al < 0 if f' > w 
If Al = 1 Al = 0 if f' = w 
Al > 0 if f ' < w 
A < 1 0 if f ' > w 
If \ > 1 Al = 0 if f' = w 
A > 
~ l 0 if f ' < w 
2 . Note : Only those paths of policy A which cut f ' = w in the 
region F:::: wkd 
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Consider the region in which F > wkd . Then from Al above , Al 
cannot equal one anywhere in the region f ' ~ w other than at 
f ' = w if the policy Dis to switch into either policy E or policy 
G. Therefore in the region f ' > w , along policy D, Al> 1 . 
Then from Al above , D cannot switch into A and Bin the region 
f ' < w nor take the system to the endpoint . 
Consider the region in which F s wkd Because in the region 
f' > w 
' \ < 0 and at f ' = w ' Al = 0 ' it is necessary that Al 
be greater than one at all points in the region defined by F S wkd 
and f ' ~ w But in the region f ' < w 
' 
Al > 0 therefore it is 
possible for Al to be equal to one somewhere in this region so 
that Al will be greater than one at f ' = w . 
From the discussion of policy A, Al along A becomes one somewhere 
in the shaded region . 
kf 
y 
f'=qi 
d 
Therefore it is possible that policy A will switch into policy D 
. 3 
somewhere in the shaded region . 
3 . In this region policy A cannot be optimal beyond the Al= 1 
point because Al> 0 in this region . 
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Policy B 
Policy B does not switch into any other policy but takes the system 
to the final endpoint . 
Policy C 
"1 - 1 "2::: 0 
"1 = - [f ' - "1w] ; "2 = -[(f ' - ~) - "2w] 
"1 > 0 if f I< w 
If 
"1 = 1 "1 = 0 if f ' = w 
"1 < 0 if f' > w 
-
"1 ? if f ' < w 
If 
"1 < 1 "1 < 0 if f ' = w 
_ "1 < 0 if f ' > w 
If ' < 0 ' < 0 fov, a 11 f ' . /\1 ' /\1 .._ 
From 
"1 above , "1 cannot equal one anywhere in the region f ' s w 
except at f ' = w if policy C is to switch into either policy B or 
I. 4 Therefore in the region f' along policy C 
" < 1 < w ' 1 
Then from >- 1 above , policy C cannot switch into either For E in 
the region f ' > w nor take the system to the endpoint . 
If 
if f ' = ~ 
if f ' > ~ 
4 . Later it will be shown that if policy Fis to be optimal in this 
region f ' < w , >- 1 > 1 and never equal to one . Therefore , neither 
can C switch into F nor Finto B. 
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~~2, 
0 if f ' = <P 
If 
"2 > 0 
"2 ? if f ' > <P 
Then from 
"2 above , "2 cannot equal zero anywhere in the region 
f ' ~ <P except at f ' = <P if policy C is to switch into ei her policy 
I or B. Therefore in the region f ' > <P 
' 
policy C has 
"2 > 0 
Policy D 
If 
' = 0 ' = -' [f' - ~] > 0 i'n the whole regi·on f ' < ~ . /\2 ' /\2 /\1 't' 't' 
Ther efore , along D, >- 2 i O at any point within this region f ' S <P 
other than at f ' = <P if policy Dis to switch into policies E and 
G and in fact , if it is to be optimal . Also , >-
2 
must be less than 
zero if policy A is to switch into policy D. 
Policy E 
Policy E does not switch into any o her policy but takes the system 
to the final endpoint . 
Policy F 
If 
"1 = 1 
If 
"1 > 1 
>- = ->. [f' 1 1 
"1 > 0 
Al = 0 
"1 < 0 
-
"1 > 0 
Al = 0 
>- < 1 0 
-
w] >. = -[>. (f ' - ~) - >. w] 2 1 't' 2 
if f ' < w 
if f ' = w 
if I > w 
if f ' < w 
if f ' = w 
if f ' > w 
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Then from Al above, Al cannot equal one anywhere in the region 
f ' ~ w other than f ' = w if policy Fis to switch into policy E, 
policy I , or policy D. Therefore in the region f ' > w , along 
policy F Al> l . Then from Al above, F cannot switch into C 
or Bin the region f' < w nor ake the system to the endpoint . 
If A2 = 0 , A2 > 0 in the region f ' > $ Therefore , along policy 
F A2 ., 0 at any point within this region f ' ~ $ other than at 
f ' = $ if policy F is to switch into either policy E or I and in 
fact , if it is to be optimal . Policy F will switch into policy D 
at f ' = $ only if part of f ' = $ lies in the region 
f " (F - wk) + wkf$ ' < 0 
Policies G and I - same as for policies Band E. 
Shape of the curve F = 0 
By total differentiation 
f' 
= dkd f I - $ 
< 0 if f ' > $ 
dkf > 0 if f ' < $ 
i.e . 
dkd 
is 
= 00 if f' = $ 
= 0 if $ = 00 
Because the slope of F = 0 is less than the slope of the f ' = $ 
curve , if F = 0 lies below f ' = $ initially it will remain below 
it for all kd 
Also the endpoint is defined as the point where sustainable con-
sumption per head is maximised. That is , net output is maximis ed 
• 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
. 
Net output= f - rkf - wkd = F - wkd 
But c ~ 0 , so that 
F ~ wkd ~ 0 . 
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Therefore , for the endpoint to be stable it must lie in the region 
F ~ 0 . That is , it must be either on F = 0 or in the phase space 
between the origin and F = 0 But F cannot be zero at the end-
point because this means that the curve must initially lie below 
the f' = ~ curve and from the above , the curve must then remain 
below f ' = ~ . 
Therefore the F = 0 curve must lie beyond the endpoint and in fact 
must lie completely beyond the f ' = ~ curve or intersect it at 
the kf axis . 
Thus the curve is rising everywhere until kf = y where it becomes 
horizontal . 
Shape of the F = wk d curve 
By totally differentiating f - rkf - wkd = 0 , 
the slope f' - w 
f' - ~ 
< 0 when f' < ~ , f ' < w 
dkf = 0 f ' = w 
Then 
dkd 
is 
> 0 f' < ~ 
' 
f ' > w 
= 00 f ' = ~ 
At kd = 0 , F = wkd intersects the curve F = 0 . 
-
--. 
At kf = 0 , 
b 
f ' =w #i# 
/2 
/2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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f 
Therefore , F = wkd curve cuts the kd axis at kd in the region 
f I < W , 
Shape of f" ( F - wk ) + wk cp ' = 0 f 
Along t hi s curve , F - wkd i s greater than zero at 
except at kf = 0 where it equals zero . Therefore 
wholly below the F - wkd = 0 curve and intersects 
kf = 0 axis . 
all points 
this curve lies 
it only at the 
The fixed endpoint is defined such that sustainable consumption per 
head is ma ximised and at this endpoint there exists an optimal 
policy such that kd = kf = 0 Therefore the curve 
f"(F - wk) + wk <P ' = 0 must lie above the endpoint . 
f 
At the kd = 0 a xis , both the slope of the curve and its intercept 
on the axis are somewhat indeterminate . However the important question 
is whether the curve cuts the 
f ' = cp line . For example : 
k = 0 d 
axis above or below the 
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f '=<t> 
f' =qi 
Appendix No . 2 . 
To minimise 
JT A Q (c - C )d t 
subject to 
kd = id + id - wkd 
l 2 
kf = if - id - wkf 
2 
C ::".:. 0 
id ::".:. 0 
l 
id ::".:. 0 
2 
0 .'.': if < V 
Define the Hamiltonian 
and the Lagrangian 
- wk J d 
L = H + p[f(k) - r(k )k - C - i - i J + tc 
f f dl d2 
+ pld + mid + qif + v[V - if] . 
l 2 
Th0 necessary conditions for an optimal solution are 
(a) that the auxiliary variables Al and A2 are continuous 
functions of time given by 
aL 
= -[pf' 
akd \ - - and 
aL A = - - - -[p(f' - ~) - A2W] . 2 akf -
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification (Arrow 
et al [4]) at any point of time and the Hamiltonian is maxi-
mised subject to this constraint . That is : 
= 0 
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a1 
>. 1 0 aid = + p 
- p = 
1 
aL 
"1 "2 aid = 
- - p + m = 0 
2 
aL 
"2 aif 
= + q - V = 0 
p :::: 0 pid = 0 
1 
q :::: 0 qif = 0 
V :::: 0 v[V - if] = 0 
t :::: 0 tc = 0 
m :::: 0 mid = 0 
2 
p :::: 0 p[f - rkf - C - id id J = 0 
1 2 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality from 
Arrow [3], lecture 1 , proposition 4 . 
As t :::: 0 and p = 1 + t 
' p > 0 Therefore the budget constraint 
is satisfied with equality and the possible policy combinations are 
Policy id id C if 
1 2 
A 0 0 F 0 
B 0 0 F >O 
C 0 0 F V 
D F 0 0 0 
E F 0 0 >O 
F F 0 0 V 
G <F 0 <F 0 
H <F 0 <F >O 
I <F 0 <F V 
J 0 F 0 0 
K 0 F 0 >O 
L 0 F 0 V 
M <F <F 0 0 
N <F <F 0 >O 
0 <F <F 0 V 
Policy id id C 
1 2 
p 0 <F <F 
Q 0 <F <F 
R 0 <F <F 
s <F <F <F 
T <F <F <F 
u <F <F <F 
Properties of the policies 
Policy A 
Policy B 
C = F 
Then p :': 0 m:':O ; t=O q :': 0 
and Al = p - p s 1 
A2 = -q s 0 so that 
Al A2 = p p + q 
But Al A2 = p - m 
Therefore p - q = m 
or p :': q 
Also Al= -[f ' - A1wJ and 
A2 = -[(f ' - q,) - A2W] 
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if 
0 
>O 
V 
0 
>O 
V 
v=O,p=l 
id = 0 id = 0 ; C = F ; 0 < if < V 
1 2 
Then p :': 0 m :': 0 t = 0 p = 1 V = q = 0 
' 
Al = 1 p 1 
' 
A2 = 0 
Al A2 = 1 - m 
Therefore along policy B, p = m 
But since A2 = 0 
' 
A2 = 0 and therefore policy B is only consistent 
if it lies along A2 = 0 or along f' = ~ • 
Polici'. C 
id = 0 id = 0 C = F if = V l 2 
Then p > 0 ; m ~ - 0 t = 0 p = l q 
and Al = l - p s l 
A2 = V ~ 0 
Al A2 = l - m 
But \ A2 = l (p + v) 
Therefore along policy c, p + V = m 
Policy D 
id = F id = 0 ; C = 0 ; if = 0 l 2 
Then p = 0 m ~ 0 t ~ 0 p ~ l ; q 
and Al = p ~ l 
A2 = -q < 0 -
' 
Al - A2 = p - m 
But Al - A2 = p + q 
Therefore along policy D, q = -m 
But this is impossible unless q = m = 0 , that is , 
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= 0 V ~ 0 
~ 0 V = 0 
A = 0 and thus 2 
A2 = 0 Then policy Dis only consistent if it lies along the 
curve f ' = ~ • 
Policy E 
id = F id = 0 ; C = 0 ; 0 < if < V l 2 
Then p = 0 m ~ 0 t > 0 p ~ l V = q = 0 
and A2 = p ~ l 
A2 = 0 
Al A2 = p 
But Al A2 = p - m 
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Therefore along policy E, m = O . 
Then policy Eis only consistent if it lies 
along the curve f ' = ~ . 
Policy F 
id = F id = 0 ; C = 0 ; if = V l 2 
Then p = 0 m ::'.: 0 t ::'.: 0 p ::'.: l ; q = 0 V ::'.: 0 
and Al = p ::'.: l 
A2 = V ::'.: l 
Al A2 = p - m 
But Al A2 = p - V 
Therefore along policy F , v = m. 
Policy G 
id > 0 id = 0 ; C > 0 ; if = 0 l 2 
Then p = 0 m ::'.: 0 t = 0 p = l ; q ::'.: 0 V = 0 
and Al = l 
' 
A2 = -q s 0 
' 
Al A2 = l - m 
But Al - A2 - l + q 
Therefore along policy G, q = -m which is impossible unless both 
q and m are zero . That is , policy G is only consistent if 
which makes policy G only consistent at the endpoint . But since 
kf < O and kd > O , this policy is non-optimal at the endpoint 
. . 
which is defined by kd = kf = 0 . 
Policy H 
id > 0 id = 0 ; C > 0 ; 0 < if < V l 2 
Then p = 0 m ::'.: 0 t = 0 q = V = 0 
' 
p = l 
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and Al = 1 
A2 = 0 
Al - A2 = 1 m 
Therefore m = 0 along policy H . But policy His only optimal 
at the endpoint where id a nd if are s uch as to maintain 
1 
Policy I 
id > 0 id = 0 ; C > 0 ; if = V 1 2 
Then p = 0 m ~ 0 t = 0 p = 1 ; V ~ 0 q = 0 
and Al = 1 
A2 = V ~ 0 
Al A2 = 1 - m 
But Al A2 = 1 - V 
Therefore along policy I , m = v 
But Al= 1 and therefore Al= 0 
sistent along f ' = w . 
That is , policy I is only con-
Policy J 
id = 0 
1 
Then p ~ 0 
and 
Therefore p = q along 
Also Al = - [pf I - AlW] 
and A2 = -[p (f ' - <P ) 
The slope of the pa h 0 
id = F ; C = 0 ; if = 0 
2 
m = 0 t ~ 0 p ~ 1 ; q ~ 0 V = 0 
Al = p p 
A2 = - q 
' 
A - A2 = p 1 
policy J . 
- A2W] 
policy J is given by 
( F + wkf ) 
< - 1 . 
F - wkd 
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Therefore policy J is steeper than the curve f ' = w . 
Policy K 
id = 0 id = F ; C = 0 ; if > 0 1 2 
Then p ~ 0 m = 0 t ~ 0 V = q = 0 ; p ~ 1 
and \ = p p 
A2 = 0 
Al A2 = p p 
But Al A2 = p 
Therefore p = 0 and Al~ 1 
Since A2 = 0 , A2 = 0 and thus policy K is only internally con-
sistent along f ' = 
region f ' > w and 
consistent if if -
Policy L 
id = 
1 
Then p ~ 0 
and 
But 
Therefore p = V = 0 
L is only consistent 
Policy M 
id < F 
1 
Then p = 0 
and 
<t> As Al is greater than unity only in the 
f ' = <t> is negatively sloped , policy K is only 
F < wl<f 
0 id = F ; C = 0 ; if = V 2 
m = 0 t ~ 0 q = 0 ; V ~ 0 p :::: 1 
Al = p p 
A2 = V 
Al A2 = p p - V 
Al A2 = p 
That is Al = 1 and A2 = 0 Then policy 
at the endpoint . 
id < F ; C = 0 ; if = 0 2 
m = 0 t 
-
0 p :::: 1 ; q ~ 0 V = 0 
Al = p , 
A2 = -q , 
Al - A2 = p 
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Therefore q = 0 and thus A2 = 0 
Also Al = -A [f ' 1 w] 
and A2 = -[p(f ' <P) J Since A = 0 
' 
A2 = 0 and thus policy 2 
Mis only internally consistent along f ' = <P But f ' = <P has 
a negative slope and therefore this policy is only consistent if 
Policy N 
Then 
and 
Since A2 = 0 
a long f ' = <P 
Policy 0 
id < F 
1 
p = 0 
A2 = 
i < F 
dl 
0 
Then p = 0 
and 
id 
rn = 
Al -
and 
< F ; C 
2 
0 t ::: 0 
Al = p 
= 0 2 
A2 = p 
policy N 
< F ; C 
t ::: 0 
Al = p 
A2 = V 
A2 = p 
= 0 ; if > 0 
p ::: l ; q = V = 0 
is only internally consistent 
= 0 ; if = V 
p ::: 1 ; q = 0 V ::: 0 
Therefore v = 0 and A2 = 0 
only consistent along f ' = <P 
That is A2 = 0 and policy O is 
Policy P 
id = 0 
1 
Then p::: 0 
and 
id 
2 
rn = 0 
Al 
A2 
Al - A2 
= F ; 
t = 
= 1 
= -q 
= 1 
C < f ; if = 0 
0 p = l ; q ::: 0 V = 0 
p 
' 
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Bu t A - A = l - p + q . l 2 
Ther efor e p = q alon g policy P . 
Also Al - A2 = l and therefore Al A2 = 0 . Then policy Pis 
onl y consistent along ~ = w . But ~ equals w only at kf = kf 
Policy Pis ther efore non-optimal because at the endpoint 
and here kf < 0 · 
k = k = 0 f d 
Policy Q 
id = 0 id = F ; C < F ; if > 0 l 2 
Then p :::: 0 m = 0 t = 0 p = l ; V = q = 0 
and Al = l - p 
A2 = 0 
Al A2 = l 
But Al A2 = l p 
Therefore p = 0 and Al = l along policy Q. That is , policy Q 
only internally consistent at the endpoint . 
Policy R 
id = 0 id = F ; C < F ; if = V l 2 
Then p :::: 0 m = 0 t = 0 p = l ; q = 0 V :::: 0 
and Al = l p 
A2 = V 
Al A2 = l 
But Al A2 = l p - V 
Therefore policy R is only consistent if 
= v = 0 , that is if 
A2 = 0 and Al= l . Then policy R is only consistent at the end-
point . 
Policy S 
C < F 
is 
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Then p = 0 m = 0 ; t = 0 p = 1 q ~ 0 V = 0 
and 
"1 = l 
' 
"2 = -q 
' 
"1 "2 = 1 
But 
"1 "2 = 1 t q 
Therefore q = 0 and >.
2 
= 0 . 
Then this policy satisfies the necessary conditions of the theorem 
at the endpoint . But as the endpoint is defined by kd = kf = O , 
this policy is non-optimal because kf < 0 • 
Policy T 
Then 
and 
id < F 
1 
p = 0 
< 
"1 
F ; C 
t = 0 
= 1 
< F ; if > 0 
p = 1 ; V = q = 0 
Then this policy is only consistent at the endpoint . 
Policy U 
id < F id < F ; C < F ; if = V 1 2 
Then p = 0 m = 0 t = 0 p = 1 ; q = 0 V 
and 
"1 = l 
"2 = V 
"1 "2 = 1 
But 
"1 >- = l - V 2 
Therefore this policy is only consistent if V = 0 and thus 
policy is only consistent at the endpoint . 
Possible Policy Switches 
~ 0 
the 
The possible policy switches are determined by the necessary 
condition that the auxiliary variables must be continuous functions 
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of ime given by 
A = -[pf' - Aw] · 1 1 ' A2 = -[p(f ' - cj>) 
From the properties of policies B, D, E, K, M, N and O it is known that 
A2 = 0 along f ' = cj> • Also from policy I , Al= 1 along the 
f ' = w curve in the region f ' ~ cj> • 
In Appendix No . 1 it was shown that policies A and C switch into 
Bat f ' = cj> , policies C and F switch into I at f ' = w and 
policy F switches into Eat f ' = cj> Since D, M, N and O can also 
lie along f ' = cj> in the region f ' > w , policy F can also switch 
into D, K, M, N and Oat f ' = cj> • 
Policy J 
Al= p - p , A2 = -q and p = q . 
Because p = q along policy J , as A2 goes to zero so does p 
and Al is greater than or equal to one. Therefore policy J 
cannot switch into policy B which is characterised by A < 1 l and 
A2 = 0 (except at the endpoint where Al= 1) . 
Also policy A cannot switch into policy E (and thus into D,K , , N 
or 0) as discussed in Appendix No . 1. Then policy J is the only 
policy which can possibly switch into E, D, K, M, N or O along f ' = cj> • 
In the region F > wkd 
' 
kd 
fore Al must be nega ive. 
which takes the economy to 
cannot equal 1 and 
path in the region 
must be 
F ~ wk d 
is positive along policy J and there -
That is, along any path of policy J 
f ' = cj> in the region f ' > w 
' 
Al 
greater than lat all points along the 
Therefore in the region F ~ wkd 
policy A cannot switch into policy J . However , in the region 
f ' < w , Al may become negative alonr policy J and policy J can 
switch into policy A. 
- .. 
-· 
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I n the region F ~ wkd , kd is i ncreasing along policy J therefore 
Al mu st be negat ive . Tha t is , policy J is only app l i cable i n the 
region where Al i s negative or i n t h e r egion p ( f ' - w) > A
2
w , 
with p ~ l . Similar l y , along policy A kd i s decreasing and 
therefore Al must be po s itive . That is , pol icy A i s only 
applicabl e i n the region (f ' - w) < A
2
w In other wor ds , policy 
J switches i nto policy A at the boundary ( f ' - w) = A
2
w . 
Policies D, E and M. 
The policies D, E and Mare internally consistent only if they lie 
along f ' = ~ i n the region f ' > w On each of these policies 
consumption is zero and kd = F - wkd and kf is such as to move 
the economy along f ' = ~ On policy D k = - wk 
' 
on policy f f 
kf > - wk and on policy k < -wk Therefore the optimal f f f 
policy will be determined by the slope of the f ' = ~ curve . 
kf X - wkf 
-.- - F wkd 
where 
kd -
X The slope of these policies is 
zero depending on the pol i cy. The slope of f ' = ~ i s 
is> 
- f " 
f" - ~' 
(see Appendix No . 1) . Then the optimal policy is the one along 
X - wkf -f" 
which k - f " -~ It should be noted that the slope of F - w d '+' 
M > slope of D > slope of E and that switches can occur between 
these policies . 
E 
Appendix No . 3 . 
The Optimisation Problem 
To minimise 
I TO [ U ( c~ ) ( ) ] - LJ C dt , 
where T is unspecified , along the path from any initial point to 
the fixed endpoint subject to 
f(kd + kf) 
kd = id -
kf = i -f 
C ~ 0 
0 < i S V 
- f 
- r(kf)kf - id - C ~ 0 
wkd 
w 
It is also assumed that U' (c) > 0 , U"(c) < 0 and U' (O) = 00 
The ixed endpoint is such that sustainable consumption per head 
is maximised . As derived in the Chapter V the endpoint (kd , kf) 
is defined by f ' = ~ = w 
Applying Arrow ' s ethod of Solution (Arrow [3]) again the Hamiltonian 
is 
and the Lagrangian is 
L = H + pid + qif + v[V - if]+ tc 
+ p[f(kd + kf) - r(kf) . kf - C - id] 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) The shadow prices Al and A2 are continuous functions of 
time given by 
216 . 
217. 
Al 
3L 
-[pf' AlW] and = 
- 3kd = -
A2 
3L 
-[p(f ' <t> ) A2W] = 
- 3kf = - -
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification 5 at any 
point of time a nd the Hamiltonian is maximised subject to this 
constr>aint . That is 
3L U' (c) ac = + t - p = 0 
3L 
Al 0 3id = + p 
- p = 
3L 
A2 0 3if = + q - V = 
p ::::: 0 pid = 0 
q ::::: 0 qif = 0 
V ::::: 0 v[V if] = 0 
t ::::: 0 tc = 0 
p ::::: 0 p[f - rkf - C - id] = 0 
(c) The optimal value of the Hamiltonian is zero. That is , 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for an optimal solution 
because the Hamiltonian is a concave function of the state variables 
kd,kf given Al , A2 and t . This sufficiency condition is given 
by Arrow [3] , lecture 1 , proposition 4 . 
From aL 8c = 0 , p = U' (c) + t . But t ::::: 0 therefore p::::: U'(c) 
Then all of net output is distributed between consumption and 
current domestic investment. As discussed in section I, any policy 
5. Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
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along which consumpt ion is zero is non-optimal . Therefore , the 
possible policy combinations are 
Policy id C if 
A 0 F 0 
B 0 F >O 
C 0 F V 
D O<id<F O<c<F 0 
E O<id<F O<c<F >O 
F O<id<F O<c<F V 
G F-c C 0 
H F- c c >O 
I F-c A V C 
where F = f(kd + 
Properties of policies 
Policy A 
Policy B 
id= 0 ; c = F ; if= 0 
p ~ 0 ; t = 0 ; V = 0 
Therefore Al S U' (c) 
q ~ 0 
A < 0 
2 
id = 0 ; 0 < if < V C = F 
kf) - r(kf)kf 
p = U' (c) 
p > 0 ; V = q = 0 
-
t = 0 p = U' (c) 
Therefore Al s U I (C) A2 = 0 
and Al= -[pf ' A1w] ; A2 = -U ' (c)[f' - <j,] 
But A = 0 therefore 2 Then policy Bis only consistent 
in the region f ' < w and along f ' = <j, • 
Policy C 
C = F 
p _ 0 ; q = 0 V ~ 0 t = 0 p = U' (c) 
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Therefore Al~ U' (c) ; A2 ~ 0 
and Al= -[pf ' - AlW] ; A2 = - [p(f ' - ¢) - A2W] . 
Policy D 
if= 0 ; 0 < c < F 
p = 0 ; q ~ 0 ; V = 0 t = 0 p = U I (C) 
Therefore Al = U' (c) A2 ~ 0 
and Al = -A [f ' - w] A2 = -D1 (f ' - ¢) - A2W] l 
But Al = U' (c) so that 
Al = U"(c)c 
U' 
w] or C = 
- U" [f ' -
Along f ' = w , C = 0 Therefore ~ C must equal C and this is 
policy G which will be discussed below. 
Along policy D A2 _ 0 with A2 = -[A (f ' - ¢) - Aw] l 2 Then 
policy D can only be optimal in the ~e~ion f ' < ¢ so that A2 > 0 . 
Policy E 
0 < id < F 0 < if < V ; 0 < C < F 
p = 0 ; q = V = 0 ; t = 0 p = U' (c) 
Therefore Al = U I (c) A2 = 0 
and Al = -A [f ' - w] A2 = -A [f ' - ¢] l l 
Because A2 = 0 
along f ' = ¢ 
A2 = 0 . Then this policy is only consistent 
Also , as derived for policy D above , 
U' 
w] C = U" [f ' 
Then along policy E, C > 0 in the region f ' > w 
' 
C < 0 where 
f ' < w and C = 0 at f ' = w 
-· 
r 
I 
I 
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Policy F 
0 < • < F J..d if= V ; 0 < c < F 
p = 0 ; q = 0 ; V ::'.: 0 t = 0 p = U I ( C) 
Therefore A = U' (c ) l A2 ::'.: 0 
and Al = -A [f ' - w] A2 = - 0 1( f ' - <P ) - A2w] l 
As derived for policy D, U' C = - ()" (f ' - w) • 
A Along f ' = w , c = O . Therefore C = C and this is policy L 
which will be discussed below. 
Along policy F , A2 :".: 0 and A2 = -[A1(f ' - <P) - A2w] . 
Then policy F can only be optimal in the region f ' > <P so that 
A < 0 • 2 
Policy G 
id = F - C C = C if = 0 
p = 0 ; t = 0 ; V = 0 q ::'.: 0 p = U I (c) 
Therefore Al = U I (C) A2 < 0 
and Al = -U I ( C) [ f I w] A2 = -[p(f ' - <P) - A2w] 
As derived above , U' C = - ()" (f ' - w) Therefore policy G can 
only be optimal along f ' = w But alon~ f ' = w , k = 0 That 
i s, id must equal wk The allocation from net output to current 
domestic i nvestment is F - c = r(kf)kf - r (kf)kf + wkd . Then 
policy G lies on f ' = w only if 
wk = r(kf )kf - r(kf)kf + wkd 
or if wkf = r(kf)kf - r (kf)kf . 
But r(kf ) > r(kf) and kf > kf therefore the right-hand 
t he equation is negative and thus cannot equal Wkf Then 
G does not lie along f ' = w and is therefore non-optimal . 
side of 
policy 
i 
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Policy H 
id F 
A A 
if = - C C = C > 0 
p = 0 ; t = 0 ; V = q = 0 p = LJ I (C) 
Therefore 
"1 = LJ I (c) "2 = 0 
Then this policy can only be optimal at the endpoint . 
Policy I 
A 
C = C 
p = 0 ; t = 0 ; q = 0 
Therefore >. 1 = U' (c) 
and >- 1 = -U '( c)(f ' - w) 
V::: 0 p = U'(c) 
As for policy G, this policy can only be optimal along f ' = w . 
But along f ' = w, k = 0 . Therefore this policy is only con -
sistent if kd = - kf = -(V - wkf) . The amount of net output 
allocated to current domestic investment is F - c Then 
Then policy 
I is only optimal if 
that is , if 
The left-hand side of this equation is constant because k = k 
along f ' = w and V, w are given constants . The right - hand side 
is not constant but decreases along policy I . Therefore this 
condition for consistency is satisfied only at one point on f ' = w 
and thus the policy is non-optimal. 
Possible Policy Switches 
It is known from the properties of the policies that >-
2 
is zero 
along f ' = ~ and >. = U' (;) at the endpoint . 1 Then using the 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
: 
I 
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fact that the auxiliary variables are continuous functions of time 
and of the state variables and that the necessary conditions for 
optimality are 
all possible policy switches can be determined . 
Policy A 
Policy A is only optimal in the region f ' S ~ and Al S U' (F) 
As reasoned in Appendix No . 1 policy A switches into policy B 
at f ' = ~ • 
Al along policy D is U' (c) where C < F Then in the neighbour-
hoo of A =U ' (F) 1 ' C is falling along D and Al is increasing . 
But in the limit, >-.1 on policy D must equal U' (F) at the 
boundary ).. = U' (F) 1 That is A = U ' (F) 1 is the switching 
surface where policy A switches to policy D. 
Policy B 
A = 0 2 
Policy Bis optimal along f ' = ~ in the region Al S U' (F) . 
As discussed for policy A above policy B switches at 
into policy E . 
Policy C 
A = U' (F) 1 
Policy C is only optimal in the region f ' ~ ~ and Al S U' (F) 
As discussed in Appendix No. 1 policy C switches into policy B 
at f ' = ~ . Applying similar reasoning for policy Fas for 
policy Din relation to policy A, policy C switches into policy 
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F at the "switching surface " Al = lJ ' (F) . 
Policy D 
Al = U' (c) 
If A2 = 0 along policy Din the region f ' < ~ then policy D 
cannot switch into any other policy nor take the system to the 
endpoint. Therefore A2 must equal zero at f ' = ~ and there 
policy D switches into policy E. 
Policy E 
Al= U' (c) A = 0 2 
Policy E does not switch into any other policy but takes the system 
to the endpoint . 
Policy F 
Al= lJ ' (c) 
Using a similar reasoning here as for policy D policy F switches 
into policy Eat f' = ~ . 
Shape of kd = 0 curve 
At the endpoint kd = 0 and therefore this curve passes through 
the endpoint . 
From the necessary conditions for optimality the Hamiltonian is 
zero . Therefore along kd = 0 , 
Differentiating totally 
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de 
1-
A2W 
or 
dkf = LJ I (C) 
kd = 0 
That is, along kd 0 de 0 if >-2 0 = , --< < dkf 
de 
and 
-- > 0 if dkf >. 2 > 0 , when if is constant. 
Along policy D, >-2 S 0 if = 0 and kf < 0 so that kd = 0 
curve cuts the path of policy D where C is positive . As discussed 
under the properties of policy U' w) D, C = - U" (f' - Therefore 
kd = 0 curve cuts the path of policy D somewhere in the region 
f ' > w 
Similarly , for policy F >. 2 ~ 0 , if= V and kf > 0 , so that 
the k = 0 d curve cuts the path of policy F where C is positive . 
That is , the path of policy Fis cut somewhere in the region 
f ' > w • 
The exact slope of kd = 0 is indeterminate but from the three 
properties above it takes the following shape : 
f '= cp 
Appendix No . 4. 
Solution of the problem in section I 
To minimise 
f~ (c - c)dt 
along the path from any initial point to the endpoint subject to 
f (kd + kf) - r(Lkf)kf - id - c ~ 0 
kd = id - wkd 
C ~ 0 
Applying Arrow ' s Method of Solution (Arrow [3]) , the Hamiltonian 
is 
and the Lagrangian 
where Al is the shadow price of net domestic investment and p , t , p 
are the Lagrange Multipliers . 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) Al is a continuous function of time given by 
· aL 
A = - - = -[pf ' - Aw] 1 akd 1 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification at any 
point of time (Arrow Hurwicz , Uzawa [4]) and the Hamiltonian 
is maximised subject to this constraint . That is 
aL 
ac=l+t-p=O 
= 0 
aL - p[f ' (k) ~(Lk )] = 0 
akf - - f 
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p ~ 0 
t 0 tc = 0 
p ~ 0 
These necessary conditions can also be shown to be sufficient for 
optimality by using the theorem in Arrow [3] , lecture 1, proposition 
4. 
Then from ~ = 0 ac and t ~ 0 , p ::: 1 
constraint is satisfied with equality. 
Properties of the policies 
Policy A 
id= 0 ; c = F . 
Therefore the budget 
Then p _ 0 ; t = 0; p = 1 . 
Also A 1 ~ 1 
Policy B 
Policy C 
and Al= -[f ' - >- 1w] . 
Then 
Also 
and 
0 < 
Then p = 
Also Al 
and Al 
id = F ; C = 0 
p = 0 ; t > 0 ; p 
-
Al ~ 1 
Al = ->. [f' - w] 1 
= 
= 
i < f d 
0 ; t 
1 
-[f' -
0 < C < f 
= 0 ; p = l 
w] 
::'.: 1 
But A = l and therefore l "1 = 0 . Thus this policy is only 
consisten along f ' = w . 
Solution of the problem in section II 
To minimise 
J~ (c - c)dt ' 
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along the path from any initial point to the fixed endpoint subject 
to 
Applying 
and the 
f(kd + kf) - r(Lkf)kf - c 
kd = id wkd 
kf = if - wkf 
C ~ 0 
- i ~ 0 d 
~ V(r) . 
Arrow ' s Method of Solution again , he Hamiltonian 
H = 
-cc - C) + A1[id - wkd] + Ai if - wk] f 
Lagrangian is 
L = H + pid + tc + qif + v[V(r) if] 
+ p[f(kd )kf) - r ( Lk )k - c 
- id J f f 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
is 
(a) that the shadow prices Al and A2 are continuous functions 
of time given by 
>. = ~ = -[pf ' - A w] and 1 - akd 1 
>- 2 = - !tf = -[p(f ' (k) - ~(Lkf)) - A2w - vV ' ~(Lkf)] 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification at any 
point of time (Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4]) and the Hamiltonian 
is maximised subject to this constraint . That is 
a1 1 t 0 ac - + - p = 
a1 
Al 0 aid - + p - p = 
a1 
A2 0 aif - + q - V = 
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p :::: 0 pid = 0 
q :::: 0 qif = 0 
t :::: 0 tc = 0 
V :::: 0 v[V - if] = 0 
p :::: 0 p[f(k) 
- 4>(Lkf)kf - C - id] = 0 
From ~ = 0 ac and t::::O , p::::l 
is allocated between id and c 
Therefore all of net output 
Then the possible policy 
combinations satisfying the given constraint are those listed in 
Chapter VII . 
The properties of these policies and the switches between them are 
the same as for the policies of Appendix No. 1 . 
Shape of 
Appendix No . 5 
f ' - 8 - r* - Kr*' = O f 
Differentiating totally , 
Therefore 
dKf _ 
dKd - F " r:': I 
-F" 
[r:': "K - r:': ' J 
f 
But assuming that r :': 11 % O 
dKf - -F" 
d Kd - F " - 2r :': ' < O • 
Shape of F ' - 8 - r* = 0 
Differentiating totally 
Therefore 
dKf -F" 
dKd = F" - r *' < 0 . 
These two curves have negative slopes between O and -1 but the 
curve F ' - 8 = r* is steeper and they intersect on the 
axis . 
The Optimisation Problem 
To minimise 
subject to 
f~ [U(C) - U(C)]dt , 
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8]Kf - C - Id 
l 
K = 0 f 
C > 0 
Id ::'.: 0 
l 
Id 
> 0 < 
2 
0 s If s (a + o) K;': 
' 
where n = n(Id ) and r = (l - T)[F ' (K) - o] . 
2 
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The control variables are now 
variables are Kd and Kf . 
T and the state 
Define the Hamiltonian 
and the Lagrangian 
- oK] f 
L = H + p[F(Kd + Kf) - F ' (K)Kf + T[F ' (K) - o] - C - Id - nid J 
l 2 
+ pid + mid + nC + qlf + v[(a + o)K* - If] 
l 2 
+ z[r - r;': J . 
Necessary conditions for an optimal solution are : 
(a) The auxiliary variables Al , A2 are continuous functions of 
time given by 
and 
Al 
aL 
-[p(F' F"K + TF"K) Alo z(l T )F"] = - aKd = - - - -f f 
A2 
aL 
-[p(-F"K t T(F ' o) Tf"K) v(a o) = 
- aKf = - + + + f f 
+ z(l - T )F" - zr ;': ' - A2°] 
(b) The constraint satisfies the Constraint Qualification at any 
point of time (Arrow , Hurwicz , Uzawa [4]) and the Hamiltonian 
is maximised subject to this constraint . That is , 
aL 
Al 0 
afd 
= - p + p = 
l 
aL 
Al A2 p[n + Id n ' ] 0 afd = - - + m = 
2 2 
aL 
A2 0 
aff = + 
q 
- V = 
cL ac = U' (C) - p + n = O 
~ = (F ' - o)(pKf - z) = 0 h 
p ::: 0 pid = 0 
l 
m ::: 0 mI = 0 
d2 
n ::: 0 nC = 0 
q ::: 0 qif = 0 
V ::: 0 v[ (a + o )K:': If] 
z ::: 0 z[r r:':J = 0 
p ::: 0 p[F F ' K + T(F' f 
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= 0 
o)K - C -I - nid f dl 2 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality from 
Arrow's sufficiency theorem Arrow [3] , lecture 1 , page 10 . 
From ~ = 0 z = pK CT ' f (F' -/- o as discussed earlier in part I of 
this chapter) . Substituting for z in the equations for Al and 
A2 , they become 
A2 = -[pT(F ' - o) + v(a + o) - zr*' - A2oJ . 
From :~ = 0 , p = U' (C) + n > 0 . Therefore the budget constraint 
is satisfied with equality and z is positive for all Kf > 0 so 
that at any point of time when Kf > 0 , r = r* . Then from the 
budget constraint all possible policies are 
Policy Id Id C If l 2 
A 0 0 f 0 
B 0 0 f O< I < (a+o )K:'-f 
C 0 0 f (a+o)K* 
D O<I <f 
dl 
0 O<C<f 0 
J = 0 
Policy Id 
l 
E O<I <f 
dl 
F O<Id <f 
l 
G 0 
H 0 
I 0 
J O<Id <f 
l 
K O<Id <f 
l 
L O<I <f 
dl 
M 0 
N 0 
0 0 
p O< I <f- nI 
dl d2 
Q O<I <f-TII 
d2 d2 
R O<I <f-1rI 
d2 d2 
Properties of these policies 
Policy A 
Id = 0 Id 
l 2 
Then p ::: 0 m ::: 0 
a nd p 
Id 
2 
0 
0 
O<I <f 
d 2 
O<I <f 
d2 
O<I <f 
d2 
O<I <f 
d2 
O< Id <f 
2 
O<I <f 
d2 
<O 
<O 
<O 
<O 
<O 
<O 
where 
= 0 ; C 
n = 0 
= U' (C) 
Therefore Al S U' (C) a nd A2 SO . 
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C If 
O<C<f O< I < (a+o )K•'; f 
O<C<f (a+o )K1; 
O<C<f 0 
O<C<f O< I < (a+o )K·'; f 
O<C<f (a+o )K;'; 
O<C<f 0 
O<C<f O<I <(a+o)K1, f 
O<C<f (a+o )K,-; 
f-nid 0 
2 
f-nI 
d2 
O<I <(a+o)K1; f 
f - 71J 
d2 
(a+o )K1; 
O<C<f<nI 
d2 
0 
O<C <f-nI 
d2 
O<If<(a +o)K;'; 
O<C<f - nI 
d2 
(a+ o) K,'; 
f = F - F ' K + T(F ' 
- o)K f f 
= f ; If = 0 
q ::: 0 ; V = 0 
Since Id + Id = 0 
' 
Kd < 0 Therefore Al must be positive . l 2 
Then policy A is only consistent i n the region pF ' - A1 o < 0 ' A1 o that is , in the region F ' < U'(C) < 0 But the only feasible 
region of the phase diagram is F ' ::: o and therefore this policy 
is non-optimal . 
Then u sing this same reasoning , i t can be shown that policies Band 
Care also non-optimal . 
Policy D 
Id > 0 Id = 0 ; C > 0 ; l 2 
Then p = 0 m ~ 0 n = 0 V = 
and p = LJ I (c) 
Therefore Al = u I (C) 
' 
A2 = -q S 0 
and Al A2 = p - m 
But Al A2 = u I (C) + q 
So that q = -m 
But this is only possible if q = m = 0 
' 
that 
and A2 = 0 
Because A2 = 0 A2 = 0 Therefore policy D 
along the curve 
Tp(F' o) - zr1:' = 0 
That is , 
Policy E 
Id > 0 Id 
l 2 
Then p = 0 m ~ 0 
and 
Therefore 
K r1: ' f T = (F'-o) opt . 
= 0 ; C > 0 ; 
n = 0 V = 
p = u I (C) 
A 1 = U ' ( C ) and 
0 < If 
q = 0 
A = 0 2 
< 
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If = 0 
0 ; q ~ 0 
is if A = u I (C ) l 
is only optimal 
(a + o )K* 
Because A2 = 0 , A2 = 0 and policy Eis only consistent if 
T p ( F ' - o ) - zr ;': ' = 0 . 
That is , policy Eis only consistent if 
K r ;':' 
f 
Topt . = (F ' -o) 
Then policies E and Dare only consistent if they lie along 
r* = (l - T t )(F ' 
op . 
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Policy F 
Id > 0 Id = 0 ; C > 0 ; If = (a + o ) K~', l 2 
Then p = 0 m ~ 0 n = 0 q = 0 ; V ~ 0 
and p = u I (c) 
Therefore 
·\ = u I (c) and "2 = V ~ 0 
Also 
"l = -U ' (C)[F ' - oJ 
Therefore in the region F ' > o , ,-1 < 0 and thus policy Fis 
consistent only if ~ > 0 . 
Policy G 
Id = 0 Id > 0 ; C > 0 ; If = 0 l 2 
Then p ~ 0 m = 0 n = 0 q ~ 0 ; V = 0 
and p = u I (C) 
Therefore 
"1 s u I (c) and "2 s 0 
Because ,- 1 S U' (c) , ,-1 must be positive if policy G is to switch 
into any other policy or to take the economy to the endpoint . That 
'-10 
is , "l > 0 if F ' < -- < o . 
p 
Then policy G is non-optimal as the region F ' < o is not a feasible 
area of the phase diagram . 
Policy 
Then 
and 
There 
only if 
H 
Id = 0 Id 
l 
p ~ 0 m = 
p 
ore Al 
[1r + 1r ' I ] 
d2 
= 
s 
2 
0 
> 0 ; C > 0 ; 0 < If < (a + o )K;': 
n = 0 V = q = 0 
u I (C) 
u I ( C) 
"2 = 0 and "1 - "2 = U' (C)[1r + 1r ' Id J 
2 
Therefore policy His internally consistent 
is less than one . However from the discussion 
of n (Id ) when 
2 
Id > 0 and 
2 
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If> 0 , n must be greater than 
unity . Therefore policy His non-optimal . 
Policy I 
Id = 0 
l 
Then p ~ 0 
and p 
Id > 0 ; 
2 
m = 0 n 
= u ' Cc) 
C > 0 ; If = (et+ o )K1: 
= 0 q = 0 ; V ~ 0 
Therefore Al s U' (C) A2 ~ 0 and Al - A2 = U' (C)[n+n ' Id] 2 
But A -A =U ' (C)-p-vSU'(C) l 2 
internally consistent only if n S 1 
Therefore policy I is 
However from the discussion 
of the price n(Id ) 
2 
when If= (et+ o)K* and Id > 0 , n must 
2 
be> 1 . Therefore this policy is non-optimal . 
Policy J 
Id > 0 Id > 0 ; C > 0 ; If = 0 
1 2 
Then p = 0 m = 0 n = 0 V = 0 ; q ~ 0 
and p = u I (C) 
Therefore Al = u I (C) and A2 = -q 
Because A
2 
< 0 and Kf < 0 , A2 must be positive if it is to 
switch into any other policy or to take the system to the endpoint . 
Thus policy J can only switch into some other policy if 
region 
Policy K 
Then 
and 
1 [F ' - o J < K r;':' f 
Id > 0 Id 
l 2 
p = 0 m = 0 
> 
p = U' (C) 
Therefore Al = U' (C) 
0 
n 
That is , policy J is optimal in the 
; C > 0 ; 0 < If < ( Ct + o )K;': 
= 0 V = q = 0 
A2 = 0 and Al - A2 = U' (C)[n+n ' Id J 2 
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But Al - A2 = U'( C) . Therefore policy K is consistent only if 
n + n ' I = l and this occurs only at 
d2 
policy K is non-optimal . 
Policy L 
Id > 0 Id > 0 ; C > 0 
l 2 
Then p = 0 m = 0 n = 0 
and p = U' ( C) 
; 
Id = 0 • 
2 
I = f (a + 
Therefore 
o) Ki; 
q = 0 ; V ~ 0 
Therefore Al = U' ( C) A2 > 0 and Al - A2 = U' (C )[ n + n ' Id ] 
2 
But Al - A2 s u I (C) Therefore policy L is consistent only if 
1T < l But from the discussion of the price 1T when Id > 0 
2 
and If = (a + o) K~'; 
' 
1T must be > l. Therefore policy L is 
non-optimal . 
Policy M 
Id = 0 ; Id < 0 C > 0 If = 0 
l 2 
Then p ~ 0 m = 0 n = 0 q ~ 0 ; V = 0 
and p = U' ( C) 
Therefore Al s u I ( C) and A2 s 0 
Also Al = -[pf ' - Alo} 
Since Kd < 0 , Al must be positive . Then policy M can be consist-
ent only in the region F ' < o . But this region is not part of the 
feasible area of the phase diagram . Therefore policy Mis non-
optimal . 
Policy N 
Id = 0 Id < 0 ; C > 0 ; 0 < If < (a + o )Kr; 
l 2 
Then p ~ 0 m = 0 n = 0 q = V = 0 
and p = U' ( C) 
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Therefore Al:': U'( C) and A2 = 0 . 
Also Al= -[pF' - A1oJ . 
Since Kd < 0, Al must be positive . Then policy N is non-optimal 
for the same reason as policy Mis non-optimal. It can be shown 
that for the same reason policy O is also non-optimal . 
Policx: p 
Id > 0 Id < 0 ; C > 0 ; I = 0 
1 2 f 
Then p = 0 m = 0 n = 0 q ~ 0 ; V = 0 
and p = u I (C) 
Therefore Al = u I (C) A2 :': 0 and Al - A = U'{C)[n+ nid ] 2 2 
Since Al - A2 = U'(C) + q ~ U'{C) , [n + n'Id
2
J must be greater 
than one . But from the discussion of the price n(Id ) when 
2 
I = 0 and Id < 0, n must be less than unity . Therefore f 2 
policy Pis non-optimal . 
Policy Q 
Id > 0 Id < 0 ; C > 0 ; 0 < If < (a + o )K:': 1 2 
Then p = 0 m = 0 n = 0 q = V = 0 
and 
Therefore 
p=U '{ C) 
Al= U'(C) and = U'(C)[n+n'Id] 
2 
Since A - A2 = u I (C) 
' 
policy Q is consistent only if [n+n'Id J 1 
2 
equals one. But this is impossible unless Id = 0 Therefore 
2 
policy Q is non-optimal. 
Policy R 
Id > 0 Id < 0 ; C > 0 ; If = (a + o )K:': l 2 
Then p = 0 m = 0 n = 0 q = 0 ; V ~ 0 
and 
Therefore 
p = U' (C) 
Al= U' (C) and 
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= U' (C)[TT+TT ' I J 
d2 
, [TT+ TT ' Id J 
2 
TT(Id ) when 
2 
must be less than one . But 
from the discussion of I = (a+ o)K* and I < O f d 
TT must be> 1 . Therefore policy R is non-optirral . 
2 
Slopes of policies D and E 
If either policy Dor Eis to lie along the curve F ' - o = r;': + K r;':' 
f ' 
then the slope of the policy must equal that of the curve . 
The s l ope of F ' - o = 
appendix and is equal to -F" F"-2r ;': ' 
has been derived earlier in this 
That is , it is negative and 
lying between zero and minus one . 
dKf Kf If - oKf The slope of policy E is = ,-- = 
dKd Kd Id - oKd 
l 
Then If is positive and is such as to al low policy E to lie along 
F ' - 0 = r''; + K r;':' f 
The slope of policy Dis 
The slope of policy Dis steeper than that of policy E and D will 
be the optimal policy along that part or the curve F ' - o = r ;': + K r;': ' 
f 
which is too steep for policy E. It should be noted that policy D 
can switch i nto policy E a nd this will occur at a point along the 
- oK 
curve where its slope is equal to f It should be noted 
Id - oKd 
l 
that by choosing Id correctly , the curve F ' - 0 = r ;': + K r ;':' f l 
is never too steep for policy D. 
Possible policy switches 
The auxiliary variables are continuous functions of time . From the 
n 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality , 
A = -[pF ' - Ao] 1 1 
A = -[pT(F ' - o) + v(a + o) - zr* ' - Ao] 2 2 
Using hese relationships with the fact that A
2 
= 0 along 
F ' - o = r;': + r;': ' K it can be shown that the only possible policy f 
switches are policies F and J into either Dor E. 
Appendix No . 6 . 
Shapes of curves 
A. Both countries completely specialized 
E r;': 
r * = R - o - r *' K + 1 f D;',' 
1 
Differentiating totally , 
E 
r ;',' dK = R'(dK + dKf ) - (r;'," K + r ;'·' )dK + l ·'-' dK f d f f o;',' ro f 
Therefore R' 
E 
2r;':' - R ' - ;',,_!_ 
r o;':' 
1 dKf 
Thus -1 < -- < 0 . 
dKd 
1 
assuming r ;'," :t O • 
Since this curve is equivalent to r * = (1 - T)(R - o) with 
T > 0 , it lies completely below the curve r * = (R - o) . 
B. Home country completely specialized and foreign country incom-
pletely specialized 
Therefore dKf - R' 
dKd - -R ' + (r ;':• /;o:•,, 
1 
as dr* = 0 , and 
dKf 
- 1 with dK , when good 1 is labour- intensive 
dK d 
f 
abroad , is greater than -- , when good 1 is capital-intensive 
dKd 
abroad. 
If it is optimal for the home country to subsidise foreign invest-
ment , this curve lies above r * = R - o • Otherwise it lies below 
240 . 
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the curve r* - R - 6 . 
C. Home country incompletely specialized and foreign country 
completely specialized 
E r-1: 
1 
r:', = R - 6 - r * ' Kf + Df ' 
Differentiating totally , 
Er*' F 'r* 
r:': ' dKf = -(r:'," Kf + r;',' )dKf + ~f' dKf - ~f' (dKd + dKf) 
+ R'dp . 
From the tariff formula , 
-El 
= o~'; ' ' so that 
l 
F I 
l 
dp = D*' (dkd + dkf) for given p* . 
l 
= 
F '(R' - r;',) 
l Therefore 
dKd -F ' (R ' - r*) + 2r*' D* ' l l 
If good l is labour-intensive at home,then 
If good l is capital-intensive at home,then 
dKf 
when R' > r * in which case -- < -1 . 
dKd 
The curve R - 6 = 0 
Differentiating totally , 
R 'dp = 0 
From the optimal tariff formula , 
Therefore = -1. 
The curve r* = (R - 6) 
Differentiating totally , 
r;', ' dK = R 'dp . 
f 
From the optimal tariff formula , 
dKf 
O>-->l. 
dKd 
dKf 
0 > -- > -1 except 
dKd 
u 
D* ' r* ' dK = F ' R' l f l 
Therefore 
dK F ' R' f - l 
dKd - -F/R ' + Dfr~·,, 
If good l is capital-intensive at home 
dKf 
lies between O and -1 . dKd 
If good l is labour-intensive at home 
dKf 
0 > -- > -1 . 
dKd 
R ' > 0 F ' > 0 
' l 
R' < 0 F ' < 0 
' l 
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